Following what was announced during his electoral campaign, the new president
of the United States, the ultra-reactionary and genocidal Donald Trump, has
imposed a 25% customs tax on exports from Mexico and Canada to the US and a 10%
tax on Chinese exports to its territory by means of presidential decrees, which
he has sought to justify on the grounds of national security (drugs such as
fentanyl and illegal immigration). In order to be able to bypass internal legal
norms and trade agreements with these States and the rules that govern
international law.
It is clear that with the justification of “national security” he bypasses
Congress, which is in charge of establishing these economic measures as US
laws, thus accumulating more authority in the person of the President. As it
has been doing with its other executive provisions, for example, on
immigration, thus advancing at a rapid pace in the greater reactionary nature
of the Yankee imperialist State through the centralization of power in the
president, presidential absolutism to the detriment of parliament.
The measures of the North American administration not only imply unilateral
taxes on trade between countries but are true economic sanctions that, although
they appear to be directed against those three countries, hit the exports of
other countries that use Mexico, mainly, and Canada, to a lesser extent, as
export platforms. That is, it hits German exports and those of other countries
of the so-called European Union and China, again. But, it does not only have to
do with trade but with other economic activities, as announced by the Spanish
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bank (BBVA), which says that its banking activity
will also be affected.
Trump's most recent executive order is closely related to the other
executive orders or presidential decrees issued since the inauguration of his
second term, such as the one referring to the repeal of the previous
administration's regulations on electric cars in favor of the production of
gasoline or diesel combustion engine cars. Thus, the European manufacturers of
these cars would have also benefited, just like the US manufacturers. These
initial measures affect exporting companies not only from the named countries
but from many others. In addition, it is expected that the economic measures
will be expanded as sanctions against other countries, especially oppressed
countries such as South Africa. In the case of Mexico, it not only pursues
economic objectives but greater subjugation. The order to militarize the
southern border and expand the number of "criminal" immigrants has
served as a "legal argument" for the protectionist measures.
Yesterday, the White House announced that President Trump has scheduled a
telephone conversation on Monday morning about customs duties with the Prime
Minister of Canada and, later, with the President of Mexico.
What is he aiming for with these measures?
Donald Trump, the highest representative of Yankee imperialism, is
seeking to negotiate new economic agreements from a position of strength with
Canada and Mexico, as well as with China; but as the measure directly affects
the EU countries, mainly Germany, he is seeking with this measure to prepare
the ground for preferably bilateral agreements with these countries. Regarding
this, it is important to quote from an article published by the Royal El Cano
Institute of Spanish imperialism, the following:
“Seen from the European Union (EU), this perspective heralds problems. On
the one hand, because we can see that, with all its economic and technological
power, it will seek to divide and weaken the Twenty-Seven by strengthening
bilateral relations with each of them to the detriment of Brussels. To the
extent that it cannot subordinate the whole of the Union to its plans, it will
try to feed the fragmentation that already exists, courting some (with Viktor
Orbán and Giorgia Meloni at the head), while punishing others; All of this with
the intention of contributing to the discredit of a political union project
that represents the opposite of what the magnate advocates. On the other hand,
beyond the fact that his own figure will serve as an example to follow by
Eurosceptic and anti-European actors, determined to dynamite the Union from
within, he could be in charge of supporting them financially so that they can
have greater capacity to promote the same anti-democratic ultranationalism that
defines the next tenant of the White House” (Trum en clave imperial, Jesús A.
Núñez Villaverde, 15 Jan 2025).
In the quote, the author is well informed of the plans of Yankee
imperialism as the sole hegemonic imperialist superpower to divide the European
imperialist alliance under German hegemony and subdue the different countries
that make it up, a Yankee imperialist plan that with Trump takes a sharper and
more belligerent form. But the author of the article is wrong when he wants to
limit the collusion and struggle of the imperialist superpower with the
imperialist alliance of the EU to a personal question of the “convictions of
the magnate”. We do not agree because in this way they want to exonerate Yankee
imperialism, the imperialist State, because by recognizing the role of the
individual, in this case of the imperialist genocidal Trump, as the head of an
imperialist faction, he is the one who embodies this bourgeois-imperialist
State in a centralized Power as the absolutism of the president. Of course,
these independent interests that are presented as an individual's desire or
whim, as the embodiment of the relative independence of the State from society
- we repeat, represented in this case by "the magnate" - are
exercised precisely when Yankee imperialist society is at risk, and it has to
strike a faction or a part of the exploiters who endanger the interests of the
whole, the interest of maintaining the sole hegemony of Yankee imperialism, so
that is precisely when it assumes the class interests of the exploiters and
oppressors, in this case, Yankee imperialism. Regarding Trump's support for
"Eurosceptic and anti-European actors, bent on blowing up the Union",
it is an objective convergence. That is why Musk intervened in German politics
by supporting the AfD candidate.
Chairman Mao said in 1947: “The economic power of American imperialism,
which grew during the Second World War, is faced with unstable and shrinking
domestic and foreign markets every day. The further contraction of these
markets will provoke the outbreak of an economic crisis. The war boom in the
United States was only temporary. The strength of the United States is only
superficial and transitory. Irreconcilable internal and international contradictions,
like a volcano, threaten American imperialism every day. American imperialism
is sitting on this volcano.” The long process of collapse, which has tormented
American imperialism from then until today, shows the just and correct judgment
of Chairman Mao. American imperialism with the new government expresses a
greater political decomposition, as part of its process of greater
decomposition in all orders.
The principles on which Trump, as the head of Yankee imperialism, is
based are the same as those that Zbigniew
Brzeziński (Johnson's campaign advisor from 1966 to 1968 and
security advisor to US President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981 and consultant
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington,
D.C.) set out in his book "The Only World Power (1997)", as the
guidelines of the strategy that the United States should follow, among others,
which are:
„The main interest of the United States must be to help ensure that no
single power gains control over (Eurasia) this area of geopolitical
importance and that the world community has unhindered economic and financial
access here.
The United States is the only superpower in the world today, and
Eurasia is the central stage. The question of how power is distributed on the Eurasian
continent will therefore be of vital importance to America’s global supremacy
and historical legacy.
The three most important imperatives are imperial geostrategy:
avoiding collusion among vassals and preserving their security dependence,
keeping tributary states docile, and protecting them to ensure that “barbarian
peoples do not unite.”
Given the climate of people on the political horizon of Europe and Asia,
any successful American policy must focus on Eurasia as a whole and be guided
by a geostrategic plan. (…) This requires a high degree of tactics and
manipulation so that an opposition coalition does not form that could
ultimately call into question the primacy of the United States (…).”
THE INTERIMPERIALIST CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA
With reference to later comments, we quote from the same institute of
Spanish imperialism the report: “Why does Latin America matter?”, Carlos
Malamud, José Juan Ruiz and Ernesto Talvi (eds.), Report 32 | June 2023, Elcano
Royal Institute - Madrid – Spain www.realinstitutoelcano.org, the part that
says:
„ 3.2. China as a competitor and as a market
China has become a formidable competitor for emerging economies. Its
exports to emerging countries represent a figure close to the sum of US and EU
exports.
However, the EU and the US remain the main export markets for emerging
economies.
The combined sum of US and EU imports from emerging countries is almost
twice as large as China's imports. Moreover, US and EU imports, taken
separately, are similar and comparable to Chinese ones.
Regarding China as a competitor and as a market for Latin America, there
are two very different realities.
China is extremely small as an export market for Mexico and Central America
in relation to the dominant player, the US. 92% of Mexico's and Central
America's exports to the three major economic blocs – the US, EU and China –
are destined for the US.
In South America, the opposite phenomenon is observed. China is the main
destination for exports with a share greater than that of the EU and the US
combined.
As for imports from China, the share is more evenly distributed between
Mexico and Central America, and shows a similar pattern to that of imports from
China to South America.
3.3. China as a buyer and seller of primary and manufactured products
As Mexico and Central America's trade with China is very small in absolute
terms and in relation to trade with the US, this section will focus on South
America, where the contrasts are marked.
What does China buy and sell to South America? The region is a strong
exporter of natural resources and primary products, of manufactured goods based
on natural resources and agro-industrial products. These represent 80% of total
exports, with China being the main buyer, 37% of the total, and
greater than the combined sum of the EU and the US.
South America is a strong importer of manufactured products (70% of the
total), with China being the main seller (35% of the total), equal to the sum
of the EU and the US. If we focus on high-tech manufacturing, China is the main
seller to South America, accounting for 30% of the total,
also more than the EU and the US combined.
South America's trade link with China is marked by a strong contrast: it
sells natural resources and primary products (and manufactures from these
resources and products) and buys medium- and high-tech manufactured products.
Although there are segments in the agro-industrial chain and in the
industrialization of natural resources that produce high value-added and
sophisticated manufactures, these are chains that, even in the case of Mexico
and Central America, which primarily export industrial products to the US,
import a quarter of their medium- and high-tech manufactures from China.
To whom does South America sell the little it exports of high value-added
and sophisticated manufactured products? 50% to the US and the EU and only 6%
to China.
…
3.4. China as an investor
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that Latin America is being invaded by
an avalanche of Chinese investments in infrastructure and other strategic
areas, to ensure supplies of natural resources and food, the data speak of a
different reality.
First, Latin America is the emerging region with the lowest direct
investment from China and its FDI stock barely exceeds 1% of GDP.
Second, China's investment stock only exceeds 5% of GDP in one country,
Panama.
Third, the sum of the investment stock in Latin America of the EU and the
US is 20 times greater than the stock of Chinese investments.
It can be argued that the accumulated stocks reflect the past, but not the
present or the future. The sum of investment projects and M&As originated
predominantly in the US and EU, and although China has a larger share of FDI
flows than of stocks, those of the EU and the US were five times higher. FDI
flows over the past 10 years have also seen an increase in the US share
relative to the EU.
3.5. China as a lender
As with investment, the narrative suggests that China is not only playing a
predominant role as a bilateral lender to countries in the region, but is also
competing as a provider of finance with multilateral institutions, in
particular the IMF and the World Bank.
Once again, the data reflect a very different reality.
First, Latin America is the emerging region, along with South Asia, with
the lowest levels of indebtedness to China.
Second, China's stock of bilateral loans, including its Development Banks,
which are its main source of external financing, only exceeds 5% of GDP in
Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Suriname, Guyana, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and
Dominica.
Third, Chinese bilateral loan flows and stocks have consistently declined
since 2017 following the sharp slowdown in China's growth rate and debtor
countries' payment difficulties that forced China to grant multiple debt
restructurings and forgiveness.
The result of China's reduced lending to Latin America and the increased
lending from the IMF and the World Bank during the pandemic was that its share
as a creditor has been reduced to represent only 11% of the sum of total
lending to the region from the IMF, the World Bank, the Paris Club, and China.
If we include the bonds that Latin America issues under international
jurisdiction, 85% of which are in Western jurisdictions (mostly New York and
London), China's share of total loans to the region falls to 3%.
3.6. China in the military field
In the military field, China's influence is practically non-existent.
Latin America's arms purchases from China are not only the lowest among all
emerging regions; thus, in 2020 and 2021, no purchases were recorded. In that
biennium, arms purchases were made in the EU and the US, with a strong contrast
between Mexico and Central and South America.
90% of Mexico's and Central America's arms purchases were made in the US,
and almost 60% of South America's were made in the EU, a ratio of four to one
with the US.
3.7. China and Latin America: tourism, higher education and migration
As regards interpersonal ties with Latin America, the superiority of the
Western blocs is overwhelming.
In Mexico and Central America, the predominance of the US is almost exclusive.
More than 90% of tourism is to and from the US. 60% of university students from
Mexico and Central America who study abroad do so at US universities (Figure
34f), 97% of migrants live there, and 97% of remittances from immigrants from
Mexico and Central America to their countries of origin have the same origin.
In South America, the EU plays a leading role. 56% of tourism to South
America comes from the EU and 52% of South American tourism is destined for the
EU. 60% of South American university students who study abroad do so at
European universities and 50% of South American migrants live in the Union
(Figure 34g). As a result of the latter, a similar percentage of remittances
originate in EU countries.
And the report on the cited part concludes:
„Conclusions
In just 30 years, China has become a giant of the global economy,
comparable in size to the US and the EU, and it is natural that it has
gained weight in
global trade. But, despite the formidable growth of its share in the
world GDP and in trade, China is underrepresented in all areas:
as an export market for medium and high sophistication products, in
FDI and in financial, human and military relations.
The EU and the US remain the dominant players in Latin America, with
Mexico and Central America strongly linked in all areas to the US and
South America being “more European”, except in the commercial area.
When the data is carefully analyzed, the prejudice does not hold up.
Neither the EU nor
the US have abandoned Latin America, nor is China the dominant player in
the
region".