Notes on
the International Situation
ENOUGH
IMPERIALIST EXPLOITATION! IT MUST END!
................
…………
NEW RELEASE
MODEL
CRISIS AND NEED FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF CHINA IN THE FDI ACTIVITIES
A little
more about this process and its significance:
On the
study published by the Canada Ministry of Commerce, cited above, the following
is noted:
"It is
important to note that many of these international supply chains are regional,
not global. The cost and unpredictable delays involved in intercontinental shipping
still matters. Moreover, co-ordination in the same time zone is easier and more
reliable. An additional factor that has fostered regionalization over
globalization is the fact that the cost of moving key managers and technicians
has not fallen radically. If a Canadian firm puts a factory in Mexico, the
manager may have to spend a whole day to hold a one-hour face-to-face meeting.
If the factory is in China, the time cost will be more like one whole
workweek."(59).
In this
study they overemphasized that it is a "regionalization" and not
"globalization". Underneath "regionalization" as we have
said, they are trying to hide: the actual division of the world by imperialist
countries’ finance capital, how the world is divided up today and how
the new
division of the plunders from what was the Soviet social imperialism´s
Influence area is occurring.
So let us
continue with the synthetic history of this process:
"The
first large-scale production unbundling started in the mid-1980s and took place
over very short distances. The maquiladora program created “twin plants,” one
on the US side of the border and one on the Mexican side. Although the program
existed since 1965, it only boomed in the 1980s, with employment growing at 20
percent annually from 1982 to 1989 (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 2002,
Feenstra and Hanson 1996). Another second unbundling started in East Asia at
about the same time (and for the same reasons). In this region, distances are
short compared with the vast wage differences (Tokyo and Beijing are about 90
minutes apart by plane, yet in the 1980s the average Japanese income was 40
times the Chinese average). In Europe, the second unbundling was stimulated
first by the European Union (EU) accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, and
then by the emergence of Central and Eastern "(60).
Here is the
process at a glance. The maquiladora program, to which it refers, is the OAP
(overseas assembly programs), which was established in the US in the early 30s
of last century to lower costs and secure supplies of intermediate products for
the steel industry. Let’s see how after these the steel industry is pushed in
our countries (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, etc.).
Regarding
the development of this process in the US, one of the studies cited in the Book
concludes:
"European
nations. U.S. import data suggests modest growth in parts trade, relative to
other complex goods. It appears that much of this relative growth has occurred
in the form of increasing relative quantities of parts shipped, rather than
changes in relative prices or the relative number of source countries."(61).
Which means
that the "fragmentation or international dispersion of parts production
and their assembly in an integrated production process", in North America,
sphere of domain of the single hegemonic superpower and the country that trades
with the highest number of countries of the world, only occurs in a small way
and focused primarily in Canada and Mexico; which means that the Yankee
imperialist capital (their FDI) , in order to organize their monopolies
internationally, acts in every region of
the world according to the given conditions.
"The
value of import content in exports in 2005 represented an average of 23% of
total trade between the countries of the OECD; in some countries, including as
Luxembourg, Hungary, Ireland and Estonia (see these as already noted Huber,
except Luxembourg are small economies, these countries are in the Third
World-our note), contained imported part in exports It exceeded 50% in 2005. In
other countries like the United States, the Russian Federation, Australia,
Brazil (on Brazil is a semi-colonial country and a high degree of
"re-primarization" of the economy .... see note previous delivery and
steering of the Revolutionary Front for the Defense of the People of Brazil at
the World Cup, our note) and India (also a semi-colonial country or the Third
World, our note) the imported part on the vertical trade was less than other
countries because of its size. This relatively small value of vertical
specialization for large countries reflects more the relationship with VCGs is
located within the vastness of the country ".
"
Vertical specialization takes place both within MNEs and through offshoring to
external suppliers. The results for the VS1 measure suggest that the import
content of exports is closely related to the presence of MNEs. The increase in
vertical specialization comes most clear in countries with a high multinational
presence. Foreign affiliates in different host countries produce intermediates
that are then exported to final consumers, but also to other affiliates and to
the headquarters of the multinational company. The degree of vertical specialization
is found to be particularly large in more basic industries that are heavily
using primary goods like cokes and refined petroleum, basic metals, chemicals,
and rubber and plastics. A second group of industries concern higher technology
intensive industries that produce modular products. Parts and components are
often produced in one country before they are exported to another country where
the assembly is taking place. This international division of labor is found in
industries like electrical machinery, radio/television and communication
equipment, office, accounting and computing machinery but also motor vehicles
(...) This position of countries in GVCs is assumed to be directly related to
the technological profile of countries (Uchida and Inomata, 2009): the
production of parts and components for consumer goods especially in high
technology intensive industries, requires on average larger technological
capabilities and more advanced business processes, hence these activities will
be relatively more undertaken in technology advanced countries. The assembly of
parts and components into final products, even in higher technology industries,
is rather based on simple routines and hence less technological advanced countries
will ‘specialize’ in these activities (...) Hungary, Indonesia, Estonia, the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic show a strong integration in both
intermediates and final goods (…) In
contrast, countries like Japan, United Kingdom and the Netherlands seem to
specialize more in the production of(high value added) intermediates (...)over
the period 1995-2005 showing the increasing importance of downstream assembly
activities in China. However, at the same time, China seemed to have also moved
into the more upstream production of parts of components (for the production of
other intermediates), which is most likely related to the technological
upgrading of the country over the years. Other studies have also suggested that
some assembly activities are increasingly moved away from China to other Asian
countries like Vietnam, Cambodia and the Philippines. (...) The strong increase
in both vertical specialization measures for China e.g. over the period
1995-2005 demonstrates in the first place that China has become more central in
international production networks, both as an assembler of final products and
producer of intermediates. Second, the large vertical specialization of China
(especially the still large (downstream) assembly activities) indicates that
the competitiveness of China is largely built on the intermediates produced
somewhere else. In Asian countries like Japan, China and Korea, the majority of
the intermediates embodied in their exports are sourced from within the region.
Previous research has shown that a triangular trade pattern has emerged in this
region, in which parts and components are produced by more developed countries
like Japan, and Korea and then exported to emerging countries like e.g. China
and recently increasingly also to other countries like Vietnam, Cambodia and
the Philippines where the assembly of the different intermediates into finished
products is takes place. The assembled final products and intermediates are
then exported back to Japan, Korea, etc. as firms re-import a growing part of
the production they relocate. Assembled products from China are also exported
to other developed countries/regions such as Europe and the United States where
they may undergo in addition some smaller changes (packaging, marketing, etc.)
and hence appear in the vertical trade of these countries. The case of Apple’s
iPod illustrates this clearly: components for this product are produced in
Japan, Korea and the United States, are then assembled in China and then
exported to the United States (Linden et al., 2009). (...)The regional
character of GVCs is also clearly illustrated when identifying so-called
‘dominant’ links of intermediate trade flows between economies (…) which
represent more than 15% and 20% of the total exports of the (exporting) country
(…). The results suggest the existence of 3 large groups of economies in the
global trade of intermediate products: NAFTA, EU and Asia including East Asia
(with Japan, Korea and China) and ASEAN economies (…) export flows between
individual economies across different regional groups are significantly less
important.(in terms of intermediates) (...) "(62).
As a
comment to these quotations we just want to point out that this so-called
process of "dispersion" is not in one way, even the multinationals
export parts and high-tech components to its subsidiaries or producers abroad
and import both end or assembled products and intermediate goods (parts and
components intensive in labor). It´s Importantly to contrast this against those
who speak of the imperialist countries as "post-industrial
societies." In addition, some companies or sections of these are relocated
abroad, while other foreign companies or some of its sections are located in
the same country.
MODEL
CRISIS AND NEED FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF CHINA IN THE FDI ACTIVITIES
Furthermore,
the above quote is important because it shows why the model is in crisis.
Because of the needs of the imperialist FDI, China now has to move to other
activities where FDI can find more profitable opportunities. The reason is that
average wages cannot be maintained so low indefinitely in the most
labor-intensive industries; consequently the investments have to move to where
it is cheaper. For the same reasons that China specialized in these activities,
now it must move to "more activities" as those produced in South
Korea and Taiwan (countries, which as we have seen, are semi-feudal,
semi-colonial and with bureaucratic capitalism, where the imperialist finance
capital generated their "daughter" companies, which then generated
"granddaughters" in China and elsewhere), where it is said there are
more mature foreign direct investment (FDI).
China is
losing its comparative advantage over "to other countries in Asia in the
activities of parts, components and assembly production that are" more
labor intensive ". But that is not enough, China has become increasingly
dependent on the imperialist FDI, it needs to integrate more in international
activities and financial services ("scape forward"), to be more open
to foreign financial capital. Thus, in the future the Chinese revisionists may
show improved macro data, but the economy will be distorted and will sink
further and will become even more dependent. View the OECD 2014 document, on
the diagnosis and needs of the Chinese economy (63).
Let´s
recall that in previous quotes and comments we have seen that the components
and parts that are more intensive in technology are mostly manufactured by
companies of bureaucratic capitalism of Asia, Korea and Taiwan, which have been
mainly generated by Yankee or Japanese FDI with greater emphasis since the 60s;
the Chinese "comparative advantage" that attracts imperialist FDI is
the "abundance of cheap labor" and under the yoke of fascist
discipline (securities for FDI), more favorable conditions for investment,
within which is the privileged access to the North American market and it must
be added by the way that the revisionist
bureaucracy corruption will serve to further boost the entry of FDI and promote
private monopolies and, therefore, to fuel the contradictions between the big
bourgeoisie factions in China.
Let´s keep
in mind, the particularity of the development of the monopoly capitalism in
China, where from the beginning appears joined the immense State power with the
monopolies´ power, through the "personal union" between government
officials and businesses. While in other imperialist countries, the merge
between the monopolies capitalist and the immense State power occurred some
years after that the capitalism entered its monopoly or imperialist stage.
Around the First World War, monopoly capitalism became state monopoly
capitalism.
Everything
we've been saying on FDI and China shows that it flows from the US, Japan,
Germany, etc. -either directly or using Hong Kong or others as a bridge-;
because there are gains opportunities, since it is more economically backward.
This shows, that the Yankee imperialism remains the only hegemonic superpower
and then the others are stronger and better organized than the Chinese social-imperialism,
they are superior to it; and, therefore, shows us how the force relationship
among the imperialists is in these times. Without forgetting, that the US
imperialism is a colossus with feet of clay that every day is sinks more and
that it is, like all imperialists, paper tigers.
The
so-called "comparative advantage"
In a study
of the "Chinese miracle" (64) published by the UCM, we read:
"Chinese
wages are four times lower than the Latin American average. In 2002, the
average monthly wage in the Chinese manufacturing sector was $ 112, while in
Mexico was $ 440, and in Central American maquiladoras was 300 "
Another
study also by Mexico (65) established in this respect:
"Mexican
vs Chinese factors Comparison. 1. Labor cost: "The great Chinese advantage"
over Mexico and many other developing countries is its 1.3 billion population
and the Mexico´s population is of 107. International companies look around the
world, in a precise manner; the cheaper production factors since the reduction
of some cents per unit produced can mean maximizing profits and this in turn
minimizes costs. Thus China provides one of the cheaper labor costs for
companies that make intensive use of labor –semi trained work - for exports.
Given this advantage, many maquiladoras have moved to those Far East countries,
companies such as: Microsoft, Kodak, Lenovo, Dell, Motorola, Olympus, Michelin,
Bridgestone, Goodyear, Tetra Pak, where wages can be a dollar an hour, while in
Mexico the workers can earn three dollars an hour, which is twice the costs in
China. "( Mexican and Chinese National Advantage in the XXI century*
.Danae Duana Avila, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Hidalgo century Menidia
López Lira.2 Mexico State UA p. 4, 2003).
The
comparative average workforce compensation is very instructive, returning to
the study of Australian university we have been quoting, in the "Table 1
(66): Average annual compensation per worker, in selected countries, around
2000"
As it is stated in the foregoing chart, around
2000, only Indonesia and Vietnam had lower wages than Chinese averages. China
had lower wages than the Eastern Europe and all other Southeast Asian countries
and also Mexico. Therefore, part of the maquiladoras moved from Mexico to China
in the late 90s of last century. But, as is an economic law, wages in China has
also to go up and as they are in the labor market for imperialist maquila and
intermediate goods with low value attached (intensive use of labor); therefore,
on the one hand, as Korea in the last two decades of the previous century, we
will presence a great intensification of the class struggle in China, and this
in a very different subjective condition to that of Korea, because the Chinese
proletariat has a historical experience like no other, it has reached the first
great proletarian cultural revolution and, on the other hand, as is also
increasingly occurring , there will be a greater drain of imperialist foreign
capital activities because of rising wages, increasing daily the ghost towns
and cities (there are cases where cities with over 400,000 inhabitants have
been reduced to 40 000 inhabitants).
High
technology goods Exports are not a sophisticated expression of internal
development of China
Continuing
our comments on the quotes entered in the part about the " Model Crisis
...", our underlined part highlights the fact that the rapid growth of
high technology products exports are not a sophisticated expression of internal
development of such industry in China, but the product of China's reliance on
FDI and the imperialist world market, specifically of the components imported
produced by FDI in countries of bureaucratic capitalism in the region and the
higher value attached components (high technology intensive) are produced in
the imperialist countries like USA, Japan, Germany, etc. The imperialist capital uses China for the
final assembly (maquiladora), for the advantages it offers: the abundance of
cheap labor (comparative advantage). Therein lies the "export
success" of the "Asian giant". This explains why Japan gives in,
as a global exporter to the Chinese push and at the same time increases the FDI
of Japanese origin to countries of bureaucratic capitalism in the region, which
are parts or components suppliers for the Chinese assembly industry.
To illustrate
this dependence, we present Figure 1 (67) about: The evolution of the regional
production network from 1985 to 2005. Period in which China, being in a
marginal situation until 1985, then it appears first, around 2000, as an
assembler of components from nationalist china
(N) and South Korea (K), then it moves to fill the Central position
(2005) as the assembler of that region; thence to export finished products to
the US, Japan, EU countries, etc., as "export platform". While Japan
abandoned the central role in the assembly and components production played in
1985 to keep components production with a higher added value and which more
technology-intensive ("
relocation of production"), increasing its FDI in the countries of
the region:
Here is expressed in a concentrated way the
imperialism´s monopolistic character, parasitic and decaying. Character that is
expressed more as more developed the imperialist country is. Imperialism is
cancer, the more it develops the more the disease progresses. So, US imperialism
is sinking more than the others, followed by everyone else.
THE
DOMINANT INTERMEDIARY STATUS OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY
The
intermediary character of Chinese exports, its dependence on FDI from the
United States, Japan, etc., is shown in these notes and is most apparent in the
following assessment:
"Koopman
et al. (2008) showed that the share of foreign value added in Chinese
manufactured exports is about 50%. Looking specifically at processing exports
which benefit from duty exemptions on imported raw material and other inputs
‘as long they are used solely for export purposes’, this foreign share rises up
to 82%. As a direct corollary of this, GVCs might also qualify the large trade
(bilateral) imbalances between countries. For example, Kierzkowski and Chen
(2010) have shown that taking into account the imports of parts and components
by both countries reduced the large US deficit with China by approximately
half, given that a lot of high value intermediates are exported from the United
States to China"(68)
This is the
relationship between exports and imports, what the bourgeois economists call
the macroeconomic analysis. The same economist that, applying the analysis to
the enterprise level, conclude:
"A
micro-economic analysis of the international value chain of the iPod has
clearly demonstrated the discrepancy between trade performance and value
creation across countries (Linden et al., 2009). Using firm-level information,
the analysis showed that China was merely specialized in the assembly of the
imported intermediates into the final product which is typically generating
relatively little value. The largest part of the value creation throughout the
production process was done and captured by the producers of high value components
(United States and Japan) and the seller of the iPod (Apple in the United
States). The iPod example shows that the concept of competitiveness may
sometimes need to be assessed at a detailed level, in order to fully understand
what drives the international performance of countries."(69).
China is a
capital exporter, has capital superabundance, part of which comes from its
exports, and is an exporter of primary commodities, low technology and added
value inputs and of assembled goods (maquila) and it´s an importer of capital
(mainly in the form of FDI), energy, raw and especially high-tech inputs and
added value machinery, equipment and
materials. We can say so as a corollary of all the material we've explained in
these notes.
One way
that the Chinese capital export takes is the purchase of foreign currency in
dollars and other currencies through debt securities or bonds here is expressed
in a concentrated way the parasitic nature of the Chinese social-imperialists,
their dependence on FDI, of the exports and backwardness of its economy, as we
read in the following quote:
"(...)
Many Asian countries consider that although they have an excess of savings
today, they want to invest in foreign exchange reserves and so they do not have
to deal with a sudden capital flight as something similar to what was
experienced in the 1990s crisis.
The excess
savings in China is partly the result of China's exchange rate policy. Buying
large amounts of dollars serves to maintain a weak national currency, promotes
exports and reduce domestic spending. The result is a high level of net
national saving, much of which ends up in the central bank's foreign reserves.
The US, Britain and other deficit countries have shown a high appetite for
cheap credit from abroad.
All
countries that produce manufactured goods as China, or oil or metals, have
excess savings, which has led them to seek ways of safe and liquid investment
abroad, due that the national financial instruments are neither large nor
sufficiently developed to absorb such large amounts of excess savings "(70).
And its
dependence on imported capital and high technological value is goods gets well
illustrated in its trade with the developed imperialist countries (71), as
illustrated by its trade with Germany in the following quote:
"Among
more distant trading partners, China has not only become an important source of
many inputs but also a large customer of German exports of products and
services and which accounted for about 5 percent of total German exports in
2009. The reasoning for this follows that of traditional comparative advantages
and patterns of specialization; China demands goods like capital-intensive and
research-intensive machinery and equipment in which Germany has a comparative
advantage."
Lenin said
about it:
“The extent
to which monopolist capital has intensified all the contradictions of
capitalism is generally known. It is sufficient to mention the high cost of
living and the tyranny of the cartels. This intensification of contradictions
constitutes the most powerful driving force of the transitional period of
history, which began from the time of the final victory of world finance
capital Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination and not for freedom,
the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful
of the richest or most powerful nations — all these have given birth to those
distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as
parasitic or decaying capitalism. More and more prominently there emerges, as
one of the tendencies of imperialism, the creation of the "rentier
state", the usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie to an ever-increasing
degree lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by "clipping
coupons". It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay
precludes the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of
imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie
and certain countries betray, to a greater or lesser degree, now one and now
another of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is growing far more
rapidly than before; but this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven
in general, its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay
of the countries which are richest in capital (Britain). (...) On the other
hand, a comparison of, say, the republican American bourgeoisie with the
monarchist Japanese or German bourgeoisie shows that the most pronounced
political distinction diminishes to an extreme degree in the epoch of
imperialism — not because it is unimportant in general, but because in all
these cases we are talking about a bourgeoisie which has definite features of
parasitism.”(72).
The
"dependence” relations are relations of subordination, domination and
violence as well defined by Lenin. We also showed that it was stupid to attempt
to separate the "real economy" from the speculation.
POLITICS IS
CONCENTRATED EXPRESSION OF THE ECONOMY
All of the
explained above is very important to correctly set the proper place of China in
the world economy; as well, to see the weight or power of China, that as an
imperialist country, confers its "extraordinary progress" as the
world's largest exporter and especially in our case, seeing its weight in South
America, where China is evolving into the most important "trading
partner".
Based on
the facts, we can apply correctly the great truth established by Lenin, that
"politics is the concentrated expression of economics". And from
there, establish the political significance for the world and for Latin
America, in particular the "greater integration of China into the global
production networks", ie of the Chinese companies, whatever their degree
of association with the imperialist foreign capital is, as part of the combined
or "mixed" monopolies (like links or nodes, of what they call the
"chains of vertical integration of production" or "global
production networks"), vertically integrated monopolies at the
international level:
“This
transformation of competition into monopoly is one of the most important — if
not the most important — phenomena of modern capitalist economy, a very
important feature of capitalism in its highest stage of development is
so-called combination of production, that is to say, the grouping in a single
enterprise of different branches of industry, which either represent the
consecutive stages in the processing of raw materials (…) or in different
branches that play an auxiliary role to another (for example, the utilization
of scrap, or of by-products, the manufacture of packing materials, etc.). (…)
From here it is a gigantic process of socialization of production (...) the
process of inventions and technical improvements. But the appropriation remains
private (...) forced subordination of monopolistic associations. (...) And the
main profit goes to the "geniuses" of financial machinations ...
achieved this socialization, goes to benefit…speculators "(73).
In the case
of China, who are these "geniuses" behind who manage from above all
this "global supply chain value" or rather who are the big monopolists
who act internationally? Mainly the handful of imperialist companies in the
United States, Japan, Germany, England, France, Holland, etc., who are at the
head of those investments, which handle FDI in that region of the world and in
China, then comes the social-imperialists Chinese and the handful of
bureaucratic capital big bourgeois in these Southeast Asian countries .
THE
CONCRETE WAY TAKEN BY THAT "FORCED SUBORDINATION" OF THE ECONOMY
To make
perfectly clear how this forced subordination of the foreign capital related
Chinese enterprises is, as links in the chains of the greatest Yankees
Japanese, German, English, French, etc. monopolists, we will consign below the
concluding observations of the Australian university study:
“Concluding
Remarks:
There is
clear evidence that the fragmentation-based specialization has become an
integral part of the economic landscape of Southeast Asia and in the wider East
Asian region. Trade in components has been expanding more rapidly than
conventional final-good trade. The degree of dependence on this new form of
international specialization is proportionately larger in East Asia, in
particular in Southeast Asia, compared to North America and Europe. A notable
recent development in international fragmentation of production in the region
has been the rapid integration of China into the regional production networks.
This development is an important counterpoint to the popular belief that
China’s global integration would crowd out other countries’ opportunities for
international specialization. China’s imports of components from countries in
Southeast Asia and other developing East Asia countries have grown rapidly, in
line with rapid expansion of manufacturing exports from China to extra-regional
markets, mostly to North America and the European Union. Booming component
exports from Southeast Asia to China, however, does not mean that the process
has contributed to lessening the regions dependence on the global economy. On
the contrary, the region’s growth dynamism based on vertical specialization
depends inexorably on China’s extra-regional trade in final good, and this
dependence has in fact increased over the years."(74).
To enable
the reader to learn more of the history of the previous concluding
observations, we recommend reading Table 6 (6th and 6b) and comments of that
study (75) concerning: the "relative performance in the world machinery
trade and trends and patterns of China´s bilateral trade in this product
category "; on the "structural shift in Chinese exports" and
"differences in geographic patterns of imports and exports ... China as a
final product assembler for advanced countries markets using parts and
components procured from countries in the region. "
That growth
based on exploitation of the workforce, of the class, with the so called
"labor intensive” use and, therefore, a low growth of the social
productive forces, that the bourgeois economics say "intensive labor usage
and low growth rate of potential gross domestic product " is one of the
characteristics of bureaucratic capitalism. To see this also in China, which
despite being an imperialist country, its level of capitalist development of
the productive forces does not reach the US and the other imperialist
countries, which are ahead in that uneven development; therefore the external
sector of China is increasingly more dependent on FDI, only in special areas
there are 40 million workers directly exposed to exploitation of this financial
capital through their monopolies settled there.
Why did the
imperialist investment or FDI into China leave to the extent registered in the
recent years?
Because
that labor was even cheaper than in the Philippines and many other Southeast
Asia countries, much lower than Mexico and the Eastern Europe countries, and
this is changing and is one of the reasons why the "model " has
gotten into trouble and is being "reformed "; another reason is
because of the good conditions and assurances offered by that
social-imperialist country to FDI; and thirdly, it is to position itself in
this "new market" that appeared with the restoration and especially
because it is a "huge potential market", that means it still is not,
because despite the immense mass of current population, its solvent consumption
ability is reduced, that allows us to see that revisionism can never meet the
needs of the masses and the revolutionary power in development is the main
thing to consider and ultimately it will derail all social-imperialist dreams
of becoming a superpower and will end up doing the anti-restoration to continue
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist revolution.
MAIN TREND
IS THE REVOLUTION
The
revolution is the main trend, which is opposed to the another trend; which says
that in 2030 China will reach the United States or that in 2050 China will have
surpassed it, etc. This latest trend is the only one referred to by those
economists of some investment banks and all opportunists like the two ROLs in
Peru, trying to beautify the system and hide or ignore the increasingly acute contradictions
of imperialism, driving the development of the revolutionary situation in the
world and all it means for the development of the subjective forces of the
world revolution, to initiate and develop people's wars. In China, as was
established by Chairman Mao himself, the counter-restoration will also be done
with People's War (universality of the People's War).
All this
leads us to see how US imperialism exerts its hegemony and sinks quicker than
others; shows greater parasitism, as expressed in the deficit, in different
economic levels; and how it finances it, subtracting each month more economic
production means of production worldwide for clipping coupons, for more
parasitism.
US
imperialism seizes increasingly, by legitimate and illegitimate means, what is
produced by others and feeds the financial game, speculation, through the
increase of its debt and treasury bonds, debt of its enterprises through the
highest stock market speculation and household debt through the "easy
credit", which is then packaged as "new financial products" and
thrown to speculation.
The
collapse of imperialism increases its need of war to maintain its domination
over the vast majority of countries on Earth, trying to escape its final
crisis, so it sinks again, in a complex system of wars of all kinds; extra
economic factors domination, political, military, cultural, etc., to try to
escape their collapse and inevitably sweeping away, they are increasingly
reactionary and violent. Therefore, the final sweeping away of imperialism can
only be finished up with the people's war worldwide.
The
imperialist and reactionary propaganda through revisionists, opportunists,
Trotskyists, etc. seeks to throw dust in the eyes of the masses; all of them
endlessly repeat what their imperialist masters dictate, using the Chinese
case. That is why it’s so important to properly characterize China as
social-imperialist country, ie imperialist, with a deformed development by revisionism
and that exhibits weaknesses and
backwardness in their economic development compared to the US, Japan, Germany,
France, England, etc., which is expressed clearly in the external sector of the
economy, the economic policy pursued by the Chinese revisionists in their
country and its imperialist policy is intended as a "soft power"; as
a "soft" in foreign policy, in collusion and conflict with the sole
hegemonic superpower, Yankee imperialism, and the rest of the imperialist powers,
including the atomic superpower, Russia, and that because of their deformation
have to invest in Treasuries debt and other imperialist countries and in the
Third World. As an Annex, we consign the assessment of the military forces
situation in Asia, extracted from an imperialism source, but it serves to get
an idea about it.
When
properly characterizing China, we made the clear difference with the countries
of bureaucratic capitalism and their businesses and capital and subordinate
place in the world, over which China, as an imperialist country, keeps
oppressed and subjected to the most savage and vicious exploitation, as is
clear for everyone, for example, in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
We reaffirm
ourselves in what was established in the CPP International Line, in which the
historical trend and main policy in the world today, is revolution. That in
today's world there are the three fundamental contradictions, of which the main
one is between superpowers and imperialist powers, on the one hand and
oppressed countries, on the other.
Oppressed or Third World countries are the foundation of the world
revolution; we are in the stage of the collapse of imperialism and its sweeping
away, of the world proletarian revolution, i.e. at the stage of strategic
offensive of the world revolution and the imperialist strategic defensive that
began around the 80; that at the present the new great wave of world
proletarian revolution unfolds, where the war of imperialist aggression pushes
revolution.
Everywhere
in the world people are rising up against imperialism and world reaction,
rejecting and crushing revisionism and opportunism. But the successful
development of this new great wave requires us, communists, to finish the
delayed task ahead of the constitution or reconstitution of the Communist
Parties, as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist parties, mainly Maoist, militarized to
initiate and direct the new people’s wars or transform existing armed
resistance struggles in Maoist people's war.
To see the
anatomy of the global situation, to see the role of the superpowers and powers,
how the inter-imperialist contradictions develop and its collusion and
contention for new world division, which is promoting the development of the
main contradiction. We saw how the US hegemony is and, above all, how the process
of its sinking is given amid the general collapse process of the world
imperialist system. The collusion and conflict for a new world division. How
the powers contend to advance to superpowers and fight for world hegemony
slithering away the sole hegemonic power.
The dream of the Chinese
social-imperialist is precisely to turn China into a superpower to move towards
world hegemony. We say that while this is a trend of development, the Chinese
revisionists will inevitably sink. That the main trend in China and the rest of
the world is revolution. Therefore, it behooves us wherever we are, to serve
the reconstitution of the parties and in our case the general reorganization of
PCP, crushing revisionism, to continue the victorious development of people's
war to complete the democratic revolution in service of the world revolution.
AND
(To be
continued)
____________________________
Notes to
the notes:
59.
"Global Value Chain ..." p. 51
60.
"Global Value Chain ..." p. 52
61.
"Global Value Chain ...", "Causes of the international
fragmentation of production, some evidence" Hillberry, Melbourne, p. 99.
62.
"Global Value Chain ...", "International Comparative Evidence of
Global Value Chain, De Backer and Yamano, p. 114.
63. OECD
(2013), Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2014: Beyond the
Middle-Income Trap, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/saeo-2014-en.
64. Los
capitalismos emergentes en la nueva arquitectura internacional, ¿qué hay de
nuevo en la división internacional del trabajo?, Palazuelos, A, Revista del
Este, Universidad Complutense de Madrid), 2007, nota a pie de página n° 17.
65.
Dr.Danae Duana Avila de la Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Hidalgo y M. E. Nidia
López Lira de la U.A. del Estado de
México, “La Ventaja Nacional de México y China en el siglo XXI”, pág. 4, 2003.
66.Prema-chandra
Athukorala 27. or. Cit., P. 23.
67. Trade
Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia IDE-JETRO © and World Trade
Organization, 2011, www.ide.go.jp/English. We recommend reading it in full,
because they are there exposed with illustrations data and facts that have been
highlighted in other studies: The evolution of regional production network from
1985 to 2005.
68.
International Comparative Evidence on Global Value Chains, Koen De Backer and
Norihiko Yamano, OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Trade
Policy Research, Canada, 2011, p. 122.
69.
"Global Value Chains ..." p. 122.
70. Korean
Economy in Transition Toward an Advanced Economy: Prospects and Challenges by
Choong Yong Ahn and Kyttack Hong, p. 111 et seq
71.
"Global Value Chains ..., The Role of Global Value Chains for German
Manufacturing" Godart and Gorg, p 362.
72. Lenin,
op. Cit., P. 84.
73. Lenin,
op. Cit. P. 18.
74. Prema-chandra
Athukorala 35. or. Cit., P. 23
75. Prema-chandra
Athukorala 36. or. Cit., Australian National University College of Asia and the
Pacific, p. 10 and ss.
ANNEX 1
HOW CHINA
SEES AMERICA
THE SUM OF
BEIJINGP´S FEARS
By Andrew J
Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China's Search for Security (Columbia University
U.S.
military forces are globally deployed and technologically advanced, with massive
concentrations of firepower all around the Chinese rim. The U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM) is the largest of the United States' six regional combatant
commands in terms of its geographic scope and non wartime manpower. PACOM's
assets include about 325,000 military and civilian personnel, along with some
180 ships and 1,900 aircraft. To the west, PACOM gives way to the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for an area stretching from Central
Asia to Egypt. Before September 11, 2001, CENTCOM had no forces stationed
directly on China's borders except for its training and supply missions in
Pakistan. But with the beginning of the "war on terror," CENTCOM
placed tens of thousands of troops in Afghanistan and gained extended access to
an air base in Kyrgyzstan.
The
operational capabilities of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific are magnified by
bilateral defense treaties with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines,
and South Korea and cooperative arrangements with other partners. And to top it
off, the United States possesses some 5,200 nuclear warheads deployed in an
invulnerable sea, land, and air triad. Taken together, this U.S. defense
posture creates what Qian Wenrong of the Xinhua News Agency's Research Center
for International Issue Studies has called a "strategic ring of
encirclement."
Chinese
security analysts also take note of the United States' extensive capability to
damage Chinese economic interests. And the United States is one of China's
largest sources of foreign direct investment and advanced
technology….most-favored-nation…China has not earned a voice equal to that of
the United States in a hypothetical Pacific Community or a role in a global
condominium as one member of a "G-2." China will not rule the world
unless the United States withdraws from it, and China's rise will be a threat
to the United States and the world only if Washington allows it to become
one... America can handle the rise of China while attending the problems of its
territory and to hold on to their own values.
