"Autumn Harvest Uprising," an oil painting from the collection of the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution, created in 1973.
To mark the 99th anniversary of the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the establishment of the path of encircling the cities from the countryside (CCCC), we are republishing the Peru People’s Movement (MPP) document: “The Communist Party of Peru and Maoism”.
The Communist Party of Peru and Maoism∗
Peru People’s Movement
October 2023
On the Problem of the Path of Encircling the Cities from the Countryside (CCCC)
In this document, issued on the occasion of the celebration of the 95th an-
niversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Peru by José Carlos
Mariátegui on October 7, 1928, according to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism,
Gonzalo Thought, it is explained how Chairman Mao resolved the pending
issue of specifying revolution in a country under imperialist domination with feudalism at its base and bureaucratic capitalism. It also discusses how the Communist Party of Peru, under the leadership of Chairman Gonzalo and his all-powerful Gonzalo Thought, upholds, defends, and applies it, developing it further.
How did Chairman Mao solve the problem of revolution?
Chairman Gonzalo, at the First Party Congress, summed it up with great
precision:
“With the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the establishment of
the strategy of encircling cities from the countryside, it was in
1936, in Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War that
the law was first established: The ‘encirclement and annihilation’
campaigns and counter-campaigns became the primary form of
development in the Chinese civil war.”
It is Chairman Mao, then, who resolves the pending issue. The
Autumn Harvest Uprising took place on September 9, 1927; as
everyone knows, he gathered soldiers, organized them into the
army linked to the Party because they were within the Kuom-
intang army, but there were parts that obeyed the communists.
He brought together those parts and formed battalions with work-
ers and peasants; that is the Autumn Harvest Uprising. As it is
known, even among them, clashes occurred, and there was a re-
treat. The Chairman narrowly escaped falling into the hands
of Chiang Kai-shek in Hanyang. He regrouped his forces and
marched to Jinggang, establishing the Power and, for the first
time, the laws of people’s war in 1936, which is nine years later.
Chairman Mao created the Power in Jinggang, after having cre-
ated the Red Army of workers and peasants.”
History of the Army: The formation of the People’s Liberation Army of
China has been a challenging process. The Chinese Red Army (called the
Eighth Army and the New Fourth Army Corps during the War of Resistance against Japan and later, the People’s Liberation Army) was born on August 1, 1927, with the Nanchang Uprising.
Regarding the above, Chairman Gonzalo continues:
“Chairman Mao, with this, he solves a pending problem because,
until him, it was not known how to carry out the revolution and
lead it in a country under imperialist domination with feudalism
at its base and bureaucratic capitalism. This is very important
because for some, simply seeing capitalist relations means the
country is capitalist. Thus, Chairman Mao solved the problem,
which was unresolved before; Lenin did not solve it, and neither
did Stalin. It was the Chairman who solved it, and in this way,
he develops the democratic revolution under the leadership of the
proletariat led by the Communist Party. How can we deny this
reality?
Chairman Mao Zedong once again reaffirms and advocates revolu-
tionary violence as a universal law without any exceptions what-
2soever; this is extraordinary. He specifies violence as war and the
military and asserts its character as a universal law.
‘power grows out of the barrel of a gun,’ 1927, That’s when the
Chairman raised this thesis; don’t get confused because it’s in a
later text.(1) Chairman Mao, in the August 1927 meeting, after all
the slaughter carried out by the wretch Chiang Kai-shek, raised
the slogan: ‘Power grows out of the barrel of a gun,’ and it was
also at that time when he proposed the issue of ‘encircling the
cities from the countryside’ (CCCC).
The Chairman reaffirms once again: ‘Revolution as the violent
replacement of one class by another,’ and he tells us that it is a
universal law without any exceptions. Because Marx presented us
with violence, but he thought that in England, given its peculiari-
ties in the past century, it might be possible to take power without
applying violence as an exception, as he clearly explained in the
19th century, as Lenin has pointed out perfectly. However, Lenin
himself, after the February 1917 revolution, began to think that
due to the dual power structure in old Tsarist Russia, following
the bourgeois revolution of February, and considering that there
were committees called soviets in which soldiers were involved,
and that part of the army only moved by order of the soviets,
and if not, it did not move; given the set of contradictions that
made the government of Kerenski extremely fragile, he thought
that, as an exception, power could be seized because it was very
corrupt, a reactionary power, indeed, very corrupt. When the
events of July (the Kornilov affair) occurred, the reaction vio-
lently suppressed the proletariat and the people, so Lenin said
that it was not feasible, that violence had to be applied, but in
order to prevent it from failing, the revolution had to be armed,
the revolution had to be prepared. When everyone was saying,
‘It’s impossible now, they’ve beaten us so much.’
Regarding the specification of the revolution in backward coun-
tries, Lenin himself, at the Second Congress of the International,
gathered comrades from the East and told them, including him-
self, that we know the revolution in capitalist countries but not
in backward countries under imperialist domination; that is your
task, it is pending, you have to solve it without forgetting that
you are communists and that you must organize yourselves as
such, as a Party, linked to the Communist International.”
Continuing, Chairman Gonzalo, regarding the “Autumn Harvest Upris-
ing”:
“The Chairman himself, in an interview with Edgar Snow, says:
‘In September, we had managed to organize a very broad uprising
with the peasant unions of Hunan, and the first worker-peasant
units of the army were formed. The recruits came from three
sources: rural populations, miners from Hanvang, and insurgent
troops from the Kuomintang. This initial military force of the
revolution was called the ‘First Division of the First Army of
Peasants and Workers”
At the First Party Congress, Chairman Gonzalo takes on the defense
of the historical significance for the Chinese Revolution and the worldwide
revolution of the “Autumn Harvest Uprising.” In a controversial tone, he
addressed the members of the First Party Congress with a strong convic-
tion about how the great communist leaders should act in the face of new
situations they have to resolve. He said:
“I ask now, what were the great armies that Chairman Mao de-
feated, what were the sieges he destroyed if the sieges began on
the 30th? I believe what is happening is that we don’t even know
what we’re talking about. Yes, comrades, I refer to the biography
of Chairman Mao Zedong, furthermore, I refer to the history of
the Communist Party of China. I do not agree with the stupidity
that the Autumn Harvest Uprising was a failure; for the idiot
opportunist revisionists, for Deng, it is a failure! The classifi-
cation made by the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of
China in Moscow when it was said that among the uprisings in
Nanchang, Autumn, and Canton, the most important was Can-
ton, is erroneous, comrades, if we view it in the light of Maoism,
we do not understand it; we cannot allow it because in ‘Peking
Review,’ what does it say? The revolution was crushed, it was
a defeat, but if it was the path of encircling the cities from the
countryside, what the Chairman does is raise the Autumn Har-
vest, gather the forces after that initial clash, or perhaps they
thought they would take power the next day? They march to
the Jinggang Mountain, which was a den of bandits, or weren’t
they? And there, he creates the new Power. How did Chairman
Jinggang find it?, the revolutionary forces were destroyed, I refer
to ‘The Jinggang Mountains,’ isn’t it there? I wonder, what are
we reading? What are we studying?
With the laws that the President passes afterward, they are mak-
ing a mistake with the laws established by Article 36, regarding
how they are developed, but they are not addressing how they
begin. They are confusing birth with adulthood. Do you think
that’s correct? It’s like equating a baby’s first cries with a young
person who votes, (2) who comes up with that? I repeat, when
do the blockades start? On the 30th! There are no blockades
on the 27th, 28th, or 29th; the blockades strictly appear on the
30th, the problem is that then the President passes the law and
confuses things. I believe, comrades, that we should never be
mechanistic; mechanicism leads to opportunism. It is the Chair-
man himself who says this in Introducing The Communist like
this: ‘Why did many comrades fall into opportunism? Due to
mechanical application,’ he says. It is in a long process that the
general laws are established; it is 1936 in Problems of Strategy
in China’s Revolutionary War that the law is established for the
first time, 9 years later. Isn’t this the very history itself? Then,
with this, he resolves a pending issue because it was not known,
until him, how to make the revolution and how to lead it in a
country under imperialist domination with feudalism at its base
and bureaucratic capitalism. This is very important, comrades,
because for some, just seeing capitalist relations means the coun-
try is already capitalist. This is how the problem was resolved; it
was the Chairman who resolved it, and in this way, he developed
the democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat
led by the Communist Party. How can we deny this reality?”
Chairman Gonzalo, also at the First Congress, said in this regard:
“So, the Chairman has solved the problem of the democratic rev-
olution and its uninterrupted transition to socialism; the Chair-
man has resolved that. Lenin couldn’t do it because Kerenski
happened to lead the democratic revolution in old Russia due to
historical chance. Lenin did say that the Bolshevik Party could
and should lead the democratic revolution, as he put it in his
words, a ‘revolutionary government of workers and peasants.’ So,
doesn’t he propose that? Remember, comrades, in Two Tactics
he proposed that; but he himself acknowledges that the Party
was not in a position to lead the democratic revolution, that was
the reality, so we cannot say that he solved the problem, it was
the Chairman. The fact that it should be uninterrupted, Lenin
knew that, he knew it, it comes from Marx; from Marx comes the
valuable thesis of permanent revolution, which is rarely touched
upon because Trotsky, that idiot, tarnished the term, and there is
fear of using it. But, comrades, the time will come when we will
use it again because it is of pure Marxist origin. The Gotha Pro-
gram, comrades, who made it? Marx did, that’s key. He proposed
permanent revolution, a revolution after revolution until commu-
nism, he said. Of course, he didn’t list them for us, he didn’t
say, ‘revolution here,’ ‘revolution there,’ ‘cultural revolution,’ no,
he didn’t tell us that. Comrade Stalin, did he know this? Of
course, he knew about uninterrupted revolution. Did the Com-
munist International know? Of course they did. Many things,
my dear comrades, that are in Mariátegui’s writings are from the
Communist International, in case you didn’t know; I believe we
don’t know our history and talk about things we don’t under-
stand. Do you think the Communist International didn’t know
that the revolution was uninterrupted? Do you think the Com-
munist International didn’t know that? Comrade Stalin knew
that perfectly well. Wasn’t Stalin a Marxist? Please, man! Let’s
not forget that Mariátegui was in Europe; let’s not forget that
there were recommendations from the Communist International,
explicit ones. I think we don’t remember or know many things.
But it’s the Chairman who has embodied it, developed it, found
its laws, and solved the issue of uninterrupted revolution by giv-
6ing it an economic, political, and ideological foundation. So, he
has been, comrades.”
The Establishment of the Path of the CCCC and the Development of the Proletarian Military Line in the Democratic Revolution in China Took Place in a Fierce Struggle Against Opposing Lines
Against the establishment of the path of the CCCC and the development
of the proletarian military line in the democratic revolution in China, the
bourgeois military line was expressed. In those years, after August 1927,
when the right capitulationism of Chen Duxiu was swept away, as stated by the Chairman himself, it manifested as “left” lines:
“For a brief period after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, a
‘Left’ putschist tendency arose in the Communist Party. Regard-
ing the Chinese revolution as a ‘permanent revolution’ and the
revolutionary situation in China as a ‘permanent upsurge,’ the
putschist comrades refused to organize an orderly retreat and,
adopting the methods of commandism and relying only on a small
number of Party members and a small section of the masses, erro-
neously attempted to stage a series of local uprisings throughout
the country, which had no prospect of success. Such putschist
activities were widespread at the end of 1927 but gradually sub-
sided in the beginning of 1928, though sentiments in favour of
putschism still survived among some comrades.” (3)
The “line of Li Lisan” refers to the opportunistic “left” line that pre vailed in the Party for approximately four months, starting in June 1930, and was represented by Li Lisan, the main leader of the Central Committee of the CPC at that time. This line rejected the need to prepare the masses for revolution and denied its uneven development. It considered Chairman
Mao Zedong’s ideas, which focused on creating support bases in rural areas, using the countryside to encircle the cities, and leveraging these bases to accelerate the revolution across the country, as “extremely wrong localism and conservatism characteristic of the peasant mentality.” It advocated making immediate preparations for uprisings nationwide. Based on this erroneous line, Li Lisan devised an adventurous plan to immediately organize armed uprisings in China’s major cities. At the same time, this line did not recognize the uneven development of the world revolution, claiming that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to the world revolution and that only with the general outbreak of the world revolution could the Chinese revolution succeed. It also did not acknowledge the protracted nature of the democratic-bourgeois revolution in China, asserting that the initial victories of the revolution in one or several provinces would mark the beginning of the transition to socialism. Therefore, it formulated a series of untimely, adventurous, and “leftist” political measures. Chairman Mao Zedong defeated this erroneous line in September 1930, and Li Lisan was removed from his leadership position.
The “left” opportunists of the years 1931-1934, such as the “Li Lisan line,” also did not understand the law of the repetition of “encirclement and annihilation” campaigns. In the support base of the Jupei-Jonán-Anhui Border Region, the so-called theory of “auxiliary forces” emerged. Some leading comrades there believed that the Kuomintang army, after its defeat in the third “encirclement and annihilation” campaign, was nothing more than an auxiliary force. They thought that for a new attack on the Red Army, the imperialists themselves would have to intervene as the main force. The strategic line based on this estimation was to launch the Red Army against Wuhan. This was in line with the opinions of comrades in Jiangxi who urged the Red Army to attack Nanchang, opposed efforts to unite support bases, opposed the tactic of luring the enemy deep into our areas, believed that capturing the capital and other major cities of a province was a guarantee of victory in the entire province, and argued that “the struggle against the fifth ’encirclement and annihilation’ campaign is the decisive battle between the revolutionary path and the colonial path,” etc. This “left” opportunism was the origin of the wrong line adopted and caused enormous losses to the Chinese revolution.
Chairman Mao’s proletarian military line was definitively imposed on the opposing lines (bourgeois military line) at the Zunyi Conference, when the CPC established a leadership headed by Chairman Mao, adhered to his line and rejected the right opportunist lines disguised as “left.” The lessons of this blood-curdling experience of the Chinese and world revolution must be studied and embodied by the Maoists of the world, primarily for those who have the task of carrying out democratic revolutions.
The history of the CPC tells us:
At the expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party held in January 1935 in Zunyi, Guizhou province, a new leadership of the Central Committee was established, led by Chairman Mao Zedong, replacing the old opportunist “left” leadership. This meeting took place during the Great March of the Red Army, where decisions were made on the most urgent military issues and organizational matters related to the Secretariat and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee.
The Second Revolutionary Civil War
April 1927: Chiang Kai-shek carries out a counterrevolutionary coup d’état and crushes the masses and the Party.
August 1927: The Central Committee of the CPC rectifies the line and
dismisses Chen Duxiu (Chen Duxiu’s right opportunism: capitulation on the united front).
September 1927: Second Revolutionary Civil War. Chairman Mao
leads the Autumn Harvest Uprising and establishes the first revolutionary
support base in the Jinggang mountains.
(...): “Left” line of Chu Chiu-pai.
1930: “Left” line of Li Lisan.
1931: “Left” line of Wang Ming.
1934: The Long March of the Red Army.
1935: At the Zunyi Conference, the CPC established a leadership headed by Chairman Mao, adhered to his line, and rejected the right opportunist lines disguised as “left.”
1935: “Left” line of Zhang Guotao of dividing the Army.
1937: War of Resistance Against Japan. United front: CPC and
Kuomintang.
Note: In the history of the CPC, it is stated that in his December 1935 report, Chairman Mao Zedong foresaw that contradictions among different imperialist powers could lead to a division within the ranks of the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie in China. Later, as the Japanese imperialist offensive in Northern China seriously clashed with the interests of
Anglo-American imperialism, the Communist Party of China considered that Chiang Kai-shek’s gang, closely linked to these interests, could, by order of their masters, change their attitude towards Japan. In view of this, they adopted the policy of forcing Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan. In May 1936, upon their return to Northern Shaanxi province from Shanxi province, the Red Army directly demanded from the Kuomintang government in Nanjing the ending of the civil war and unity against Japan. In August, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang proposing that both parties form a united front against Japan and designate delegates to hold negotiations with this objective. However, Chiang Kai-shek rejected these proposals. It was only in December, when he was detained in Xian by Kuomintang army officers who supported an alliance with the communists to resist Japan, that Chiang Kai-shek was forced to comply with the Communist Party’s demand to end the civil war and prepare for resistance against Japan.
The Application and Development of the CCCC by Chairman Gonzalo
(Regarding Unified People’s War)
(Regarding Unified People’s War)
The application of the CCCC, in the People’s War in Peru, is specified as a unified People’s War, where the countryside is primary and the city is a necessary complement. Furthermore, in the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru, Chairman Gonzalo clarified how the path established by Chairman Mao for democratic revolutions is being applied in the People’s War in Peru. This is the path that, despite all the twists and turns, including the current ones, our People’s War will continue until conquering power throughout the country, establishing the People’s Republic of Peru, and thereby proceeding uninterruptedly to develop the socialist revolution.
In the First Congress, attention was given to work in the cities, it says:
“it is very important to focus the struggle in the cities, it has to do with
the insurrection; if we don’t prepare for the seizure of the cities, mainly the
largest ones, to complete the final stage of the People’s War, the conquest
of power in the entire country will be delayed...” It continues: “The work
in Lima must be developed more, considering that it is the capital.” (4) Very important, it sees the role of the cities and Lima in particular; it
is highly relevant to take this into account. Lima is like an echo chamber,
where everything that happens there has repercussions in the world."
Then, the application of the CCCC, in the people’s war in Peru, is speci-
fied as a unified people’s war, where the countryside is primary and the city is a necessary complement. How should this specification and development of Maoism by Chairman Gonzalo be understood? As we have already pointed out, to clarify this, we refer to the Central Document of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru, a historic and momentous plenum, where an assessment is made of the path taken in the 12 years of development of the people’s war in Peru.
In that plenum, Chairman Gonzalo clarified how the path established by
Chairman Mao for democratic revolutions has been applied in the People’s
War in Peru. This path, through all the twists and turns, through all the
challenges and even the current obstacles, will continue to guide our People’s War until the democratic revolution is successfully completed, and we can immediately and uninterruptedly transition to the socialist revolution. The Chairman said:
“(...) regarding The People’s War. We have completed twelve
years, we are starting the thirteenth. In everything, we always
have to see the specific aspect. What does ‘the specific’
mean? It is the result of the application of Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism to the Peruvian reality. If this is the case in everything,
it is even more urgent in warfare, which is the primary form of
struggle and is generated or concretized by the primary form of
organization, which is the People’s Guerrilla Army managed by
the Party in terms of military line; so, we need to examine the
development of the people’s war and the counterrevolutionary,
counter-subversive war; that’s what we need to look at. The two
hills, and see what the specific laws of our people’s war are, that
is the main thing for us, that is decisive. The question of balance,
how does it occur here? In the Second Plenum, it is well specified:
‘The protracted war and its three stages. The three specified stages
of the protracted People’s War in Peru. The strategic equilibrium
and the preparation of the counter offensive: the enemy, to recuperate positions to maintain its system. The development of the strategic offensive via the building of the conquest of power.
Because of that, reaction sees the need to annihilate the People’s
War and the Party while the people must build the conquest of power.’
(5) War is a problem of military strategy; therefore, military strategy
must be examined in its course, in its development, in how it stands
today, and how it needs to be developed to be effective. It has to do
with the construction of the People’s Guerrilla Army that needs to be
strengthened, especially its main forces. It also involves how to
develop our Army, which has its own characteristics like the three
forces. Strategy and tactics are another field, but in these three things,
the focus is on understanding what is happening here, the specifics of
this war. This is what we should be concerned about (…) "
The Path of Encircling the Cities from the Countryside and the Shifting of the Focus from the Countryside to the City
"When analyzing the situation in Ayacucho, fundamental political
questions were taken into consideration. At this point, the following proposition is noteworthy: ‘The strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside and the shift of power from the center to the city.’
In synthesis, Maoism teaches us that the people’s war in a country like ours follows the path of encircling the cities from the countryside, which requires placing the focus of work in the countryside for many years. As the end of the people’s war approaches, as it progresses, the conquest of power in the country, in the entire country, requires shifting the focus from the countryside to the city. It is a challenge and a perspective in every approach to encircling the cities from the countryside.
What is important to us is that this is no longer a perspective, it is a reality that we are implementing and need to develop. The work of the Party and the development of the war clearly show that the path of encircling the cities from the countryside is coming to an end, to that encirclement of the cities and the capital itself. It is obvious to understand that this encirclement and development are not equal, it is uneven, but it is happening. The work and development in Lima are clear evidence that what was once a perspective is now a reality, and we must strive intensively to advance this direction so that the weight is shifted from the countryside to the city. This requires intense work and time; it is related to our own efforts and the development of the class struggle. We must understand with great precision that it is not that the city is already the center, but the shift has already begun, and we must work to make that shift a reality. However, this shift requires tasks to be fulfilled, such as strengthening and further developing the work in the countryside, which is still where the weight of the Party and the people’s war lies, particularly developing work in the Principal areas, in the Fundamental areas, in the Fundamental Committees, in what is known as the Sierra in the country, in the jungle’s edge, and in the Coast; promoting work in the cities but starting by expanding it in the countryside, taking into account small, medium, and large cities, and especially the capital itself.
So, we have the shift as our perspective, and it is already a reality. The weight of the Party that is in the countryside must be shifted; this phenomenon has already begun. Let the tasks we have just outlined be fulfilled, and we will achieve it. It is an indispensable condition for conquering power throughout the country, and the center of this weight should be in the city. It is not lost on anyone that this is a complex, tough, and arduous task, but it is the right one, no matter how much we might wish it weren’t. Well, the objective prevails, our problem is that the subjective aligns with the objective. It is important to insist that this is of great importance.”
The Changes of Contradiction in the Development of the Democratic Revolution
The main contradiction, Chairman Gonzalo said, is between the popular masses and semi-feudalism; that’s the main one. However, there are three contradictions: the other one is against bureaucratic capitalism and against imperialism. These are three contradictions that exist in the country. But, with the development of the people’s war, a change in contradiction willnecessarily occur.
The Second Revolutionary Civil War, as Chairman Mao himself specified, was carried out under the leadership of the CPC from 1927 to 1936, paving the way for the War of Resistance against Japan from 1937 to 1945, which was also led by Chairman Mao and the CPC. From the end of the War of Resistance against Japan until the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it encompasses the historical period of the War of People’s Liberation, or the Third Revolutionary Civil War against Chiang Kai-shek, supported by American imperialism. Chiang Kai-shek represented the interests of large landowners and the bourgeoisie in the country, who sought to snatch the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance from the hands of the people and keep China as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under their dictatorship. On the one hand, the Communist Party of China, representing the interests of the proletariat and the masses, resolutely defended the gains of the people’s struggle and worked towards the creation of a new China, a China of new democracy for the broad masses under the leadership of the proletariat. Thanks to the correct leadership of the Communist Party, the Chinese people achieved a great national victory in just four years of struggle: the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and the creation of a new China.
Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of correctly managing the fundamental contradictions of the democratic revolution and the changes that occur in their interrelation. Because in the initial phase of the democratic revolution, the contradiction between the masses and feudalism is the primary contradiction, which we emphasize because failing to recognize this will inevitably lead to failures and costs in the development of the revolution. Then, with the development of the revolution, due to the intervention of imperialism, it changes, polarization occurs, and the primary contradiction shifts, as we have just seen in the previous paragraph, as it happened in China.
In the same document of the Third Plenum, Chairman Gonzalo, in this regard, states:
“Rectification Campaign. Specific documentation. Let’s
also highlight that, as in other cases, the Ayacucho Zonal Com-
mittee has been asked to study certain documents. We are all
studying three documents in the Rectification Campaign:
Regarding Our Policy, Quotations on the People’s War by
Chairman Mao, and The Construction of the Party, the docu-
ment by Bandera Roja.(6) However, each committee is being in-
structed to study specific documents or consider such experiences
and lessons from Marxism for their own work. In this case, the
Ayacucho Zonal Committee has been tasked with studying three
documents by Chairman Mao that form a unit. They are titled
The Role of the Communist Party of China in the National War
(the first one), The Issue of Independence and Initiative Within
the United Front (the second one), and Problems of War and
Strategy (the third one). These documents are the result of the
same meeting of the CPC’s leadership, during which Chairman
Mao analyzed these three issues for the direction and guidance
of the anti-Japanese war. This occurred when there was a shift in
the contradiction, which became a contradiction between the Chinese
nation and Japanese imperialism. One might wonder: but we are not
precisely in that contradiction. That’s true; our primary contradiction
is between the popular masses and semi-feudalism. That is the
main one. However, there are three contradictions; the other two
are against bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism. These are three
is between the popular masses and semi-feudalism. That is the
main one. However, there are three contradictions; the other two
are against bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism. These are three
contradictions that exist in the country. While that is the main point,
we must consider that the development of people’s war, the issue of seizing
we must consider that the development of people’s war, the issue of seizing
power throughout the country, inevitably leads to clashes with
imperialism. Inevitably, it’s like two plus two equals four. Therefore,
this contradiction will become primary. Why? Imperialism could not,
in any way, tolerate us taking power while they simply watched. They
imperialism. Inevitably, it’s like two plus two equals four. Therefore,
this contradiction will become primary. Why? Imperialism could not,
in any way, tolerate us taking power while they simply watched. They
could not allow that, especially in America. This is a specific issue to consider,
seeing American imperialism as the major enforcer aiming to become the
sole hegemonic superpower. Imperialism always fights
against the seizure of power and strives to crush the revolution, especially
against the seizure of power and strives to crush the revolution, especially
where the danger is greater. Where does the danger arise in Latin America?
In Peru, that’s the fact. Latin America is the direct sphere of influence, the
very foundation of its power to exploit and oppress this continent, and thus
use it as a base to establish hegemony worldwide, to be the sole hegemonist.
Because it needs its own base of influence to exercise it all over the globe.
Just as others have dreams, the American dream is the same, and it has been
exercising that power and influence in Americasince the 1910s. This is
something we must consider. They themselves say that Peru is a danger to
American imperialism, and it is true, and it isa growing, ever-increasing danger.
In synthesis, the fact that the people’s war is unfolding in a strategic equilibrium,
preparing for a strategic offensive to seize power, leads to a change in
contradiction, to the intervention of imperialism, mainly Yankee (referring to U.S. imperialism). We are in the midst of this transition; contradictions must
be viewed differently because there is polarization occurring in Peru. I believe
be viewed differently because there is polarization occurring in Peru. I believe
this needs to be acknowledged. In Peru, polarization is taking place; this
polarization implies that on one side, there is imperialism and the Peruvian
reactionaries, which includes bureaucratic capitalism, landowners, and all
reactionaries. On the other side, there is the people led by the Party as the
representative of the proletariat. This is a class struggle issue, with all
reactionaries and pro-imperialists on one side, led by the bourgeoisie, and on
the other side, all the classes that make up the people, led by the proletariat.
That is the problem. To understand this, one must remember or revisit what
Chairman Mao says about contradiction in Volume 1, on page 354 and the
following page.(7) He states: ‘In a semi-colonial country such as China, the
relationship between the principal contradiction and the non-principal
contradictions presents a complicated picture.’ He presents three possibilities:
the first one is ‘When imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a
country, all its various classes, except for some traitors,can temporarily unite in
a national war against imperialism.’ This is the first case, and it is indeed the
case when imperialists unleash an aggression, invading a country. For example,
when Japan invaded China, when Japan invaded Korea, or when the United
States invaded Vietnam, or when the social-imperialism led by the USSR
invaded Afghanistan, in those situations, the contradiction is between the
nation and imperialism. However, what distinguishes them is the aggression;
they aim to conquer and subjugate for their global interests. In other words,
it does not involve a revolution. This is the third case, where
there is aggression in line with their global struggles, attacking a country and
there is aggression in line with their global struggles, attacking a country and
taking possession of it. That’s the irst one, he says.
‘But in another situation,’ says the Chairman, ‘When imperialism carries on
‘But in another situation,’ says the Chairman, ‘When imperialism carries on
its oppression not by war, but by milder means - political, economic and cultural
- the ruling classes in semi-colonial countries capitulate to imperialism, and the
two form an alliance for the joint oppression of the masses of the people.’
When it doesn’t engage in military aggression, when there’s no direct attack,
it uses other means - political, economic, and cultural. ‘At such a time,’ he
continues, ‘the masses often resort to civil war against the alliance of imperialism
and the feudal classes, while imperialism often employs indirect methods rather
than direct action in helping the reactionaries in the semi-colonial countries to
oppress the people, and thus the internal contradictions become particularly sharp.’
An example is the Revolutionary War of 1911 in China and the ten-year Agrarian Revolutionary War that be- gan in 1927. This is our case; we have initiated
An example is the Revolutionary War of 1911 in China and the ten-year Agrarian Revolutionary War that be- gan in 1927. This is our case; we have initiated
an agrarian war, and it must be remembered. That’s why
the principal contradiction is against semifeudalism. However, since
there are three fundamental contradictions in Peru, we also fight against
the principal contradiction is against semifeudalism. However, since
there are three fundamental contradictions in Peru, we also fight against
bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism, but not as the principal one.
There has been an objective issue for some time regarding how this has been
There has been an objective issue for some time regarding how this has been
changing, and it even seems that the Party-Armed Forces contradiction is
emerging in perspective. In other words, we have considered that there is a change
in contradictions, but the decisive issue remains semifeudalism - combating
feudalism in its general form in Peru remains the principal contradiction, masses
versus semifeudalism, that’s the problem. This is how it has played out in Peru.
Then the Chairman says, ‘When a revolutionary civil war develops to
the point of threatening the very existence of imperialism and its running dogs, t
Then the Chairman says, ‘When a revolutionary civil war develops to
the point of threatening the very existence of imperialism and its running dogs, t
he domestic reactionaries, imperialism often adopts other methods in order to
maintain its rule; it either tries to split the revolutionary front from within or
sends armed forces to help the domestic reactionaries directly. At such a time,
foreign imperialism and domestic reaction stand quite openly at one pole while
the masses of the people stand at the other pole, thus forming the principal
contradiction which determines or influences the development of the other
contradictions.’ That’s what needs to happen. So, the issue at hand is the question
of the third point, in the meeting of the Political Bureau of 1990, there we already
raised the issue of polarization, this needs to be looked at, if I remember correctly,
I think we also discussed polarization in the First Plenary Session, we said that
polarization is occurring, and that’s the direction we are heading towards.
So then, we need to consider the three scenarios presented by the Chairman.
So then, we need to consider the three scenarios presented by the Chairman.
Firstly, when imperialism invades and unleashes aggression without there being a
revolution. This was a predominant case in the previous century, carried out by
all major powers. It still occurs in this century when there is no revolution, but
imperialism, due to its hegemonic conflicts, leads to this situation. This is how
it happens. Thesecond scenario he presents is when imperialism doesn’t intervene
directly but indirectly. In this case, if the revolution progresses, develops, and
directly but indirectly. In this case, if the revolution progresses, develops, and
ignites a people’s war, how does it do so? Through armed struggle, specifically
agrarian warfare. Why? Because we are talking about semi-feudal and semi-colonial countries. When discussing the relationship with imperialism, what we need to
emphasize is the semi-colonialnature of these countries. This is a crucial
consideration. The issue with regards to imperialism is that it’s semi-colonial, and
that’s why there is imperialist dominance – that’s the crux of the matter. The third circumstance he mentions is when the revolution advances, and imperialism has to
intervene. That’s the problem he’s pointing out. Imperialism intervenes, leading to polarization. What’s important to note here is that imperialism can intervene directly
by sending a large number of troops, or it can intervene directly as an advisor with
fewer troops. It can even intervene by mobilizing othersas a multinational force or
by using puppet regimes, neighboring states with appetites, to achieve its goals.
However, this doesn’t change the fact that it’s still imperialistic aggression, as
it’s ultimately imperialism pulling the strings. In other words, there are various
forms of intervention, and based on this, the contradictions are defined.
So, in Peru, we are in the process of polarization, and that’s why the imperialist
So, in Peru, we are in the process of polarization, and that’s why the imperialist
question comes into play. How is it intervening today? Through its low-intensity
warfare. Don’t they have advisors? However, its actions will either increase; they
can send in many troops or a few troops and bring in troops from neighboring
countries or send multinational troops. That’s the problem. And what’s the
consequence? It endangers us. And what does endanger mean? It means moving
towards the conquest of power throughout the country. That’s the danger.
Therefore, studying these documents, keeping in mind, without forgetting for a
moment, that the Chairman is already talking about the anti-Japanese war, which
means that the nation-imperialism contradiction is well-defined, will be very
useful for us. We can handle them well, use them to apply. Later on, we’ll have
to analyze other issues to see the polarization mentioned in Volume 4. It’s not
the problem at this moment. So, this serves us in perspective. This is how we
are prepared. Remember that we have been raising the issue of Yankee aggression
and intervention for a long time. All of this prepares us.”
The process of polarization raises the two poles at each stage of the rev-
olution and the change of contradiction. This is about identifying who our
main enemies are and who our friends are. This leads us to the problem of
the front of the revolution, and there is leftism and rightism in the imple-
mentation of the policy to unite all forces that can be united. In the cited
document, the Chairman says:
“Specific Documentation. (...) On Policy. This text has
been agreed to be studied in the Rectification Campaign, in Vol-
ume 2, page 461. The first issue that the Chairman ana-
lyzes here is the change in situation and change in policy,
that is, how the contradiction changes, as we discussed this
morning, remember? It refers to how the contradiction changes;
a change in contradiction leads to changes in policy. This means
that just as in China, they shifted from agrarian warfare to anti-
Japanese warfare, it implied a change. Similarly, for us, the
transition towards seizing power implies a shift, a change,
the situation changes, and this leads to changes in policy.
And in these changes in policy, we must always persist in
keeping in mind the fundamental characteristics of the
revolution. It says that the Chinese revolution has character-
istics; it is a democratic-bourgeois revolution in a semi-colonial
country and a prolonged revolution. These are the same charac-
teristics that we have. It’s on page 461,(8) very important.
On the other hand, the Chairman tells us that in the struggle in
China, in those stages and those changes, in the agrarian revolu-
tion, in the anti-Japanese revolution, or in the agrarian revolution
itself, there are moments that occur of opportunist ‘left’ line con-
trary to the opportunist right line. He says we must take this into
account, so both leftism and rightism occur. He says that
if one looks at the problem head-on during the time of Cheng
Tusiu, the alliance was everything and the struggle meant noth-
ing. Cheng Tusiu represents a rightist line, around the year 1927,
meaning the alliance with the Kuomintang was everything, and
the struggle meant nothing. However, he says that in the ‘leftist’
line of the agrarian revolution, the struggle was everything, and
the alliance meant nothing. In other words, while some saw unity,
unity without struggle, others saw struggle, struggle. This phe-
nomenon always occurs, and we must draw lessons from
it. This allows us to analyze our own reality (...).
On page 464,(9) the Chairman talks about deviations and the
development of policy, that is, how to combat deviations,
how to prevent them. He says, ‘To correct the lop-sided views
of many Party cadres on the question of tactics and their conse-
quent vacillations between ‘Left’ and Right, we must help them to
acquire an all-round and integrated understanding of the changes
and developments in the Party’s policy, past and present.’ Here
lies the problem; it’s important. In other words, the deviations
themselves. We need to learn that. That’s what it says: to forge,
to assist, to understand the Party’s policy and the deviations it
has had in the past, and what the current policy is, what de-
viations it might have. And why focus on the cadres? Because
cadres are the ones who convey the Party’s policy to the members
and, consequently, to all the masses. ‘In the Kuomintang areas,
there are many people who cannot seriously carry out the policy
of having well-selected cadres working underground for a long pe-
riod, of accumulating strength and biding our time, because they
underestimate the gravity of the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist
policy.’ Why, you ask? They cannot maintain a Party following
those rules of secrecy, compact organization, selectivity, effective-
ness, staying concealed, accumulating strength, and waiting for
the right moment. In other words, why don’t they keep the
Party hidden, secret, with the five necessities when de-
veloping their actions in the cities? Why? Because they
don’t understand, they underestimate the severity of this
government’s reactionary policy. That’s the reason; it’s
not for any other. So, the concern is to make them under-
stand. Then he tells us, ‘...many others who cannot carry out the
policy of expanding the united front,’ another problem, why? ‘be-
cause they over-simplify matters and consider the entire Kuom-
intang to be quite hopeless and are therefore at a loss what to do.’
why does he mention the Kuomintang? Because the problem for
him was that the Kuomintang allied with the CPC to pursue an
anti-Japanese policy. Our problem is not like that; it’s not
our situation. So, we need to differentiate. Our problem
is how to handle class divergences and how to unite var-
ious classes. But what happens? For example, some think
that the national bourgeoisie should not participate; they
think it’s corrupt, it belongs to the other camp, the op-
posite camp, that’s what they think. There are various
criteria within the Party that express this. They don’t
understand that there can also be contradictions within
the bourgeoisie itself. They don’t understand, they don’t
grasp that, and therefore, they don’t understand how to
penetrate them. And if imperialism directly invades, directly or
indirectly with other international forces, within the bourgeoisie
itself, there are individuals who, out of patriotism, defend the
homeland, just like within the upper layers of the bourgeoisie,
what the Chairman called ‘enlightened gentry,’ the very top lay-
ers of the middle bourgeoisie, further their national sense. Our
situation is not like that today, alright, but in the case of the na-
tional bourgeoisie, their incorporation is necessary and not well
understood, it gets confused. On the other hand, I repeat, class
divergences are not seen, nor are they differentiated, nor is it seen
how to use these contradictions within the big bourgeoisie, nor
are groups seen, so a single monolithic block is seen, one must
know how to classify, then.
What happened here, it tells us in the history of the CPC?
‘...those who held such views used to stress alliance to the ex-
clusion of struggle and overestimate one of the aspects of the
Kuomintang...’ if you look at the history of the Party, it
has always been ‘uniting with the bourgeoisie,’ and with
whom? The pretext for uniting with the national bour-
geoisie was essentially to align with the big bourgeoisie,
one of its factions. That is the history of the Party, that
is the history of Peru, until the split in 1965, that was
the prevailing criterion; so, ‘[they] rejected the policy of
independence and initiative within the united front,’ isn’t
that the policy they advocate in the frontism we criticized this
morning? That’s it. Well, thus, ‘they did not dare to boldly
expand the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces,’ anti-communists,
‘[nor] conducting resolute struggle against the Kuomintang’s pol-
icy of opposing and restricting the Communist Party.’ that is
the tradition of Peru, that is frontism, they do not fight deci-
sively with the bourgeoisie; what other deviation was there? ‘an
ultra-Left tendency has cropped up in many places as a result of
the anti-Communist ‘friction’ engineered by the Kuomintang’ an
ultra-left deviation of not uniting due to the frictions that existed,
so they could not unite for the anti-Japanese struggle; thus, we
must always consider ‘rightism’ and ‘ultra-leftism,’ I think that
is what matters most in this case for the Committee (…)”
and intervention for a long time. All of this prepares us.”
The process of polarization raises the two poles at each stage of the rev-
olution and the change of contradiction. This is about identifying who our
main enemies are and who our friends are. This leads us to the problem of
the front of the revolution, and there is leftism and rightism in the imple-
mentation of the policy to unite all forces that can be united. In the cited
document, the Chairman says:
“Specific Documentation. (...) On Policy. This text has
been agreed to be studied in the Rectification Campaign, in Vol-
ume 2, page 461. The first issue that the Chairman ana-
lyzes here is the change in situation and change in policy,
that is, how the contradiction changes, as we discussed this
morning, remember? It refers to how the contradiction changes;
a change in contradiction leads to changes in policy. This means
that just as in China, they shifted from agrarian warfare to anti-
Japanese warfare, it implied a change. Similarly, for us, the
transition towards seizing power implies a shift, a change,
the situation changes, and this leads to changes in policy.
And in these changes in policy, we must always persist in
keeping in mind the fundamental characteristics of the
revolution. It says that the Chinese revolution has character-
istics; it is a democratic-bourgeois revolution in a semi-colonial
country and a prolonged revolution. These are the same charac-
teristics that we have. It’s on page 461,(8) very important.
On the other hand, the Chairman tells us that in the struggle in
China, in those stages and those changes, in the agrarian revolu-
tion, in the anti-Japanese revolution, or in the agrarian revolution
itself, there are moments that occur of opportunist ‘left’ line con-
trary to the opportunist right line. He says we must take this into
account, so both leftism and rightism occur. He says that
if one looks at the problem head-on during the time of Cheng
Tusiu, the alliance was everything and the struggle meant noth-
ing. Cheng Tusiu represents a rightist line, around the year 1927,
meaning the alliance with the Kuomintang was everything, and
the struggle meant nothing. However, he says that in the ‘leftist’
line of the agrarian revolution, the struggle was everything, and
the alliance meant nothing. In other words, while some saw unity,
unity without struggle, others saw struggle, struggle. This phe-
nomenon always occurs, and we must draw lessons from
it. This allows us to analyze our own reality (...).
On page 464,(9) the Chairman talks about deviations and the
development of policy, that is, how to combat deviations,
how to prevent them. He says, ‘To correct the lop-sided views
of many Party cadres on the question of tactics and their conse-
quent vacillations between ‘Left’ and Right, we must help them to
acquire an all-round and integrated understanding of the changes
and developments in the Party’s policy, past and present.’ Here
lies the problem; it’s important. In other words, the deviations
themselves. We need to learn that. That’s what it says: to forge,
to assist, to understand the Party’s policy and the deviations it
has had in the past, and what the current policy is, what de-
viations it might have. And why focus on the cadres? Because
cadres are the ones who convey the Party’s policy to the members
and, consequently, to all the masses. ‘In the Kuomintang areas,
there are many people who cannot seriously carry out the policy
of having well-selected cadres working underground for a long pe-
riod, of accumulating strength and biding our time, because they
underestimate the gravity of the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist
policy.’ Why, you ask? They cannot maintain a Party following
those rules of secrecy, compact organization, selectivity, effective-
ness, staying concealed, accumulating strength, and waiting for
the right moment. In other words, why don’t they keep the
Party hidden, secret, with the five necessities when de-
veloping their actions in the cities? Why? Because they
don’t understand, they underestimate the severity of this
government’s reactionary policy. That’s the reason; it’s
not for any other. So, the concern is to make them under-
stand. Then he tells us, ‘...many others who cannot carry out the
policy of expanding the united front,’ another problem, why? ‘be-
cause they over-simplify matters and consider the entire Kuom-
intang to be quite hopeless and are therefore at a loss what to do.’
why does he mention the Kuomintang? Because the problem for
him was that the Kuomintang allied with the CPC to pursue an
anti-Japanese policy. Our problem is not like that; it’s not
our situation. So, we need to differentiate. Our problem
is how to handle class divergences and how to unite var-
ious classes. But what happens? For example, some think
that the national bourgeoisie should not participate; they
think it’s corrupt, it belongs to the other camp, the op-
posite camp, that’s what they think. There are various
criteria within the Party that express this. They don’t
understand that there can also be contradictions within
the bourgeoisie itself. They don’t understand, they don’t
grasp that, and therefore, they don’t understand how to
penetrate them. And if imperialism directly invades, directly or
indirectly with other international forces, within the bourgeoisie
itself, there are individuals who, out of patriotism, defend the
homeland, just like within the upper layers of the bourgeoisie,
what the Chairman called ‘enlightened gentry,’ the very top lay-
ers of the middle bourgeoisie, further their national sense. Our
situation is not like that today, alright, but in the case of the na-
tional bourgeoisie, their incorporation is necessary and not well
understood, it gets confused. On the other hand, I repeat, class
divergences are not seen, nor are they differentiated, nor is it seen
how to use these contradictions within the big bourgeoisie, nor
are groups seen, so a single monolithic block is seen, one must
know how to classify, then.
What happened here, it tells us in the history of the CPC?
‘...those who held such views used to stress alliance to the ex-
clusion of struggle and overestimate one of the aspects of the
Kuomintang...’ if you look at the history of the Party, it
has always been ‘uniting with the bourgeoisie,’ and with
whom? The pretext for uniting with the national bour-
geoisie was essentially to align with the big bourgeoisie,
one of its factions. That is the history of the Party, that
is the history of Peru, until the split in 1965, that was
the prevailing criterion; so, ‘[they] rejected the policy of
independence and initiative within the united front,’ isn’t
that the policy they advocate in the frontism we criticized this
morning? That’s it. Well, thus, ‘they did not dare to boldly
expand the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces,’ anti-communists,
‘[nor] conducting resolute struggle against the Kuomintang’s pol-
icy of opposing and restricting the Communist Party.’ that is
the tradition of Peru, that is frontism, they do not fight deci-
sively with the bourgeoisie; what other deviation was there? ‘an
ultra-Left tendency has cropped up in many places as a result of
the anti-Communist ‘friction’ engineered by the Kuomintang’ an
ultra-left deviation of not uniting due to the frictions that existed,
so they could not unite for the anti-Japanese struggle; thus, we
must always consider ‘rightism’ and ‘ultra-leftism,’ I think that
is what matters most in this case for the Committee (…)”
The Relationship Between the Class Struggle and the National Struggle
“We do not deny the class struggle, we adjust it.”
- Chairman Mao.(10)
“We are communists, our goal is communism, but now, why are
we fighting? (...) the objective of the war is to conquer
power in order to culminate the Democratic Revolution
and continue it as Socialist.”
- Chairman Gonzalo.
Finally, we quote from the Central Document of the Third Plenum, page
31:
“On page 206, Chairman Mao presents to us ‘MAINTAIN BOTH
THE UNITED FRONT AND THE INDEPENDENCE
OF THE PARTY,’ Once again, he emphasizes the issue of the
Front. What does the Front’s policy demand? It demands the
preservation of ideological, political, and organizational indepen-
dence, and one should not waver on that. Those who participate
in the Front raise issues, says Chairman Mao: ‘To speak of unity
alone while-denying independence is to abandon the Principle of
Democracy... independence within the united front is relative and
not absolute’ Of course, if it were absolute, there would never be
unity. So here, he analyzes the issue of the Front. Here, on page
207, he tells us that everything mentioned earlier ‘...The same is
true of the relationship between the class struggle and the na-
tional struggle. It is an established principle that in the War
of Resistance everything must be subordinated to the interests
of resistance. Therefore, the interests of the class struggle must
be subordinated to, and must not conflict with, the interests of
the War...’ of course, because it’s war that decides every-
thing; everything is subordinated to the interests of war.
Why? Because that war is aimed at the central task,
the central problem of everything, which is Power, the
conquest of Power that will solve all the issues. Further-
more, war is the primary means to resolve higher contra-
dictions; everything is subordinated to it. So, when four
classes unite, the interests of all four are subordinated to
maintaining the war. But maintaining the war implies
keeping it with its objectives, and the goal of the war is
to conquer Power in order to culminate the Democratic
Revolution and continue it as a Socialist one. That’s the
problem. Therefore, we cannot renounce the class’s in-
terests, its objectives, or its goals. That’s why the Chairman
tells us, ‘But classes and the class struggle are facts, and those
people who deny the fact of class struggle are wrong.
The theory which attempts to deny this fact is utterly wrong.
We do not deny the class struggle, we adjust it.’ So, we start
from the perspective that it’s a class front where these classes
contend and fight, but they must set aside their interests in favor
of the common goal, the war. For example, we are communists,
and our goal is communism. But now, why do we fight? To con-
quer and establish a People’s Republic of Peru, that’s what we
want—the People’s Republic, in other words, to culminate the
Democratic Revolution. And that’s what the peasantry wants,
24what the petty bourgeoisie wants, what the national bourgeoisie
wants; that’s their interest. But since we do not renounce the
class struggle, we persist and remain independent ideologically
and organizationally to then continue and lead. And because
that interest is the only one that can save all of humanity, we
organize and manage everything in order to achieve that because
otherwise, the other classes cannot be emancipated. That’s how
we act, but for each stage, we have our objectives. That’s
why the Chairman says, ‘We do not renounce the class
struggle; what we do is readjust it according to the ob-
jectives.”
Long live Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally Maoism!
Long live the 31st Anniversary of the Speech of Chairman Gonzalo!
Long live the 95th Anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party
of Peru!
Celebrate the 130th Anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao!
Peru People’s Movement
October 2023
October 2023
NOTES
1 MPP: Problems of War and Strategy, November 6, 1938.
2 MPP: possibly saying: of voting age.
3 RedLibrary: Quote is from On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, 1929, Note 1.
4 RedLibrary: Elections, No! People’s War, Yes!. 1990, Plan of Strategic Development.
5 RedLibrary: Second Plenum of the Central Committee: Building the Conquest of Power in the Midst of People’s War, 1991.
6 RedLibrary: This translates…”
7 RedLibrary: In the English version, it is on page 331. On Contradiction.
8 RedLibrary: In the English version, it is on page 441.
9 RedLibrary: Page 444 in the English version.
10 RedLibrary: The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War. October 1938, Selected Works, Volume 2.