- Economy-politics-war-
The militarization of the economy and the imperialist war deepens the crises and unemployment in the imperialist countries, mainly in the United States, as it is the sole hegemonic superpower, where both factions of state monopoly capitalism resort to the militarization of the economy and the arms race for the enrichment of the largest monopolists of financial capital and as part of the preparations for the world imperialist war, which they will carry out when they are ready; The fusion of the immense power of the monopolies with the power of the State assures them of enormous military orders under advantageous conditions that provide them with considerable benefits.
Imperialism is sinking in the middle of a complex system of wars of all kinds. Imperialist wars of aggression trigger military expenditures and the profits of the arms industry dominated by financial capital. The weight of war and the militarization of the economy is unloaded by the imperialist States on the masses of the proletariat and the people of the imperialist countries themselves, in this case, the United States and, much more, on the peoples oppressed by their condition as semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, where bureaucratic capitalism is developed at the service of imperialism.
The consequences for the working class of imperialist countries are the increase in taxes and debt. The decrease in the share of workers in the national income, the reduction of expenses for housing construction, public education and medical care, and the inflation and increase in the cost of living. Although this discharges part of the debt on the workers of the country itself, the majority is discharged on the oppressed peoples. We will touch on this problem more specifically later. As lawyers say, with documents in hand.
Greater parasitism and decomposition of imperialism, changes in production. Greater labor productivity in the metropolises and the displacement of productive activities with lower productivity to backward countries. Greater exploitation of workers, greater oppression and militarization and foreign war leads to greater reactionarization of the State, a reactionary bourgeois-democratic regime of rampant centralization of Power in the Executive, presidential absolutism, with increasing suppression of workers' rights and freedoms in the US. The crumbs that the imperialists throw to the working class of their countries are becoming less and less. The bosses of the bosses' unions, the union crust, complain that the pact with the bosses has been broken, that the so-called "welfare state" has been dismantled.
Elections are a means of domination for the Yankee bourgeoisie; they are neither an instrument of transformation for the proletariat and the people, nor a means to overthrow the power of the ruling class. Hence the correct approach: to use them solely for the purposes of agitation and propaganda, through an active boycott. It falls to the North American proletariat—through its Communist Party—to lead the socialist revolution, as part of and in the service of the global proletarian revolution.
Some fundamental issues
The defeat of representatives from one faction of the financial oligarchy by those from another faction of the same cannot be framed as a victory for the people, nor as an opening for "electoral rebellions against the billionaires"—that is, against the financial oligarchy, whether in its private-monopoly or state-monopoly form. The midterm elections have resulted in a shift in the balance of forces within the enemy’s camp (those at the top can no longer continue to govern as they once did).
The electoral defeat of the Republican Party (RP) does not represent a strategic shift in Yankee politics. It does, however, create more favorable conditions for the Democratic Party (DP) to engage in electoral manipulation—for instance, by leveraging its position to redraw electoral districts for representatives to the electoral colleges. Furthermore, it can block the appointment of "conservative" (Republican-aligned) judges to the Supreme Court, and so on. The struggle for control over the bureaucratic apparatus, the media, universities, and other institutions will intensify; the Democratic Party has secured a stronger foothold through its electoral victory.
Elections are presented and conducted as a defense of the obsolete, existing imperialist order and the evolution of North American society—a process that relies on the crudest and most brazen manipulation of the electorate. Without such manipulation, these states—which function as bourgeois dictatorships—could not continue to exist (Lenin, *The State and Revolution*).
It is necessary to expose the class character of the PD and the PR, to reveal the intentions they represent, and to show what they seek within a reactionary bourgeois democracy—a system characterized by the increasing suppression of benefits, rights, and freedoms.
Make use of the contradictions within the enemy’s own ranks.
Keep in mind the intertwining of struggles and wars—a concept discussed by Lenin—but this does not mean we should merge with others or trail behind them. We must not, under the pretext of fighting "ultrarightism" or fascism, end up tailing one of the reactionary factions; nor should we, in the name of opposing one superpower, end up tailing another superpower or imperialist power.
Apply the principle of "unite, differentiate, and lead."
Without a Party, an army, and a front composed of organized masses—all under the leadership of the Party—we cannot effectively reach out to encompass all the forces that could potentially be united. Absent these conditions, any other type of front will inevitably lead to trailing behind other forces, preventing the proletariat from directing the revolution through the Communist Party. A focus on "frentism" leads, sooner or later, to the dead end of electoralism and parliamentary cretinism. One cannot counter the necessity of a Communist Party to lead the revolution by proposing a so-called "Communist Movement," nor can one replace the leadership of the Communist Party with a mass organization—regardless of whether or not that organization is under the Party's guidance. The leadership of the revolution is exercised by the Communist Party; otherwise, there is no proletarian leadership of the revolution.
The Communist Party is distinct from—and opposed to—all other parties, even those that may seem closed or aligned. The notion of a "Communist Movement" is merely "frentism," and the idea that a mass organization could lead the proletarian movement is, in effect, a denial of the necessity for a Communist Party.
Using elections for agitation and propaganda remains entirely relevant. This includes carrying out an active boycott, following the principle: "before it begins, do everything to initiate it; once it has begun, do everything to develop it."
The problem of revolution in imperialist countries
The problem of revolution in imperialist countries is that, by plundering oppressed nations, the imperialists toss crumbs to the working class and the people they subjugate. Engels explained this in the 19th century, and Lenin analyzed and further developed the concept. In this way, a "crust" (or layer) is formed—from which trade union bureaucracies and "bourgeois workers' parties" (as Engels termed them, a concept later adopted by Lenin) emerge. That is the core problem.
However, one cannot claim that imperialism fails to ripen the conditions for revolution. In fact, as an imperialist power becomes mired in struggles against oppressed nations, the struggle within its own working class and among its own people intensifies. Yet, the situation is more complex because the ideological bombardment is systematic, and the imperialists attempt to mask the chains of oppression with those very crumbs. Regardless of the specific form it takes, the revolution will inevitably occur. Lenin himself argued that the revolution must integrate two movements: the national liberation movement—which, as Chairman Mao Zedong demonstrated exhaustively, is led by the proletariat—and the revolution within the imperialist countries themselves. These two must be combined; otherwise, the revolution cannot succeed. This was the position put forward by Chairman Gonzalo at the First Congress of the PCP (1988).
APPENDICES.
1) HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF
THESE TRUTHS A History of the United States, JILL LEPORE, W. W. NORTON & COMPANY, Independent Publishers Since 1923, New York
“On February 8, 1996, in an event broadcast live and over the Internet, Bill Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act in the reading room of the Library of Congress; he signed on paper and he also signed online, at a computer terminal. If little noticed at the time, Clinton’s approval of this startling piece of legislation would prove a lasting and terrible legacy of his presidency: it deregulated the communications industry, lifting virtually all of its New Deal antimonopoly provisions, allowing for the subsequent consolidation of media companies and prohibiting regulation of the Internet with catastrophic consequences.”
Sixteen
AMERICA, DISRUPTED
(…)
Between the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the election of Donald Trump fifteen years later, on November 9, 2016, the United States lost its way in a cloud of smoke. The party system crashed, the press crumbled, and all three branches of government imploded. There was real fear
that the American political process was being run by Russians, as if, somehow, the Soviets hadwon the Cold War after all. To observers who included the authors of books like How Democracy Ends, Why Liberalism Failed, How the Right Lost Its Mind, and How Democracies Die, it seemed, as Trump took office, as if the nation might break out in a civil war, as if the American experiment had failed, as if democracy itself were in danger of dying.
I.
IT BEGAN, in the year 1999, with a panic. Computer programmers predicted that at one second after midnight on January 1, 2000, all the world’s computers, unable to accommodate a year that did not begin with “19,” would crash. Even before the twenty-first century began, even before no small number of political dystopians forecast a thousand-year clash of civilizations or the imminent death of democracy, Americans were subjected to breathless warnings of millennial doom, a ticking clock catastrophe, not the global annihilation timed by the atomic age’s
Doomsday Clock but a disaster, a “Y2K bug,” embedded into the programs written to run on the microprocessor tucked into the motherboard of the hulking computer perched on every desktop.
After much rending of garments and gnashing of teeth, this bug was quietly and entirely fixed.
The end of the world averted, digital prophets next undertook to predict the exact date of the arrival of an Aquarian age of peace, unity, and harmony, ushered in by, of all things, the Internet.
In the spring of 2000, Wired, the slick, punk, Day-Glo magazine of the dot-com era, announced that the Internet had, in fact, already healed a divided America: “We are, as a nation, better educated, more tolerant, and more connected because of—not in spite of—the convergence of the Internet and public life. Partisanship, religion, geography, race, gender, and
other traditional political divisions are giving way to a new standard—wiredness—as an organizing principle for political and social attitudes.”39 Of all the wide-eyed technological boosterism in American history, from the telegraph to the radio, few pronouncements rose to such dizzying rhetorical heights.
(.…)
(...)But, beginning in 2001, with the war on terror, the United States undermined and even abdicated the very rules it had helped to establish, including prohibitions on torture and wars of aggression.40 By 2016, a “by any means necessary” disregard for restraints on conduct had come to characterize American domestic politics as well. “If you see somebody getting ready to throw a tomato,” Trump told supporters at a campaign rally in Iowa, “knock the crap out of them, would you?”41 Countless factors contributed to these changes. But the crisis of American moral authority that began with the war on terror at the start of the twenty-
first century cannot be understood outside of the rise of the Internet, which is everything a rule-based order is not: lawless, unregulated, and unaccountable.
(…)
On February 8, 1996, in an event broadcast live and over the Internet,
Bill Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act in the reading room of the Library of Congress; he signed on paper and he also signed online, at a computer terminal. If little noticed at the time, Clinton’s approval of this startling piece of legislation would prove a lasting and terrible legacy of his presidency: it deregulated the communications industry, lifting virtually all of its New Deal antimonopoly provisions, allowing for the subsequent consolidation of media companies and prohibiting regulation of the Internet with catastrophic consequences.
Nevertheless, that the U.S. government would even presume to legislate the Internet—even if only to promise not to regulate it—alarmed the Internet libertarians. On the day Clinton signed the bill, Barlow, ex-hippie become the darling of world bankers and billionaires, watching from
the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, wrote a Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. . . .Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders.
He posted this statement on the web, where it became one of the very first posts to spread, as was said, like a virus, an infection.
Cyberutopians who had no use for government ignored the altogether inconvenient fact that of course not only the Internet itself but also nearly all the tools used to navigate it, along with the elemental inventions of the digital age, had been built or subsidized by taxpayer-funded, government-sponsored research. The iPhone, taking only one example, depended on the unquestionable and extraordinary ingenuity of Apple, but it also depended on U.S. government–funded research that had earlier resulted in several key technological developments, including GPS, multi-touch screens, LCD displays, lithium-ion batteries, and cellular networks. Nevertheless, Barlow and his followers believed that the Internet existed entirely outside of government, as if it had sprung up, mirabile dictu, out of nowhere, before and outside of civil society and the rule of law, in the borderless psychedelic fantasy world of cyberspace. “I ask you of the past to leave us alone,” Barlow pleaded. But if the futurists were uninterested in the past,
they seemed also strangely incautious about the future. With rare exception, early Internet boosters, who fought for deregulation and antitrust measures even as they benefited from the munificence of the federal government, evidenced little concern about the possible consequences of those measures on income inequality and political division in the United States and around the world.
The Internet, a bottomless sea of information and ideas, had profound effects on the diffusion of knowledge, and especially on its speed and reach, both of which were accelerated bysmartphones. If not so significant to human history as the taming of fire, it was at least as significant as the invention of the printing press. It accelerated scholarship, science, medicine, and education; it aided commerce and business. But in its first two decades, its unintended economic and political consequences were often dire. Stability, in American politics, had depended not on the wealth of the few but on the comfort of the many, not on affluence but on
security, and a commitment to the notion of a commonwealth. The Internet did not destroy the American middle class, but it did play a role in its decline. It fueled economic growth and generated vast fortunes for a tiny clutch of people at a time when the poor were becoming poorer and the middle class disappearing. It turned out that the antimonopoly regulations of the industrial era, far from being obsolete, were sorely needed in the information age. And the vaunted promise of Internet connection, the gauzy fantasy of libertarians and anarchists who imagined a world without government, produced nothing so much as a world disconnected and
distraught.
Silicon Valley, as it grew, earned a reputation as a liberal enclave, but it also drew a younger generation of libertarians, who had come not from the counterculture but from the New Right. Peter Thiel, born in Germany in 1967, had gone to Stanford, and then to Stanford Law School, where in 1987 he had founded the Stanford Review with funding from Irving Kristol. It aimed to counter campus multiculturalism, feminism, and political correctness, whose rise at Stanford Thiel had lamented in The Diversity Myth, a 1990s update and dilution of God and Man at Yale.
George Gilder and Robert Bork were among Thiel’s heroes. (Bork’s writings on the error of antitrust laws informed much Silicon Valley libertarianism.) After a brief career as a lawyer and a stock trader, Thiel had returned to California in 1996, just in time for the dot-com boom, which followed the lifting of restrictions on commercial traffic on the Internet. Ten thousand websites were launched every day, poppies in a field. In 1996, Bob Dole, an unlikely but bold pioneer, became the first presidential candidate to have a website. Amazon was founded in 1994, Yahoo! in 1995, Google in 1998. In 1998, Thiel co founded PayPal, hoping that it would free the citizens of the world from government-managed currency. “PayPal will give citizens worldwide more direct control over their currencies than they ever had before,” he promised. The Silicon Valley entrepreneur—almost always a man—became the unrivaled hero of the Second Gilded Age. He was a rescued man, the male breadwinner defended by George Gilder in the 1970s against the forces of feminism, saved, and newly seen as saving the nation itself. Multibillion-dollar Internet deals were made every day. In four years, the value of dot-coms, many of which had not earned a profit, rose by as much as 3,000 percent. By 1999, Bill Gates, at forty-three, had become the richest man in the world, and Microsoft the first corporation in history valued at more than half a trillion dollars.
(…)
“The Internet is the most democratizing innovation we’ve ever seen,” Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean’s campaign manager said in 2004, “more so even than the printing press.” At the time, many journalists agreed. Tom Brokaw talked about the “democratization of news,” and conservative journalists, in particular, celebrated the shattering
of the “power of elites” to determine what is news and what is not.
Compared to newspapers and broadcast television news, the information available on the Internet was breathtakingly vast and thrilling; it was also uneven, unreliable, and, except in certain cases, unrestrained by standards of reporting, editing, and fact-checking. The Internet didn’t leave seekers of news “free.” It left them bruatally constrained. It accelerated the
transmission of information, but the selection of that information—the engine that searched for it —was controlled by the biggest unregulated monopoly in the history of American business.Google went public in 2004. By 2016, it controlled nearly 90 percent of the market.
The Internet transformed the public sphere, blurring the line between what political scientists had for decades called the “political elite” and the “mass public,” but it did not democratize politics. Instead, the Internet hastened political changes that were already under way. A model of citizenship that involved debate and deliberation had long since yielded to a model of citizenship that involved consumption and persuasion. With the Internet, that model yielded to a model of citizenship driven by the hyperindividualism of blogging, posting, and tweeting, artifacts of a
new culture of narcissism, and by the hyperaggregation of the analysis of data, tools of a new authoritarianism. Data collected online allowed websites and search engines and eventually social media companies to profile “users” and—acting as companies selling products rather than
as news organizations concerned with the public interest—to feed them only the news and views with which they agreed, and then to radicalize them. Public opinion polling by telephone was replaced by the collection and analysis of data. Social media, beginning with Facebook, moving
fast and breaking things, exacerbated the political isolation of ordinary Americans while strengthening polarization on both the left and the right, automating identity politics, and contributing, at the same time, to a distant, vague, and impotent model of political engagement. In a wireless world, the mystic chords of memory, the ties to timeless truths that held the nation together, faded to ethereal invisibility.
2) Trump urges public to trust AI industry self-regulation
Concern in Washington reaches fever pitch after autonomous AI agents polled government websites, but the White House has focused on the technology's potential. September 29, 2026
After weeks of Washington being gripped by a wave of fear about artificial intelligence gone awry, the Trump administration on Tuesday sought to reassure a skeptical public that it can embrace the technology — and trust the industry to police itself.
By Ian Duncan and Cat Zakrzewski
Standing with the world’s richest and most powerful tech executives Tuesday outside the West Wing, President Donald Trump said that he and they had signed a voluntary accord intended to ensure the industry develops AI safely.
Trump described the agreement as “morally binding.” The text suggests that codifying its terms may make sense “over time.”
The agreement capped a day in which Trump sought to reinforce his pitch that AI is an engine of prosperity that should not be restrained by government.
“In order to build a positive future for the American people and the world, we believe every company is responsible for developing its own technology safely and in a way that builds trust with customers and the public,” the agreement says.
Under the accord, the companies agreed to develop internal controls to prevent AI systems from spinning out of control.
“I’m seeing tremendous self-policing,” Trump said, surrounded by Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei and Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg.
The accord marks the most significant action the White House has taken to date to respond to growing concerns about AI risks, as even some of the industry’s top leaders warn that companies should slow down development.
The commitments reflect many of the measures that labs building advanced AI systems had already adopted, and the accord falls far short of the government intervention that some technologists have warned is necessary as AI rapidly advances.
The announcement of the accord followed what Trump called a “very productive” and “extremely friendly” lunch at the White House with House Speaker Mike Johnson and tech executives, including Amazon founder Jeff Bezos. (Bezos owns The Washington Post.)
Trump also sought to portray AI as a technology that can bring convenience to Americans. Before lunch, he launched America.gov, a government chatbot for researching public services, as part of a day-long event featuring members of his Cabinet and tech executives.
Trump also signed an order that will rename AI as “superintelligence” in government documents, as he attempts to rebrand a technology that has sparked deep public anxiety, resisting calls for the government to craft guardrails.
The day’s focus on AI’s promise contrasts with growing questions about the technology’s trajectory. AI firms say their latest systems have become increasingly powerful, showing signs of being able to design their own more-potent successors. But companies have struggled to keep control of the technology, as rogue AI agents have hacked into company and government systems, and a roster of top industry figures have warned that the end result could be catastrophic for humanity.
Last week, it was disclosed that the federal government itself had been a victim, with a handful of websites probed by AI agents deployed by ChatGPT maker OpenAI. (The Post has a content partnership with OpenAI.)
Yet, even as the public’s concerns have grown and Democrats in Congress have pressed for regulation, Trump has largely dismissed the risk, calling it a “hoax.” On Tuesday, he accused the Democrats of stifling growth and technological progress because that could benefit Republicans.
The events on Tuesday propel a different narrative than the warnings issued by company CEOs in recent weeks. AI’s many boosters expect the technology will invigorate the economy, push the boundaries of science and help cure diseases. But that message has found only limited traction with a public worried about job losses and rogue bots sowing chaos online.
“We do not surrender to fears about what technologies will do to us,” he said Tuesday. “We decide that those technologies will do for us some very, very incredible things.”
Democrats in Congress said the White House’s response failed to meet the moment. Sen Mark Warner (Va.), the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, contrasted the CEOs’ warnings with the president’s response: renaming AI.
“But changing what we call artificial intelligence does nothing to address the very real risks that come with increasingly powerful AI systems,” Warner said.
A ‘historic’ gathering
As dozens of administration officials and tech executives gathered for lunch Tuesday in the East Room, there was little public sign of the divisions within the tech industry and the Trump administration over the future of AI.
Executives sitting around the table have expressed wildly divergent views about the perils of AI and the government’s role in responding to its potential pitfalls. Trump sat between Elon Musk, who supported calls to slow down AI development last month, and Huang, who has resisted calls for any coordinated slowdown, saying it is up to individual companies to ensure that their products are safe. Amodei, the head of Anthropic who led the calls to pace development of advanced AI systems, joined the lunch after having his first one-on-one dinner Sunday with Trump.
After the event, a reporter asked all the executives if they agreed that no government guardrails are necessary and that the industry can self-police.
“I can tell you the answer is yes,” Trump said, before any of the CEOs spoke. He then asked Huang to speak.