Thursday, September 17, 2026

Communist Party of Peru: COURSE AND ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION WITHIN THE PARTY. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE LESSONS




Proletarians of all countries, unite!

 

COURSE AND ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION WITHIN THE PARTY. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE LESSONS


FROM THE REPORT BY CHAIRMAN GONZALO
2nd PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU


EXCERPT FROM THE PREPARATORY SESSION OF THE 2nd PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE



[Prepared for the Internet by the Peru People's Movement on the occasion of the 34th Anniversary of Chairman Gonzalo's Speech of September 24, 1992, and the 98th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of Peru, October 7, 1928]

 



COURSE AND ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION WITHIN THE PARTY.

 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE LESSONS


Throughout the history of our Party's development—and particularly during its reconstitution—we have always followed a process of ideological-political construction as the foundation, underpinning, and principal matter, alongside organizational construction; all of this has taken place amidst the class struggle and the two-line struggle. Regarding how this entire construction process is specifically defined, we conceive of it as having been achieved and concretized by and for the People's War. In this way, the construction principle we have followed—and will continue to use as a guide—was concretized within the Party.

   It is important to highlight how construction—specifically speaking of organizational construction—is preceded by an ideological-political foundation and has been carried out through intense struggle; only in this way have we generated an ideological-political leap to develop construction to a higher level.

   We must also bear in mind—as the Party's experience shows—that the old tends to re-establish itself, to manifest, and to persist amidst the new. Furthermore, all our construction work has always been guided by the fact that the Party’s task is to seize power; this has taken on greater significance over the last ten years due to the development of the people's war, which is increasingly giving shape to and developing the new power. Linked to this, the seizure of power must also lead us to the dictatorship of the proletariat; without that, our status as communists would not be clearly realized.

   Our entire process of construction has taken place—and continues to take place—amidst the struggle against contemporary revisionism. We must specify now that the central target of our attack—the great, sinister "black head"—is Gorbachev; the Political Bureau and the Central Committee must define this clearly. This entire struggle against revisionism, both nationally and internationally, is waged in defense of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. It is a matter of upholding, defending, and applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism—principally Maoism—and linked to this is the question of Gonzalo Thought. We must bear these things in mind and reaffirm that the question of construction—like the revolution as a whole—is determined by the just and correct ideological line. This implies that our construction work, like all Party work, is always based on the ideology of the proletariat and leads us toward proletarian internationalism.

   Our ideology demonstrates its magnificent continued relevance. We must see and understand that our construction work always rests on a solid foundation and that ideological-political work—along with a specific approach to construction—is indispensable for defining, concretizing, and realizing it in practice. A simple review of the documents allows us to understand that today we possess a more developed base and are engaged in more complex work; the conditions are in place, and the time has come to define a Strategic Plan Framework for Construction. We must work on this basis and implement it as a pilot plan; practice will then reveal what needs correction, allowing us to finalize the plan. We must then carry out the construction work necessary to seize power as thoroughly as possible, with the utmost tenacity and effort, for this is an indispensable requirement for seizing power throughout the entire country.

 In short: The watchword "Build the conquest of power!" addresses the challenge of generating, developing, and forging the entire organizational apparatus—one that is superior to that of the reactionary forces and capable of rising to the level of the political leadership required to lead us to the conquest of power across the entire country. Comrade Stalin, following Lenin, stated: first, elevate the organizational structure to the level of political leadership; and second, select the leaders necessary to develop that entire system and thus manage, with correct and sound guidance, the great task of conquering power throughout the country.

THE PROCESS THAT UNFOLDED WITHIN THE PARTY


   The documents from the early days of the "Red Faction" in the 1960s are very revealing. If we look at Red Flag (Bandera Roja) No. 1—even the cover, which features the hammer and sickle in honor of May Day—we see clearly defined positions. This is evident in the faction's foundational party documents. On page 2, regarding social classes, we begin with a quote from Marx to elaborate on the issue of social classes. The quote refers to the fact that the only true revolution is the communist one; this appears in *Bandera Roja* No. 1 (Ayacucho, 1963). This is how the faction began to define our ideological-political conception. On page 4, in the article titled "Peasants," there is a quote from Lenin addressed to the rural poor—a quote perfectly suited to today's peasantry. In 1963—a time when the peasant movement was at the forefront and the century's largest simultaneous peasant mobilization was taking place (a stark contrast to the current situation), and when the debate centered on how to enact agrarian reform—the faction argued in that article that the revolution would proceed from the countryside to the city; this was a crucial point. It established a clear position regarding the path of the revolution, the peasantry, and the worker-peasant alliance, while opposing Belaúnde’s "pickaxes and bullets" plan. Page 5 discusses the revolution and Marx’s thesis on the clash between productive forces and relations of exploitation—a quote drawn from *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.

It also addresses the concept of a revolutionary situation, drawing on Lenin. Since the 1960s, our Party has maintained a clear understanding of what constitutes a revolutionary situation. We have always grounded ourselves in global experience and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism—as it was termed at the time. The text addresses the question of the path to be taken in Peru, a subject of debate within the Party regarding the so-called "paths." Our position was unequivocal: the only path is revolutionary violence and a revolution moving from the countryside to the city. It includes a vital quote from Marx regarding insurrection—emphasizing that it is not something to be trifled with and must be carried through to completion. We were not yet familiar with the writings of Chairman Mao, though the quotations from Marx remain entirely valid. We asserted our obligation to serve the world revolution by defending Marxism and supporting the great struggles taking place at that time. We also stated that we could not dream of a quick victory for the revolution and that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the necessary path of the proletarian revolution.

   These are highly significant points. Without political-ideological foundations, one cannot forge a path forward; it is decisive. We only came to understand later that Chairman Mao had elevated this to the highest level. April 1964, *Bandera Roja* No. 4: It extends greetings to the proletariat for May Day and calls for leadership based on Marxism-Leninism—based on its ideology. It also speaks of unions of all kinds—class-conscious unions—and the ironclad unity of the proletariat and peasantry centered on the worker-peasant alliance to unite the masses; that is how the revolution is made. Where do they get the idea that we are sectarians or opposed to unions? The issue is that we want *authentic* unions. We want to transform the existing ones into authentic ones, because we cannot leave them in the hands of traitors. "Reconstitution of a true national class-conscious and proletarian central organization, free of traitors and capitulationists." That is what we want. Authentic unions are being forged—give it time; decades and centuries condense into days, and while many things are swept away, what remains is the class-conscious, proletarian element. Our idea of ​​undermining them from below was intended to bring about this great condensation—and this does not mean we intend to wait long years for it to happen. We oppose the notion of a worker-peasant-student alliance; one cannot simply alter the fundamental nature of things. It calls for an awareness of the class's historical role. 

   There is also an article regarding the nature of the Belaúnde government in *Bandera Roja* No. 6. We unmasked its class character—stating that it could not represent the exploited classes—just one year into his administration; this did not imply it belonged to the national bourgeoisie. The issue lay in the struggle between the Ayacucho Regional Committee and the national leadership, which maintained that Belaúnde represented the national bourgeoisie. It was a fierce battle over the "Peasants" article and the stance on Belaúnde, as the article advocated for land seizures and exposed the government's true nature. This took place in August 1964; although revisionism had been ousted in January 1964, the document from the Fourth National Conference still characterized Belaúnde’s government as belonging to the national bourgeoisie and advocated a policy of "unity and struggle" with it—showing that the same revisionist position persisted within the Party.

   Editorial. Page 12. It discusses the Party and the task of seizing power and leading the people toward the socialist revolution; that was the meaning behind the slogan "Through revolution to socialism," as opposed to the view that a gradual evolution was possible—a position we did not share. These documents are very important; they outline how the faction began to carry out its work. On that basis, we swept away revisionism in Ayacucho—not a trace was left; that is clear and concrete—we wiped it out. The famous "Chinese Letter" of June 14, 1963—a happy coincidence with the anniversary of Mariátegui’s birth—served as a weapon of combat.

It shows us that we have advanced based on ideological-political principles, through a two-line struggle against revisionism and class struggle—the principal foundation upon which the Party is built. It also shows us that forming and developing a Party is no simple matter; a mere handful is enough to undertake the construction of a Party so that it may develop and grow, and the issue is not how long one will last. Mariátegui taught us to fulfill our day's work—nothing more.

   The year '65. Page 14: "On the Party, its principles and objectives." This appears in the first article of the new Statutes drafted after we broke with revisionism and held the Fifth National Conference in September 1965. The task of drafting the Statutes was entrusted to the speaker (Chairman Gonzalo, who delivered the report to the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee in 1990). It states there that the Communist Party of Peru is the party of the working class, its organized vanguard. Its ideological basis is Marxism-Leninism. Violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. A war to the death against contemporary revisionism in defense of Marxism and the national and international revolution. Pages 16 through 20 contain a very important article in which we state that Mariátegui’s line should never have been abandoned and that it had to be developed.

   In *Bandera Roja* No. 21, there is an article titled "Túpac Amaru: Revolutionary People's Hero." His figure has often been exploited for political ends; we are accused of not basing our work on history, but the proof is right here: we analyzed him and drew lessons from what we describe there as the greatest social movement in the Americas to date. We have re-examined Túpac Amaru at the 8th Plenum and drawn military lessons. What lessons does the MRTA draw?

   On page 24—in the article "July 28th: ​​Last Day of Despotism and First Day of the Same" from the July 1966 issue of *Bandera Roja*—it states that nothing changed; the same exploiting class remained. There is also the matter of the democratic revolution led by the Communist Party and the people's war. Page 29: "Chairman Mao: A Man of Thought and Action." Page 29: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, from which concrete lessons are drawn. Page 31: The PCP and clandestine work.

   There is no Communist Party without clandestine work. That is made very clear in *Bandera Roja* No. 28 (January 1967). I wrote that; I was the Secretary of Education and Organization for the Central Committee. There is a solid basis for this. The Party must be clandestine because we have to seize power and overthrow them; the PCP draws upon itself the implacable hatred of the oppressors, who seek to destroy it by every possible means—primarily by mobilizing the State's repressive bureaucratic apparatus. This holds true regardless of whether reactionaries employ a "soft-hand" tactic in one period and a "hard-hand" one in another. These shifts are merely different methods toward the same end: thwarting the revolution by annihilating the Party of the proletariat—the only Party capable of carrying the revolution through to the end. That is the reason the Party must be clandestine. When we looked at the issue of arrests and setbacks, we noted that the root cause is often overlooked; people fail to see the ideological-political foundation or the very purpose of the Party. It develops by carrying out both clandestine and open work; these are not new problems. Twenty-three years later, we are still putting forward the same position, yet there are comrades who do not understand it this way. How, then, are we to achieve the seizure of power? Will it not inevitably involve a most ferocious struggle?

   Page 35: “Let us put an end to counter-revolutionary sanctification.” This refers to which day should be celebrated: Mariátegui’s birth or his death. Revisionists make pilgrimages on the anniversary of his death every year. According to Marxism, the birth dates of leaders are what should be celebrated.

  Page 31: “Develop the Marxist-Leninist thought of our founder” and “Shining guide.” It upholds Mariátegui. We have a long history regarding how we began and developed; that initial struggle—combating revisionism, defending Marxism, and organizing the Ayacucho Regional Committee—demonstrates the ideological-political and organizational connection.

   All of this leads to a specific situation. In September 1967, measures were proposed to advance organizational building. This is found in the pamphlet containing the faction's documents. It was proposed during a session of the Expanded Political Commission and approved because no alternative was presented. These were fundamental measures required to sweep away the remnants of revisionism; we considered how to conduct open work, trade union work, and united front work—since the work is both open and involves armed force (ultimately, the Army is a form of front with arms in hand). Regarding the Party: organizational forms and forms of struggle. One cannot work effectively without a good method of leadership—without democratic centralism, without strategic centralization and the decentralization of functions. Policies are centralized, while functions are decentralized. Work style.

   It states: “Develop the struggle on all fronts to align the organizational structure with the political line.” The Party must be prepared for when the moment arrives, because once the moment is upon us, it is too late to prepare; the phrase “taking up arms during the next revolutionary upsurge of the masses” is underscored. Also underscored are: “leading the struggle against revisionism—that opportunism which threatens to corrode our ranks”; “focusing Party work on the countryside to deepen peasant struggles”; and “developing the armed force as the Party’s principal task.” The question of how to carry this out is raised.

   The National Leadership must move to the countryside. A partial relocation is feasible for the time being. Regional leaders must go to the countryside. Implement the new organizational system organically, prioritizing the highland committees. A systematic education campaign. Cadre training is decisive. The ideological basis of the campaign is the Thought of Comrade Mao Tsetung. Redistribution of Party cadres. The Central Committee must dedicate itself to the work 24 hours a day. Expansion of the Political Commission. Military Commission; comrades dedicated primarily to military issues. Regional leadership based on members of the National Leadership, selected by the National Leadership. Open work and secret work, both political and military. Purge the ranks through work. Political Commissar. Military work zones. The press, agitation, and propaganda are of paramount importance; the key aspects are drafting and control—because that is where the line resides—rather than the printing itself, though printing is necessary. Fill gaps in the united front and trade union sectors. Peasant work: an assessment and the center of our attention. Guidelines regarding the Communist Youth; the Party directs it. All of the above demands the bold and firm promotion of cadres.

   Economically, rely on one's own efforts. Bear in mind that the Party will become Bolshevized and create the powerful organs of the revolution only through armed struggle. "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Deepen the internal struggle through the expanded Political Commission. Security Commission.

   What matters is seeing how this entire ideological-political debate—establishing ideological-political foundations—leads to organizational questions and organizational construction. This situation meant that some Central Committee members would step down because they were not working full-time; the issue of cadre distribution and ending personal squabbles aimed to place armed force at the center, all in preparation for war. This sparked an intense internal struggle; indeed, page 2 of that same supplement contains the directive: "Develop the internal struggle thoroughly within revolutionary practice." An entire ideological process leads to an organizational issue, which in turn gives rise to an internal struggle for its development.

   At another juncture, “Mariátegui established the General Political Line of the Peruvian revolution.” Back then, there was a political line. Arriving at this point required internal struggle—specifically, one of the struggles most sordidly conducted by Paredes’s liquidationism. It involved the issue of *Patria Roja*, which was mishandled. It led to a split in the Party because Paredes orchestrated a plan to blow the Party apart by cunningly manipulating a police crackdown. The Party fractured because the political line and ideological unity were not clearly defined; there was Castroism, Maoism was being questioned, and Mariátegui was being rejected. Paredes believed he had created the line himself, so speaking of Mariátegui was seen as opposing the Secretary.

   It was proven that there was a strong committee—the Ayacucho Regional Committee—that stood up to him. The Party shattered; we were reduced to just one committee, whereas there had been dozens across the country.

   Declaration of the 2nd Plenum (1970). When the Party fractured, few of us remained—just a handful—so the issue isn't how many there are, but whether or not you are committed. In February 1970, the cadres adopted this declaration. The Declaration defined the character of the ruling State and government as fascist and corporatist, and outlined how we had to proceed with development—starting by unmasking the liquidationist line. It called to “reconstitute the Party on the basis of Party unity”—a concept dating back to 1967, as seen in the aforementioned documents. Once again, there was an ideological-political rationale (see page 55).

3rd Plenum of the Central Committee (1973). “On Reconstitution.” The shift occurred starting in 1970; we focused on defending the Party’s existence, and by 1973 that phase had concluded. Our task then became to expand and develop the Party, which required political foundations. Analytical outline, page 125. Just as today we propose political foundations for the conquest of power nationwide—for the Strategic Construction Plan. Regarding the political foundations of the reconstitution, we thus established the ideological-political and economic bases. 

This process also unfolded amidst an internal struggle to establish those ideological-political foundations, yet we took a crucial step: we defeated left-wing liquidationism. We entered 1976, and it became evident that the Party possessed a General Political Line; that was when we released "Let Us Return to Mariátegui and Reconstitute His Party." *Bandera Roja* No. 45—bearing that same title—contained a very important compilation of documents, as the material had previously been little known. Furthermore, the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee had taken place; the documentation served to underpin the drive for reconstitution and to analyze the political situation within the Party. It is worth paying attention to the editorial, as it explains the path we took. The guiding principle from the very beginning was not merely to return to Mariátegui, but to further develop his ideas. We observe the steps taken and the function fulfilled: having waged the struggle and secured an ideological-political document, we proceeded to drive the reconstitution forward—once again demonstrating the parallel development of the ideological, political, and organizational spheres.

   The year 1975. "Voz Popular No. 5." It is an important document regarding bureaucratic capitalism. In 1976, "Allpa" (May 1969)—a report titled "Program and Tasks" from the Ayacucho Peasant Convention—was reprinted. The peasant issue was pivotal in the struggle against Paredes; he proposed expropriation, whereas our position was confiscation—that is where the distinction lay. It was reprinted because the "Leftist liquidationists"—specifically Montañéz—advocated conducting peasant work through existing peasant organizations in Lima, focusing on narrow demands and *Tahuantinsuyo*-based criteria.

   In May 1969, the Party posited that a new agrarian law was coming and that the path of bureaucratic capitalism was the only one that could be followed. The law was enacted on June 24, 1969. But what happened between May and June of 1969? Some time earlier, the Party had created the Ayacucho People's Defense Front—a decision made by the Secretariat at the time. The Front was anchored in the neighborhoods; the Party organized the Congress of neighborhoods and shantytowns in Ayacucho, building upon earlier struggles to defend University funds. We had strength in Ayacucho and leveraged that University struggle alongside the Neighborhood Federation. This Party-led Front waged a struggle against Supreme Decree 06 regarding the education issue. Ayacucho was the epicenter of this struggle, giving rise to the Revolutionary Front of Secondary Students (FRES). The movement grew, and many young people were dispatched as delegates to various provinces—Huanta, Cangallo, Huancayo, Fajardo, Huancavelica, and Apurímac. The struggle for education—supported by the people and led by the Party—achieved a major victory and dealt the first defeat to the fascist regime. Now, there are those who wish to exploit this for their own ends; what the liquidationists sought was to undermine and abort both the struggle and the Party. The source of this opportunism is Aracelio Castillo. Now, where are the liquidationists? We are seizing Power. 

   Research plan. July 1977. Investigation of peasant labor. This is how we are advancing. We already have the foundations of the Mariátegui line and a developed situation; we have the basis established by the 1973 reconstitution; in 1975, we pushed for reconstitution; and in 1976, a process began of organizing and developing work in Lima. (Lima served as the base for organizing the Party at the national level—everything in its proper place). Because there was an ideological-political foundation—the Mariátegui line was already in place—subsequent development led us to the issue of construction, which was then expanded to the national level; this can be seen in the 6th Plenary Session of the Central Committee.

   6th CC Plenary, Dec. 1976. It was one of the most heated sessions we ever held, yet we made significant progress. The central report—specifically Part III of the session’s agenda—presented the "Report on Construction," which comprised six sections: Marxism and construction; construction in the country and the Mariátegui path; the problem of construction; generated organizations; problems regarding the internal struggle; and current construction tasks. There was also a co-report outlining guidelines for the Organization Department, covering nine points; leadership is always the key factor. Among the resolutions was a decision to convene the 7th Plenary to address the National Construction Plan, as further progress had been stalled by the internal struggle.

   Following the process that began with the 2nd and 3rd Plenaries and the documents of 1975, we dedicated ourselves to construction. This implies that the foundation is ideological-political, accompanied simultaneously by organizational construction; however, there are moments when construction becomes a fundamental, substantive issue that must be elevated to the level of political leadership.


   7th Plenary Session. April 1977: “On the 7th Plenary Session of the PCP Central Committee”—a preparatory document for the event. Political Bureau. It addresses “Internal struggle and construction”; the internal struggle had erupted during the 6th Plenary Session, with rightism present in both the countryside and the cities. “Current problems of construction” and “7th CC Plenary Session.” The 7th Plenary Session must be guided by the principle: ‘Build in service of the armed struggle.’ Content of the Plenary Session. The guiding principle and the aim of the plenary session have been stated; at certain moments, construction becomes the substantive issue.

   7th Plenary Session. May 1977: “Develop construction—primarily of the Party—in service of the armed struggle!” Plenary Session document. Part I. There, in the preliminary report, point 3: “Path to follow: National Plan for Construction in Service of the Armed Struggle.” Part III: “Develop construction—primarily of the Party—in service of the armed struggle”—this is the central part; specifically, point 5: “Work Plan.”

   In this document, we have transcribed notes from the Standing Committee’s debate, where various ideas were raised. For example: “Must construction work involve a struggle against revisionism?” or “The issue of construction is rarely addressed—why?” These are very useful questions for effectively guiding an event; it is a good habit. It would be beneficial for the Political Bureau to apply this system—adding notes, questions, and points to highlight or develop in the margins—as it contributes to a richer outcome. This summary is excellent, and such summaries should be produced for every event. Syntheses and summaries—see page 5 of the document, where the following is raised: two lines; a contrary line regarding organization is already beginning to take shape; it will develop, and subsequently, lines regarding other fronts will be presented; fundamentally, it is being designed. We must ensure a repeat of ’68 does not occur. A split—the line is antagonistic; it must be dismantled. At the 6th Plenum, a line contrary to the correct one regarding the peasant question was presented; a contrary line is already developing regarding Party building; as the fronts unfold, further contrary lines will emerge; and underlying all of this is a contrary political line and a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois conception. We are liquidating liquidationism in order to wage a two-line struggle against revisionism as the principal danger. What is the situation today? 4th Resolution: National Construction Plan and the Outline of the Construction Plan.

   Part II: Marxism and Party building, and the 26 problems of Party building. Although the National Construction Plan had been approved, it posed a challenge because the task of implementing it lay ahead—a situation that could face us today.

   Part III: National Construction Plan. It comprises 16 points, ranging from ideology to the specific organizational goal to be realized. Part IV: Work Plan, general and specific tasks, and guidelines. The 7th Plenum produced several documents—foundational materials—as these issues of Party building require this type of documentation.

   *Bandera Roja* No. 46, p. 19: "On Party Building." This is a very important document; we must keep it in mind, as it will be useful to us. *Bandera Roja* Nos. 47–48: Declaration of the 6th and 7th Plenums of the Central Committee. "Develop Party building—principally the Party itself—in service of the armed struggle." This is extremely important; it is key because it provides direction for the struggle, defines situations, and sets out conditions for how to build—relying on the masses and guided by politics—while ultimately framing the approach to ideology.

   In 1977, clear foundations were laid for how to carry out organizational building. We are going to engage in the struggle—in how to develop this building process. The 8th Plenum is very important. Let us recall that a body of work regarding "generated organizations" had been developed—work closely linked to that of the Metropolitan Committee; by analyzing the Metropolitan Committee's documents, we can find valuable experience. Furthermore, there was an important event—a national meeting of generated organizations; documents from that meeting also exist and can be very useful for our mass work and for driving forward the building plan in connection with the masses. We should also remember the National Cadre School held around June 1977; following the 7th Plenum, that School served to prepare the contingent of cadres destined for deployment nationwide.

   The 8th Plenum is of great importance and offers us valuable lessons. It is important to highlight the work carried out in political meetings during the year leading up to the event; issues of organizational building were addressed there as well. We must also look at the work of the Propaganda and Front Departments regarding building; the work of Propaganda is indispensable—in this instance, it played a key role regarding documentation—and the Front is also an instrument we must develop; it is important to consider what we emphasize regarding front work linked to the masses.

   Meeting of the Enlarged Political Bureau, September 1977. The 5th Congress was prepared here. Regarding organizational building, what interests us—and what we wish to highlight—are the agreements reached at that meeting. When the draft plan for the 5th Congress was presented, Point II proposed the following: to complete the reconstitution and lay the foundations for developing the armed struggle. To build with the armed struggle in mind. The second point is of paramount importance—"laying the foundations for developing the armed struggle"—because the goal of "completing reconstitution" had to be defined specifically as laying the groundwork for the armed struggle. The Party exists to seize Power, and once reconstituted, the Party had to initiate the armed struggle; thus, the relationship is established: laying the foundations for a new period of developing the armed struggle. One period has ended, and another must begin: the armed struggle. That is why it is of such significance.

   Bringing this to fruition and laying the groundwork will sharply intensify the struggle, as it entails a crucial qualitative leap. The comrades who had deployed following that School were gathered in November 1977 to conduct an assessment of the organizational building process. The key aspect here lies in Point 2—Implementation of the National Construction Plan—which mandates adherence to said plan and establishes that organizational building is a matter of developing the Party, the United Front, and the armed struggle. The directive for Regional Committees is to build with the aim of INITIATING THE ARMED STRUGGLE and establishing a Support Base; the regional bodies are conceived with this objective in mind.

   The Political Bureau meeting speaks of laying the groundwork to initiate the armed struggle, yet here it explicitly states "initiate"—which requires setting a timeframe—and this will further intensify the struggle. The approach to the zones is also important; one must consider the specific characteristics of each zone and recognize the distinctions between them today. It refers to "organized zones" and "zones under organization"; regarding the latter, it distinguishes between zones where work is just beginning, zones with initial work, and zones with prior work. Developing zones to support national construction means that organized zones must be developed, and this requires support from the entire national system. In zones under organization, regional construction must be developed as the foundation for national construction. This is a sound specification of how to differentiate—and how each type requires specific approaches—to serve the National Construction Plan. A guideline for the cities is also proposed: build in a way that supports the Initiation of the Armed Struggle and fosters the accumulation of forces. Naturally, this point also sparked debate, as some comrades believed the cities were to remain on the sidelines. While the "countryside-city" framework is not yet fully articulated, it is significant because it links the city to the process; it calls for supporting the ILA and the accumulation of forces with the ultimate goal of insurrection. It posits peasant work as the foundation of construction. Countryside and city. The issue of the Framework is taking shape.

   The relevant point concerns the National Construction Plan and the five-year period. It establishes a relationship between the Construction Plan and the five-year timeframe, mandating the plan's implementation within that period. This dates back to November 1977; implementation began in 1980, within the established timeframe.

   Lesson: Construction – War – Period. A profound analysis and a far-sighted plan that set a specific timeframe for the initiation to materialize. Today, we are entering a new period; this also requires a profound analysis and a far-sighted plan for the period—aimed at the seizure of power—with great flexibility regarding the encroachment of imperialism. Yet, this does not negate the need for a defined period. When a period is established, one is prepared for when the situation arises.

    A few words on the National Cadre School. It represents an important lesson, for it is essential to prepare cadres—a contingent, and above all, cadres. Indeed, forging cadres is integral to the "three bases and three guides." Eight topics were covered. This School is dedicated to the work of construction.
 

   Regarding "The United Front and Construction": the issue of tactics is a key aspect of the political line; it concerns which classes are to be grouped together. The debate centered on which tactics to apply and which classes to rally. We concluded that the Party line—Mariátegui’s line—defined a united front strategy that entailed uniting forces up to and including the middle or national bourgeoisie, yet under the leadership of the proletariat—the Party. This line was subsequently abandoned—a grave error that was rectified at the 5th National Conference in 1965. There, we concluded that the task was to unite four classes based on the worker-peasant alliance, incorporating the petty bourgeoisie; this forms the constant core of the United Front in the revolution, whereas the national bourgeoisie remains vacillating until the moment it eventually joins the revolutionary cause.

   Opportunist practice has supported the big bourgeoisie—or a faction thereof—while claiming to support the middle or national bourgeoisie; this constitutes the deviation regarding the united front issue—a rightist deviation that has persisted since the 1930s. If one looks at the 4th National Conference of 1962, support was given to the faction of the big bourgeoisie that was driving industrialization. This was the most important debate we had regarding the United Front—a key tactical question within the overall line. It concerns the application of the line during a specific phase of the revolution—within the revolution's overall strategy and character; yet, no tactical variation can run counter to the revolution's character or lead to supporting the revolution's enemies. While strategy and phase may allow for variations, any such shift must remain consistent with the character of the democratic revolution. The challenge lies in managing contradictions within the big bourgeoisie, given that it contains factions linked to imperialism that vie for hegemony. This is an issue we would need to analyze should direct or indirect intervention by imperialism—specifically the United States—materialize. It is a key issue.

   Many questions were raised, such as: "Would imperialism intervene?" At the heart of this lies a failure to recognize the role of imperialism as an aggressor—the reality of a world divided into oppressed nations and aggressor states seeking to carve up the globe as spoils. The case of Cuba is exceptional. We maintain that imperialism always intervenes, either directly or indirectly; events demonstrate that when direct intervention is not feasible due to unfavorable circumstances, they resort to every possible means to crush a government that does not suit their interests. Thus, we see that fundamental issues are at stake when the question of the united front is raised: "Is the national bourgeoisie vacillating?" "Does that mean it stands on the sidelines or somewhere in the middle?" That is not the case; one does not stand on the sidelines or in the middle—it means either trailing behind the reaction or siding with the revolution. These matters are linked to the country's long tradition of right-wing "frontism."

   From these debates, one arrives at the line that is key to construction. Another question arises: "Is Mariátegui’s thought being developed or not?" We were discussing construction when an ideological-political problem emerged—a political blow against the development of the line. The conclusion drawn is this: opposing the development of the line is tantamount to opposing the reconstitution itself. It was not merely a matter of stopping the reconstitution from reaching completion; it was opposition to the reconstitution process itself, given that it has unfolded based on a developed line.  Regarding organizational matters—specifically open versus clandestine work—the main opposition to completing the reconstitution lies in focusing on the masses and on "generated organizations." To treat clandestine work as the primary issue is to oppose the construction of the Party; it aims to negate the Party. Negating the Party amounts to seeking its destruction. In whose service? Do they want a different kind of Party? If they do not want a Communist Party, it would have to be of a different nature.

   The issue is one of ideological line; when dealing with problems of construction—and delving deeper into them—the question of the line inevitably surfaces, as it is the foundation. The theory of leadership figures is also debated: do they question all of them? And to what end? To replace them with careerism and revisionism. This represents a right-wing opportunist organizational line following a political opportunist line; issues of mere "demandism" arise, as do problems linked to day-to-day policies—such as asking, "Is a state monopoly better than a non-state one?" The fundamental problem is that they are monopolies.

   All this demonstrates that underlying organizational problems are issues of political-ideological line. This leads us to two questions that must be resolved: the characteristics of the opposing line currently taking shape—an opportunist line within the organization—and how to carry out the work of construction.


Meeting with the Propaganda Department

   Failure to pay attention to construction. Propaganda work comes to the fore because the conception, the line, and the policy must be disseminated. Is it necessary for every militant to align with the 6th and 7th Plenums? It is indispensable and imperative, especially given that some are beginning to clash with the directives of those Plenums. A quote from Stalin regarding the dangerous turn facing those not firmly attached to the Party's cause. Like the Party as a whole, the Propaganda Department must operate based on the political line and the goal of completing the reconstitution; it must apply the National Construction Plan to its propaganda work. This is a crucial period, as the construction work is aimed at launching the armed struggle.

   The National Construction Plan will be developed through a struggle against the old, familiar plan—and even against the transitional plan we are implementing as a pilot project. This pilot plan faces opposition precisely because it is new, while the old plan is accepted simply because it is old. The transitional plan is proving successful; although the new elements predominate, they carry over some of the old, and some people wish to remain in that transitional stage. The old ways will be reinforced in their tendency to persist by the weight of tradition regarding established forms of organization and struggle—we must not forget the colossal heap of rubbish involved. The new Plan will prevail; the new always asserts itself through struggle.

   The Propaganda Department itself adopted a new national construction plan for the department. All apparatuses must align themselves accordingly. The lesson here is that a department—or any apparatus—must adjust and have its own National Construction Plan. This illustrates how an apparatus must serve the National Construction Plan; otherwise, it cannot fulfill its task.

Assessment of construction work

   Why did the issue of the opposing line within the peasant movement emerge as a fundamental question during the 6th Plenary Session? The Sixth [Congress] pointed toward the National Construction Plan, because the foundation of our construction work is peasant work—this is crucial! The peasantry is the principal force; the revolution depends on their positioning. Would the struggle be based on the peasant question? Yes, and this is a fundamental issue for the reconstitution of the Party, for its culmination, and for laying the groundwork. What has been the basis of the most important struggles within the Party? All of them had, have, and will continue to have the peasant question as their foundation. That is clear-cut. Today, regarding the issue of the war: the war is based on the peasantry; it is the same.

   Construction. Uneven development is a law. Generalize and differentiate. Generalize for the entire country and differentiate for the regions; the same applies within each region—at the zonal level or the departmental level. Failure to grasp this firmly stems from a root cause: holding a contrary line; consequently, there is neither the will nor the ability to grasp it firmly. The issue is a matter of degree. There is a specific circumstance explaining why the existence of a contrary line is posited.

   Organization. Open work and secret work. How do the united front, armed struggle, and the Party take concrete form today? What is the relationship between them? Reconstituting the Party from the countryside; laying the foundation for construction work in the countryside to follow the path of encircling the cities from the countryside in order to implement the line. It is through the application of this path that the Party, the Army, the United Front, and State Power take concrete form. Regarding the Party, there are two aspects: one is the Right (revisionism), and the other is the Left (Mariátegui’s line and its development). Which aspect predominates is decisive. The Left predominates.

   A magnificent relationship. It could be framed this way: a contrary conception implies a contrary line, a contrary tactic, a contrary organizational line, a contrary construction plan, and a contrary work plan. This applies to the Party, and equally to the Front, the Armed Struggle, Mass Work, etc., etc. To everything. In the case of the Right, it is the opposite: a Marxist conception implies a general political line, a Marxist tactic, an organizational line to seize power, a construction plan, a work plan, and the seizure of power. The Left predominates; that is why we are advancing.

   Reflection. What is the 5-year plan for? To concretize the National Construction Plan; to build with the aim of initiating the armed struggle. This defines the period: if you are prepared and the opportunity arises, you seize Power; otherwise, you will go on dreaming.

Assessment of the Front Department

   How the Front operates within the National Construction Plan and how it must reorganize.

   United Front and General Political Line: National Democratic Revolution. Developing and forging itself within the General Political Line. What trend within the Front has predominated in the country? If we do not approach the united front according to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Mariátegui’s line and its development, an opportunist line will continue to prevail within the Front; consequently, we will end up trailing behind the big bourgeoisie. This issue is fully relevant to us today: the peasant movement and the question of tactics. The choice lies between capitulating to the big bourgeoisie or allying with the poor peasantry—specifically forging a worker-peasant alliance—to ensure proletarian hegemony and advance the revolutionary path. It involves struggles for specific demands viewed through the lens of Power; it is the practical application of the Marxist thesis that Power is the central issue.
National Plan for Generated Organizations. This covers the development of these generated organizations—their trajectory and role, political-ideological development, principles and program, organizational structure, leadership, national-level development, mass work, conventions, events, and propaganda. It concludes with guidelines on how to develop these generated organizations. It was a very important meeting. Today, as we hold Power, keeping these matters in mind provides a solid foundation for our work. The various mass fronts are specified—five fronts and their associated generated organizations—noting that neglecting them amounts to neglecting mass work itself.

   Circular of March 1978. Problems began to intensify further. The Party distributed a circular to the rank-and-file in March 1978, stating that all work had to be carried out within the concrete, day-to-day class struggle—thereby serving the ILA (Initiation of Armed Struggle); "initiation" was the crucial point, the target to aim for.

   A circular to the rank-and-file followed in June 1978; both were signed by the Organization Department. It was this Department's responsibility to oversee the organization's progress, ranging from political matters to organizational issues. This circular warned that, despite the agreement reached, a tendency toward "sitting back" [passivity] was emerging. It was an unstructured tendency, but if it were to take hold, it would become a counter-line; the circular called for transformation in order to serve the revolution and fight against revisionism.

   This fell within the purview of the Organization Department—the function served by such circulars: communicating Party directives, identifying problems, and outlining how to correct them.

    In this way, the Left was laying the groundwork.

8th Plenum, July 1978

   The Party stood on the brink of a split, with two-thirds of the Central Committee wavering. One-third maintained a firm position; through astute and decisive struggle, they imposed conditions, set the course, and overcame the difficult crisis we were facing.

   July 11: Assessment of four aspects of Party building—ideological-political building, organizational building, and the development of class struggle among the masses. July 13: The Leadership intervened to state that the 5th Congress could not be held on the scheduled date. July 14, 1978: Review of the fourth aspect of Party building—building the Party and the two-line struggle.

   The Leadership summarized the five problems that had arisen: 1) Ideological: Armed struggle as the concrete expression of violence; 2) Political: The general political line and its development; 3) Organizational: Developing Party building in support of armed struggle, based on the peasant question; 4) In the class struggle of the masses, mobilize the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat—represented by the Party—and 5) the two-line struggle: avert the prospect of stagnation, correct deviations, and sweep away revisionism. It is very useful to draw distinctions—stagnation, correcting deviations, and then sweeping away revisionism—so that a clear position can be taken.

   The Leadership insists on the issue of construction and the implementation of the National Construction Plan, while criticizing anarchist and anarcho-socialist views. The meeting begins to run into difficulties; a sense of pessimism begins to set in.

   On July 22, seven preliminary issues are raised, including the need to reframe the content of the 8th Enlarged Plenum. The proposed focus is "building in support of the armed struggle" and "developing construction—primarily of the Party—within the class struggle of the masses"—two slogans endorsed by the 6th and 7th Plenums; it was clearly stated that the opposing views ran counter to the 6th and 7th Plenums. The agenda is proposed: 1) International situation; 2) Economic situation and the 4-to-5-year period (the challenge being to initiate action); 3) Political situation and the period (the challenge being how to maneuver within that period); 4) Assessment of the Reconstitution. The ILA [Initiation of the Armed Struggle] framework. Spot on! A leadership cannot abandon its goals—that is what leaders are for. Then, point 6) Assessment of the Construction Plan, and point 8) The 5th Congress. Measures and tasks. This is where the decision is made; the game is quite simple: the issue has been framed as whether or not to go against the Plenums. So, where does one turn? That is for each person to consider.

   On July 23, the Leadership presented a report on Construction based on construction principles established by Chairman Mao, Lenin, and Stalin; a key point concerned the construction plan and contradictions, raising the issue of the balance of the reconstitution. Point 3 of the Construction Plan addressed the armed struggle. OUTLINE FOR ARMED STRUGGLE: development moves from countryside to city. The countryside is primary; the city is complementary. Definitions and five key issues were outlined.

   On July 25, the Leadership stated that the majority are leftists who desire revolution. It is very positive to see reality acknowledged and reflected. A debate ensued. The Leadership intervened, noting that the underlying reason for the prolonged preparatory phase was the belief that the Right was advancing; at the core, this involved questioning the general political line and its development, as well as questioning the Party itself. An offensive was launched based on Chairman Mao’s teachings regarding struggle (as found in Volume V)—a principled counter-attack.

   On July 26, the Leadership asked: "Does an ultra-leftist line exist?" It analyzed the situation and challenged eleven Central Committee members regarding issues such as semi-feudalism, the plan, specific sectors, methods, attitudes, clashes, and divergences noted in the circular. The position of the "sympathizers" was to let "two tigers fight" and see what happened (they were of intellectual background). The struggle was to be waged first against the anarchists, then against the sympathizers. The Leadership warned that the Eighth Plenum was in jeopardy. Fundamentally, the perception was that we were ultra-leftists; a "dam" (barrier) had formed, along with certain convergences. The essence of this "dam" mentality was the belief that "they are about to repeat another '68." The solution: implement the Sixth Plenum plan, which stated that the Party had an objective and would fulfill it with those willing and able to do so—implying, at bottom, a split. The Leadership established the relationship between the rightist lines in the countryside and the city; they must come together, the waters must clash, and the two poles must confront one another, or else the antagonistic struggle cannot unfold. We must make them see their connections so that polarization can begin. On July 27, the method of examining the trajectory of their ideas and the Party’s documents was applied; it was pointed out that they were attacking Party documents—the underlying issue? Rotten revisionism. Consequently, it was suggested that a certain individual was an ultra-leftist imposing his own line—evident in ideas presented during the 1977 national assessment of Party building, such as "Gonzalo alone" and "there is a vast difference between Gonzalo and us." They sought to gain an advantage but ended up worse off; in response to their arguments, it was put to them that the root cause was revisionism. What did this event lead to?

   On July 29, the Leadership intervened, stating that a purge was necessary and calling for the establishment of a Control Commission. A close link was established between the Leadership and the general political line (and its development); thus, opposing the Leadership meant opposing the general political line and its development—it became a matter of opposition to the line. Consequently, the debate centered on the line; one must never allow the issue to be pigeonholed as merely a matter of leadership—errors by individual leaders are a separate issue. All of this would lead to a purge and a new Central Committee, effectively establishing a leadership head for the Party—something every revolution requires. Thus, it was a question of Line,

   Leadership, and defining the leadership head. An incident involving duplicity occurred: people acted one way during the event and another way outside of it. The underlying motive for the incident was factional grouping. Anyone who believes in a line must strive to impose it.
The Leadership asked for opinions and proposed selecting a leadership body so the struggle could unfold; the event had to decide whether or not to change the leadership. The existing leadership was ratified, though it was demonstrated that there was no desire to continue leading.


   On July 30 and 31, the Leadership posited that the issue was shaping public opinion against a supposed ultra-leftist line; accusations were leveled at the leadership—personalizing the internal struggle and allowing no room for cowardice. What was the state of the struggle? Positions had to be defined regarding the armed struggle framework—whether or not to engage in armed struggle; without establishing the development of the general political line, there could be no Party leadership. Regarding the alleged "leftist" line, criticism was directed at sympathizers, the Central Committee was challenged to criticize them, and a call was made to draw a clear line against revisionism. In short, it was telling—and shameful—that attacks were aimed at Central Committee members who were actually doing the work, while nothing was said to those who were idle. One-third of the Central Committee was fulfilling its tasks and challenged the colluding two-thirds to expel that third. They did not know what to do; deep down, they were frightened of what was to come.

   On August 1, the Leadership proposed: 1) let us adhere to Marxism; 2) examine the decisive moments for parties; and 3) the Party begins to define its destiny. Thus, the meeting began to progress and unfold.

   August 2. Two lines and a plan for a split; the Leadership summarized events since the Fifth Conference and demanded to know: who wants to split? A communist might make serious errors, but—split? The comrades reconsidered, and we concluded that there would be no split. It was the most complex moment the Party faced during this process of reconstitution—on the verge of a split—yet after an intense struggle, we regained unity. Why? Because of the firm stance taken by one-third of the Central Committee in a fierce, demolishing struggle—leaving no stone unturned—which was the only way to avert the split. Chairman Mao tells us we must let them go too far; only then do communists begin to reconsider. We move on to the matter of cohesion: I) International Situation, II) Political Situation. The Period. Our challenge lies in how to specify the details for the third phase.

   On August 5, the Leadership put forward the position that the political question is the issue of the FRAMEWORK FOR ARMED STRUGGLE; this is the central axis regarding the economic and political situation and the historical period, and there is nothing to debate—one simply must take a stand. It was unanimously approved. Our Party is a party.

  The conclusion is that there is an organized opposing line, and that this line is gaining ground. An opposing line has been exposed; we must face the bitter truth head-on, as Lenin said. Two key takeaways: 1) how the struggle unfolds, and 2) the need for care and attention when selecting Central Committee members. We proceeded to analyze the international experience of armed struggle—the foundations and principles of the Framework intended to unify us—drawing on the experiences of China, Albania, and Algeria; the issue of the class struggle for power is fundamentally a question of mass work. The path forward is to mobilize the peasantry. We analyzed the Túpac Amaru rebellion and its invaluable lessons, as well as the MIR guerrilla movements of 1965. The core issue was identified as: how to mobilize the peasantry under the leadership of the party of the proletariat. We examined the evolution of the peasantry, *caudillismo* (strongman politics), *gamonalismo* (landowner domination), and myths surrounding the peasantry. We must concern ourselves with the history of Peru.

  On August 11, we analyzed one year of implementing the National Construction Plan amidst contradictions. Applying the armed struggle framework meant initiating the armed struggle to destroy the old order and build a new one (as opposed to the counter-line of maintaining the old order through evolution). There was an international contradiction: the banner of world revolution versus the banner of the superpowers. Politically, this involved the armed struggle framework and the question of power—mobilizing the peasantry under Party leadership versus the counter-line of following the big bourgeoisie. There was the National Construction Plan versus the counter-plan to change the line. The assessment involved completing the reconstitution, laying the foundations, ratifying the general political line and its development, and sweeping away the revisionist line—which opposed completing the process and labeled the line "ultra-leftist" in an attempt to replace it with a revisionist one. This is a sound method for handling contradictions; it allows us to know what to follow and what to combat. It represents valuable experience for the Party.
August 12. The leadership proposes instructing the cadres based on past errors; this is a sound method. It is not a simple issue but a complex one; we had already resolved a thorny problem of this nature, as a similar issue had led to a split in 1968. It is a matter of knowing how to treat the rank-and-file, the cadres, and the leaders: once an error is acknowledged, one must extend a hand to move forward together.

    August 13th, conclusion: 1) it is key to define and sanction the general political line and its development; and 2) let us define the term "reconstitution" in practice and lay the foundations for armed struggle without waiting for a specific event.

   All this demonstrates that after establishing a full political foundation, the process of concretizing the National Construction Plan takes place amidst intense struggle: approval occurs through struggle, and implementation continues through struggle. The old order resists; ultimately, it is a two-line struggle and an ideological and political issue. Firm, well-directed struggle is necessary for the Party to advance, and the Central Committee is key to this, as it is the center of the Party. If one side stands firm, it prevails.

   Thus, we have the framework: line, struggle, organizational problems, plan, and the task of implementing the plan. The struggle does not end; it continues.

   Central Committee working session, December 1978. The Political Bureau presents its position on: I) Party construction at the national level—destroying what was built under the opportunist line and overcoming what is obsolete and useless; II) The course of the organizational line: 1. Reconstitution; 2. Initiating armed struggle; 3. Laying foundations—achievements and problems; III) The outlook for the organizational line and the 1980s. This is very important. We must bear in mind that once the Party has established its organizational line, it must consider the outlook for the 1980s—a critical period—and manage the crisis that arises more acutely every second five-year period. Chairman Mao taught us that when building, one must look to the long years ahead; whenever we have failed to act this way, we have committed grave errors. Now, we must think about the 1990s and, if possible, look toward the third millennium. IV) Five points for implementing the Framework; V) Ideological-political construction, Program, line, tactics, organizational construction, and construction issues; VI) Statutes; VII) National Construction Plan. Regarding mass work: two paths, two initiatives. Parliamentary cretinism; economic basis; bureaucratic capitalism. The labor movement and its role. The peasantry. Period: elections, mass upsurge. The 1980s. Party readjustment following the 8th Plenum.


   Thus, construction and mass work—long-term periods—and how historical processes are conceived. Two decades; viewing things from a long-term perspective. A plan for the seizure of power today—one linked to how we build the State and how we advance toward socialism.

   Debate. The meeting takes place without regard for the "other barracks"; the struggle does not cease simply because we have achieved cohesion. We must uphold the Party's barracks; the other is not a Party barracks—it belongs to the reaction, it is a "black barracks." The struggle continues because classes exist. The Leadership calls for storming and defeating the black barracks, demanding its surrender—targeting its two heads—and destroying it.

  Lesson: Storm, destroy, and force the surrender of barracks. That was the situation then—not the current one—but the principle is universal; hence, we act within the class struggle. The triumph is complete: a single Party barracks. Page 409 of the "Faction Documents": the existing plan is to be adjusted in line with the 8th Plenum and the "Scheme"; five specific points are outlined for implementing the Scheme. Lesson: Regarding the people's war, we must define our own laws and establish the Scheme for the Seizure of Power, accounting for our specific characteristics.

   Page 411. The 9th Plenum is convened—a new phase of struggle and opposition to the reorganization. This process was stalled because the majority of the Political Bureau (PB) sought to allocate committees based on personal interests. The objective was set: general reorganization of the Party. Page 412, General Report, Part II. The Central Committee proceeds to implement the general reorganization of the Party; proposals were made on how to reorganize the Party, with PB specifications: 1) general reorganization; 2) an intense organizational period; 3) operating underground; 4) Deployment and distribution. Carry out the reorganization immediately.

   Political Bureau meeting. The debate is summarized, the new phase of struggle is specified, and it had to be linked to the general reorganization of the Party. Debate (p. 413): analyzing the political root of the new phase, the reorganization, and how each person participates within the new phase. Two members of the Political Bureau cause problems by attempting to deny the existence of the new phase; the underlying issue is disagreement with the Line. A prior problem to resolve regarding the struggle concerned distribution. Need for an Enlarged Central Committee to expand the Central Committee. The new phase of struggle was being denied—a difficult outlook. (p. 413) The Ayacucho Local Committee has become a base for the Right Opportunist Line (LOD) to lash out against the Leadership. Two members of the Political Bureau want to move forward, and two leaders join forces. The plan from the 6th Plenum involved a commitment not to split, yet also a readiness to split; if 10% remained, they would press on. (p. 414) “Two antagonistic lines are contending.”

   Another Politburo meeting. While there has been some progress in the situation, it remains unresolved. We must look at the new phase and the balance of forces within the Central Committee and the entire Party organization. We are entering a situation of schism; matters are worsening. A quote from Marx: in times of crisis, losing one’s head is a crime against the Party (p. 415); the course of the struggle against the LOD [Left-Opportunist Line] and the new phase. A new phase across the entire Party—it is becoming generalized: two paths, two programs, two lines, two plans, two leaderships, and two contingents are contending within the general reorganization. Generalization and differences, January 24, 1979. From this arise the "barracks," the Ayacucho fiefdom, the Cusco mini-fiefdom, and the Lima fiefdom. Situation and distribution of forces. Strategic plan; situation and distribution of the two lines. This means the Leadership must determine which positions are controlled or can be controlled. Strategic Plan of the Party line. Developing our own forces, etc. Tactics: combat those who oppose the general political line and its development—principally leaders—during the new phase of the struggle for the Party's general reorganization. Move the 90% forward, including cadres and leaders. A key particularity: the Party's reorganization will only be achieved through a process of struggle. "The Party line will triumph. The opposing line and its defeat." The split and their capitulation. The contradiction of camouflaging oneself and accumulating forces; we must not allow such accumulation—we must unmask them to prevent a split. Purge (us) and evacuate (they leave little by little): splitting and camouflaging—some split (the ringleaders seek to split), while others remain inside, camouflaged. Measures to be taken. Implement the reorganization plan. It is a comprehensive plan regarding how the two-line struggle has unfolded; we must recognize that every meeting has its own governing principle. It is a valuable lesson for us.

   We have fought hard and relentlessly to ensure that the defined plan is put into action. The 9th Plenum of the Central Committee (July 1979) and the Expanded Central Committee (November 1979) are covered in two documents: "Towards Armed Struggle" and "Long Live the Armed Struggle."We have published records of events up to 1981; there is a ten-year lag. It is advisable to publish the records of the other events. The Military School (February 1980) is particularly important for understanding the military question (over 300 pages).

   Expanded Central Committee of 1983: The Four Tasks and the Great Plan to Win Bases. The four tasks: 1. General reorganization of the Party; 2. People's Guerrilla Army; 3. Revolutionary Front for the Defense of the People and the People's Republic of New Democracy; and 4. The Great Plan. "Plan to Win Bases"—see page 62 of the May document. Studying this material is crucial because it contains the debates defining the Party's issues; the question of the Army is even more important, as it reflects many of our specific characteristics. The New State is a central issue—specifically, how to develop the New State. Regarding the military aspect, the Great Plan involves a whole set of methods and procedures we can implement; the "four forms" are procedures we are not yet even applying.

   Meeting of February 1986. Mass line. Metropolitan Committee. The discussion addresses the qualitative shift in mass work, with the central issue being Power—specifically, how the peasantry and the proletariat, for the first time, assume leadership of the State within a joint dictatorship.

   Regarding the history of the two-line struggle within the Party: February 1986, Metropolitan Committee. Pages 203 through 216 list the issues under debate; this is the most important part, aside from the Party's history itself.

    Another key moment in the process of construction: the 3rd Session of the Expanded Central Committee (January 1983). How do we proceed to escalate the war and build the New Power? Escalating the war and developing an army implies waging a broader war—confronting an armed force—while simultaneously building the New Power; it also involves how the Party must develop in order to lead this entire process. It emerged from an intense struggle. It was a key, momentous document regarding organizational building. It is crucial that we study the Plan being formulated here. It represented a major leap forward, laying the foundations for what we have accomplished to date.

   After 1983, other issues arose. There were the “Conclusions on the Armed Struggle Process” from 1984. In March 1986, an inquiry was conducted among the Committees using a questionnaire to determine how we could carry out investigative work at that stage. A limitation noted was the tendency to avoid expressing opinions on key issues.

   The document “Developing the People’s War in Service of the World Revolution” poses questions regarding organizational building; it addresses how we have disseminated our views and our methods of construction. It is highly significant regarding the Party, the EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor), and New Power.

   A historic milestone: the Congress (1987–89). The "Bases for Discussion"—covering the general political line and the issue of organizational building—contain the ideological and political foundations upon which we build. We emerge from the Congress; the Congress summary document forms the basis for all the work we must carry out. The Fundamental Documents contain the ideological issues, the program, and the general political line. This is the axis of everything; it constitutes the Basis of Party Unity—centered on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, the program, the statutes, and the general political line. It encompasses the debates and meetings of the Political Bureau.

   1st Session of the Central Committee (February 1990): addressing political issues, mass work, and methods of operation.

   The May 1990 document, "Elections, No! People's War, Yes!"; Part IV is fundamental regarding issues of organizational building.
 
    The events of 1979 led us to initiate the armed struggle and brought us to the 1983 milestone in organizational building; we have built upon that foundation. Today, we face the task of building the conquest of Power, and the Congress serves as the immediate axis for that conquest nationwide. It allows us to link up all prior experience—a foundation providing rich and valuable lessons—by drawing upon that base (specifically the positive lessons as developments and the negative experiences) to drive the new leap toward building the conquest of Power.

   What we have reported constitutes a general assessment of our experience in organizational building, aimed at establishing the fundamental milestones of our process to serve as a foundation for the supreme task of building the conquest of Power. The focus has been on organizing these events by milestones. We must view each milestone and establish the connection to the next—tracing how we developed a line of building that enables us today to structure a far more advanced and powerful line of building, one that allows us to construct apparatuses superior to those of the reaction and to elevate the organizational structure to the level of political leadership. ...to develop leadership, forge cadres, and strengthen the Party and the entire membership—enabling us to boost the EGP, transform it into the highly combative, devastating war machine we require, and advance the conquest of power across the country while developing the New State currently under construction; guided by the Congress's directives, we must achieve relative stability, expand that State amidst the people's war, and—through the conquest of power—establish the People's Republic of Peru.

   We possess a powerful asset that must propel us toward the magnificent process of construction we need.

   We have addressed the construction of the three instruments and highlighted the problem of the masses. In line with this report, we have taken stock, identified milestones, and provided materials and experience regarding points II, III, and IV of the Outline we are developing. This is an Outline of the Strategic Plan for construction, which comprises three strategies: political strategy, military strategy, and construction strategy. The fundamentals have already been laid out; what we have done is assess the situation, milestones, and the rich experience that will serve to develop the construction we need.
We should not elaborate further on points II, III, and IV, as this is merely an Outline. What we need is to reflect carefully—bearing the fundamentals in mind—and offer our views on whether this Outline suits our needs: what should be removed? What added? What developed? Whatever we approve must yield clear directives that can be implemented without causing major problems. We must define the slogan—"Develop, Build, Conquer!"—for point II, because the principal issue is developing the people's war; construction is a derivative, and Conquering Power is the summit we will reach by developing the people's war and building through it. Regarding point IV—the Strategic Plan for construction—the B.P. [Party Bureau] must form a Commission to work on it for three months.

   This Outline should be considered a Pilot Plan and implemented during Campaign III; it should serve as a pilot plan for laying the foundations of the Plan to build the conquest of Power. Subsequently, once the Commission finishes its work, the Strategic Plan for construction can be definitively approved as part of the new plan—within the Great Plan to Develop Bases for the Purpose of Conquering Power.

   The Strategic Plan for construction rests on a solid ideological-political foundation and offers a wealth of material to work with. Our task now is to define and express our views on the final form this outline should take.

(…)

Peru, August 1990 N.D.

 

 PUBLICATION NOTE: Bold text and underlining have been added by the Peru People’s Movement

to facilitate the study of the document we are publishing.