We hereby share the latest version note with some grammatical corrections and changes to improve readability, published by the Association of New Democracy – Germany (Nuevo Peru) on August 24.
THE FASCIST GOVERNMENT OF K. FUJIMORI (FP) IS THE PRODUCT
OF A REACTIONARY PLOT
1. Introduction
The new fascist, genocidal, and
country-selling government of Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza Popular – Popular
Force) is the product of an electoral farce and fraud carried out over
two rounds. The people were compelled to vote, and Keiko Fujimori
received 2,877,678 votes—approximately 10.528% of the total electoral
roll—while voter abstention stood at 7,157,687, representing 26.194% of
eligible voters. Such was Keiko’s much-celebrated triumph—a figure far
lower than the number of abstentions in the first round (April 12–13,
2026). It was only in the second round (June 7), through the plot of
Peruvian reactionaries, revisionist forces, the armed forces, and
imperialism, that she ascended to the presidency. The delay by electoral
authorities in announcing the results of both rounds was linked to this
collusion.
The new government of Keiko Fujimori and
FP “represents the continuity of the regime that has governed in recent
years, re-elected on June 7,” according to political scientist Juan de
la Puente in an article published in the reactionary newspaper La
República titled ” a Shared or Divided Future?” He adds:
“The electoral campaign and recent
statements by its spokespersons indicate that Fuerza Popular will not
govern starting from scratch—’Fujimori returns,’ ‘order returns,’ and
‘Fujimori will govern just as Fujimori governed’—but rather will be
doubly committed to continuity: that of the 1992–2000 regime and that of
the 2003–2026 regime.”
The interregnum mentioned by the author of
the cited article refers to the so-called transitional government of
Paniagua—overseen by Yankee imperialism—and the first two years of the
government of Toledo, the “Yankee with the chuyo [Note: Andean knit
cap].” This period, spanning both administrations, served to perpetuate
the regime established by Alberto Fujimori, albeit with some cosmetic
changes and personnel shifts.
2. Crisis of the fascist regime and failure of the reactionary 2026 elections
Keiko Fujimori’s “continuity” government
was born marked by the crisis of the regime and the failure of the
reactionary elections; it therefore lacks the “legitimacy” at the ballot
box that it claims.
It is a general crisis of bureaucratic
capitalism and the old State; a crisis at the summit—specifically, a
crisis of the dying, genocidal, and country-selling fascist regime. It
is a government representing the continuity of the regime that has ruled
for the last 24 years, having been reelected on June 7.
In Peru, elections serve as an instrument
of domination for feudal big landlords and the big bourgeoisie to rotate
reactionary officials; they serve to preserve or develop the Peruvian
State—a landlord-bureaucratic State, a formal republic, and a
dictatorship of big landlords and the big bourgeoisie in the service of
imperialism, mainly Yankee imperialism.
Elections have been—as could not be
otherwise within the prevailing social order—an instrument in the hands
of the big bourgeoisie. This is the defining feature of the Peruvian
State’s electoral processes and what has determined the class character
of elections in the country.
Imperialism intervenes in semi-colonial
countries—as it always does—to influence elections through various forms
of interventions; while it is not common for imperialist governments to
publicly back candidates, or parties—as is currently happening with
Trump’s Yankee imperialist government—they have historically preferred
to act through agents, embassies, and national and international media.
However, it is common for elections in our countries to be subjected to
monitoring by imperialist governments and their international
institutions—such as the OAS, the EU, and Transparency
International—which guarantee recognition of the new lackey government
based on whether the elections are deemed “democratic” or
“undemocratic.” If the defining characteristic of these reactionary
elections is their role as an instrument of imperialist intervention,
then we are facing a case of the deprivation of formal sovereignty; the
country would have shifted from being a semi-colony to a full colony.
The people can expect nothing good from
the old semi-colonial and semi-feudal Peruvian society, in which
bureaucratic capitalism operates in the service of imperialism, mainly
US imperialism and the old State. Nothing good for the people comes from
reactionary elections. “Republican institutions have failed and lie in ruins,”
observes the historian Zapata in the aforementioned cited work. The old
State exists only to be swept away by the People’s War; nothing and no
one can save it—it is merely a matter of time.
2.1 Crisis of society and the old State; crisis of the parties
The latest reactionary failure to which we
refer, was a foregone conclusion from the moment the elections were
called, in 2025, by the genocidal Dina Boluarte. This new electoral
farce and reactionary fraud was concocted by all those who ultimately
participated (36 in total) as well as some who were left out of the
reactionary event.
This failure reflects the crisis of the
reactionary parties—itself an expression of the crisis of society and
the old State; those who participate in these institutions do so for the
spoils. That explains the political fragmentation and the crisis of
party representation. Governability is realized through the upper
echelons of the State bureaucracy—the “technocratic autopilot”—assembled
since the early 1990s using Peruvian officials drawn from international
imperialist institutions, major imperialist corporations, and the
comprador class (the so-called “revolving door”), and is guaranteed by
the Armed Forces.
A crisis of the system, one expression of
which is “widespread corruption,” and a crisis of the so-called powers
of the State. A crisis of the regime and of the government currently
heading it.
ON “WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION”
“Widespread corruption” is not—as the
revisionist and capitulationist LOD maintains—merely one of the three
main problems of Peruvian society; that view attempts to invert the
terms in order to justify its own “parliamentary cretinism.” Rather, it
is a scourge inherent to the moribund system of Peruvian society.
Corruption: a scourge of the system
Corruption is a scourge of the
semi-colonial and semi-feudal system upon which a bureaucratic
capitalism develops—a capitalism serving imperialism, mainly Yankee
imperialism. Corruption lies at the root of the country’s semi-colonial
character, a concept clearly defined by Lenin when discussing the formal
sovereignty of semi-colonial countries; we quote:
“National self-determination means
political independence. Imperialism seeks to violate such independence
because political annexation often makes economic annexation easier,
cheaper (easier to bribe officials, secure concessions, put through
advantageous legislation. etc.), more convenient, less troublesome—just
as imperialism seeks to replace democracy generally by oligarchy. […] Economic “annexation” is fully “achievable” without political annexation and is widely practised. […] Argentina, for example, is in reality a “trade colony” of Britain, [Economic dependence] enable Britain to “annex” these countries economically without violating their political independence.”
In other words, it turns independent countries into semi-colonies. “That
question is the relation of economics to politics: the relation of
economic conditions and the economic content of imperialism to a certain
political form. […] Once we have the dominance of
commodity production, of the bourgeoisie, of the power of money—bribery
(direct or through the stock exchange) is “achievable” under any form of
government and under any kind of democracy. […] under a bourgeois system finance capital ‘can freely bribe and buy any government and any official.’ [With imperialism] the power of the stock exchange increases.[…] then
how can Kievsky maintain, without lapsing into a very curious “logical
contradiction”, that the immense wealth of the trusts and the banks,
which have thousands of millions at their command, cannot “achieve” the
domination of finance capital over a foreign, i.e., politically
independent, republic??”
(Lenin, A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism)
2.2 Deepening crisis of the old Peruvian society and aggravation of the scourge of corruption
So, what is happening? It is that, as a
result of the deepening general crisis of bureaucratic capitalism and
the increased penetration of imperialism into our economy and the life
of the country, corruption has worsened and become “generalized.”
As a consequence—stemming from the general
crisis of the prevailing system and the regime, and the worsening of
the ills inherent to them—the very foundation of its “democracy” (or
rather, the “legitimation” process for designating its reactionary
authorities) is eroding: “parties are losing their capacity for representation” and are instead “transforming into platforms for conducting business through the State.” The quoted ideas above come from the book “Political Struggle and Social Crisis in Republican Peru” (1821–2021) by Antonio Zapata, who further adds:
“For its part, the preferential vote
had eroded the internal life of parties because the competition for
parliamentary seats had shifted to within the parties themselves. High
levels of party-switching completed a dismal and decadent picture.
Indeed, a democracy based on hollow ‘shell parties’ is highly precarious
and offers no stability.”
A columnist from the Elcano Royal
Institute (representing Spanish imperialism) draws an important
distinction regarding the “party structure” in Peru, writing:
“The old, historic parties began their
decline (in the 1990s) and were replaced by small, ephemeral
organizations centered around candidates, ‘caudillos’ [Note: chiefs], or political entrepreneurs like César Acuña or Rafael López Aliaga. Fujimorism stands as the exception, maintaining a national party structure—except in the southern Andean region.
Due to fragmentation and the crisis of representation, no party or
candidate surpasses the 20% mark in the first round of voting. In the
post-Fujimori era, the two candidates advancing to the runoff used to
garner a combined total of over 50% of the vote, but since 2021, they
have failed to reach even 35%.” (Se peruaniza el Perú [Peru Becomes
Peruvianized], Rogelio Núñez Castellano, May 25, 2026, Elcano). The
percentages cited refer to valid votes cast.
In this context, the so-called
“traditional parties”—such as APRA, AP, the PPC, and the revisionist
minor parties that existed until the early 1990s—have collapsed, giving
rise to “parties” organized around private interests, as well as
“clientelist” and “shell” parties; these appear on the political stage
only to vanish or shift their orientation as they are transferred to new
“owners.” Yet FP endures, maintaining its party structure and a
corporatist character.
Juntos por el Perú (Together for Peru)
changed hands: according to Jehude Simons—a former minister under Alan
García—when Roberto Sánchez served as his party secretary, Sánchez stole
the membership rolls and registered the new party under his own name as
JPP.
JPP is essentially an “electoral shell” or
“empty vessel” party; during elections, it functions merely to gather
congressional candidates—figures with their own specific agendas hailing
from other minor parties.
In the most recent elections, individuals
from various fringe parties were elected to the Senate and Chamber of
Deputies—figures from “Perú Libre,” the “Castillista” faction, the
revisionist and capitulationist LOD, and so on. These are the so-called
“guest candidates” who, thanks to the preferential voting system, manage
to prevail over candidates belonging to the party’s own official ranks.
Yet, this arrangement allows the “owner” of this shell party—Roberto
Sánchez of JPP—to advance to the runoff election despite securing a
meager percentage of the vote.
3. Reactionary plot to preserve the old State
The fleeting flourishing of bureaucratic
capitalism—driven by high raw material prices in the global imperialist
market, lasting nearly 15 years—came to an end when prices began to fall
and the economy of social-imperialist China ran into trouble around
2016. That “boom,” which had generated “growth without development”
(according to ECLAC), was over. The result was a major crisis of
bureaucratic capitalism and an exacerbation of the crisis across all
spheres and within the political regime—specifically, the current
fascist regime.
The reactionary plot:
Since the 2016 elections, reactionary and
revisionist parties—acting in a mix of collusion and struggle—have
instigated five coups d’état (in 2018, 2020, 2022, 2025, and 2026) as
they vie for control over the key institutions of the old
landlord-bureaucratic State, which serves imperialism—mainly Yankee
imperialism. However, elections are the preferred instrument for
replacing reactionary authorities; for this reason, the reactionary plot
has manifested itself most notably around the electoral system and
laws, which foster political fragmentation.
Amidst this political fragmentation, the
so-called “traditional parties”—such as APRA, AP, and the PPC—along with
the revisionist “micro-parties” that emerged in the early 1990s, have
collapsed. In their place, “parties” organized around private interests
have arisen—”clientelist” parties that appear on the political stage
only to vanish, or that shift their orientation as they are transferred
to new “owners.” Yet, FP endures, maintaining its corporatist party
structure.
Plot in reactionary elections: the “Fujimorismo” vs. “Anti-Fujimorismo” polarization
The reality is that, since 2011, electoral
fronts have formed around the divide between “Fujimorismo” and
“anti-Fujimorismo”. To illustrate this, we quote from the Elcano
article:
“Fragmentation coexists with the
polarization that, since 2011, has manifested as a struggle between
“Fujimorismo” and “anti-Fujimorismo”. The“anti-Fujimorismo”
vote—amplified by the rejection Keiko herself elicits—has prevented the
Fuerza Popular (FP) candidate from winning, despite her having rebuilt
the “Fujimorismo” movement, made it competitive, and secured a
spot in the runoff elections of 2011, 2016, 2021, and 2026. Five years
ago, she fell 44,000 votes short of Pedro Castillo, and ten years ago,
41,000 votes short of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) […]”
Where has this dichotomy—which also
translates into a choice between “fascism” and “anti-fascism” during the
elections to replace the reactionary authorities of the old
State—actually led? To answer this question, we continue with the
aforementioned quote:
“[…] Visceral and heterogeneous
anti-Fujimorism—united solely by its rejection of Fujimori’s legacy, now
embodied by his daughter—paved the way for the victory of vastly
different candidates. In 2011, Ollanta Humala shifted from being an
anti-establishment leader flirting with Chavismo to an establishment
figure. In 2016, PPK—a center-right technocrat—won, followed by Castillo
in 2021 […].” (the counter-revolutionary “rondero”)
In other words, this so-called
“polarization” served to energize the reactionary elections and the
attempt to legitimize the new reactionary government that emerged from
this electoral farce and fraud. Therefore, for us, the issue is not one
of Fujimorism versus anti-Fujimorism, or fascism versus anti-fascism,
but rather of revolution versus counter-revolution; this entails waging a
People’s War to carry out the Democratic Revolution and applying an
active boycott against the reactionary elections.
On the corporatist character of FP
Keiko Fujimori’s party, FP, has a history
dating back to the era of Alberto Fujimori—that is, to the establishment
of the current fascist regime.
Keiko Fujimori relies on the legacy inherited along with her name: “the old clientelism practiced by her father”
(Zapata). The cited author fails to distinguish between clientelist
organization and corporatist organization, even though he accurately
describes how Fujimori established this corporatist structure when he
writes the following:
“During the 1990s, neighborhood
organizations lost their autonomous character because they were subsumed
into the State through the social aid provided by Fujimori. With
neighborhood society weakened by the crisis of the previous decade […]”
“[…] (“clientelism”) that was imposed with an iron fist by Fujimori”
“[…] with an iron fist and handouts”
Well, it is said that Fujimori brought this “social aid” to the neighborhoods, but in reality, it was the Army and its intelligence service; Fujimori himself once said: “behind every aid truck go members of the Army intelligence service.” Clearly, this was part of the so-called “Low-Intensity warfare”
directed by Yankee imperialism—part of its “civic action” and “control
of population and resources.” Thus, the self-help groups within popular
organizations transformed into corporatist organizations. A sector of
these corporatist organizations is managed by revisionist petty parties,
relying on the work of NGOs that also operate among the masses in the
service of the “Low-Intensity” counter-insurgency war.
For this reason, the Party characterized it as a form of fascism suited to combating the People’s War.
Electoral rules exacerbate political fragmentation and serve the reactionary plot
Electoral laws and regulations—as we have
seen—are not the root cause of the crisis of the parties (the foundation
of their “democracy”); however, these rules foster or aggravate
political fragmentation at local and regional levels. They facilitate
the electoral participation of mere labels or electoral fronts belonging
to chiefs who answer to private (“clientelist”) interests. This allows
the Popular Force party—based on a corporatist structure established by
Fujimori after April 5, 1992—to operate despite having secured the votes
of not even 11% of the total eligible electorate. …in the last two
elections (2021 and 2026), controls the majority of key State
institutions.
In light of the above, the commentary on
“vote dispersion” found in the article on Spanish imperialism published
by the Elcano Royal Institute—which we quote below—is of interest:
“Figure 2. Vote dispersion in Peruvian presidential elections, 2001–2026 Elections
Vote concentration among the top two candidates in the first round
2001 (60%)
Alejandro Toledo 35% Alan García 25%
2006 (54%)
Alan García 24% Ollanta Humala 30%
2011 (54%)
Ollanta Humala 31% Keiko Fujimori 23%
2016 (60%)
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 21% Keiko Fujimori 39%
2021 (31%)
Pedro Castillo 18% Keiko Fujimori 13%
2026 (29%)
Keiko Fujimori 17% Roberto Sánchez 12%
Against this backdrop of increasing parliamentarization, parties function as
patronage machines that respond more to particular interests than to
ideological principles—as demonstrated by Congress’s election of José
Balcázar to replace Jerí. This resulted in an unnatural alliance—denied
by Fujimori—between the Fujimorist FP and Perú Libre (PL), the
Marxist-Leninist-Mariateguist party that backed Castillo. Fujimorists,
‘Cerronistas’ (followers of Vladimir Cerrón, the PL leader), and other
allied forces worked to preserve their influence over key state
institutions. Despite their differences, they formed a parliamentary
bloc that acted in coordination to secure institutional control.”
Regarding the parliamentary rules approved by the previous Congress, the Elcano commentator states:
“The new electoral system reinforced
this dynamic, resulting in a less fragmented Parliament that remains in
the hands of the parties that have controlled it since 2016 and have
legislated in favor of specific pressure groups and the illicit
economy—particularly FP and López Aliaga’s Renovación Popular (RP),
alongside the ‘Castillista’ faction restructured within Juntos por el
Perú. These three forces will control the Senate, a key factor for
governability.”
In other words, a new Parliament—this time bicameral—that will continue to serve the reactionary plot, the so-called “Congress/Boluarte 2023–2025 model” or “parliamentary pact 2.0,”
according to political scientist de la Puente (see the aforementioned
article). It is a collusion among reactionaries, revisionists, and other
opportunists.
4. NEW GOVERNMENT OF THE FASCIST REGIME HEADED BY KEIKO FUJIMORI AND POPULAR FORCE
(The new edition of the so-called “parliamentary pact 2.0”)
After the runoff election on June 7,
Roberto Sánchez loudly proclaimed that he would not recognize the
results from the ONPE (National Office of Electoral Processes) and the
JNE (National Elections Board) if they declared Keiko Fujimori of
Popular Force the winner. He called for the defense of the popular vote.
There were mobilizations in Lima and the south of the country. Some
believed that R. Sánchez was serious, such as one of his
vice-presidential candidates from the south.
But, oh! As the days went by and July
approached, his tone, and that of his spokespeople, changed.
Transmitting through his spokesperson to claim the opposite, we quote
the news report from that day:
“Sources close to the leader of Juntos
por el Perú maintain that, regardless of the final outcome of the
elections, they will seek to build alliances in Congress and especially
in the Senate to provide a political counterweight to any attempt to
concentrate power.
While they continue to closely monitor
the vote count and the decisions of the electoral bodies, Sánchez’s
team is already coordinating with allied sectors a roadmap for the next
five years, with the aim of defending institutional integrity and
maintaining an active opposition.”
And, they cynically stated:
“It cannot be allowed that a single force control all the institutions of the State,”
is one of the concerns expressed by leaders and allies of Sánchez’s
bloc, who consider it fundamental to preserve democratic balance and the
system of checks and balances.”
Well, in accordance with the
under-the-table agreement, Sánchez and JPP recognized the “victory” of
Keiko Fujimori and FP in the sham and fraudulent 2026 elections and
prepared to be the “active opposition,” that is, to enjoy parliamentary
perks. They formed their parliamentary alliance or “bloc” with other
reactionary forces such as Juntos por el Perú, Ahora Nación, Obras, and
the Good Government Party, in opposition to the ruling alliance between
Fuerza Popular and Renovación Popular.
THE ELECTION OF THE SENATE LEADERSHIP: KEY TO THE EXECUTIVE’S CONTROL OF PARLIAMENT
The situation for the election of the
Senate leadership was that none of the alliances would have a majority,
while the opposition alliance was assured of a majority in the Chamber
of Deputies. But the key is the Senate, as we document with the
aforementioned Elcano study, which we will read:
“The new Senate will increase the
parliamentary nature of the system by having the final say on passing
laws within the new bicameral framework. It will review bills sent by
the Chamber of Deputies and may modify or reject them without the need
for them to return to the lower house. Another of its core functions
will be to appoint high-ranking state officials: the Ombudsman,
Constitutional Court magistrates, the Comptroller General, the
Superintendent of Banking, and the directors of the Central Reserve Bank
(BCR). This makes it a key player in institutional oversight and the
shaping of autonomous bodies. Unlike the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate
cannot be dissolved by the President; even if the Executive decides to
shut down Parliament following a political crisis, the Senate would
remain in operation.”
COROLLARY:
Let us briefly examine: How did JPP hand
over to FP the key institution for managing parliamentary affairs and
other State institutions? Clearly, this occurred amidst a mix of
intensified collusion and struggle, as the parties are divided by the
interests of factions, groups within those factions, and even individual
members.
The situation surrounding the election of the Senate’s steering committee presented a challenge:
“The session scheduled for noon brings together the sixty members of the Senate, divided into two groups of equal size. July 26.
The parity between the two slates is
reflected in the seat distribution: each commands exactly thirty votes,
foreshadowing an extremely tight contest. Article 17 of the Senate Rules
of Procedure stipulates that the first vote requires a simple majority
of those present; if this is not achieved, a runoff is held between the
two top-polling slates, with the winner being the one that secures the
most support.
The critical juncture arises if the
second round (…). Spokespersons for both blocs acknowledge the
possibility that neither side might prevail on its own, which would
shift the resolution to subsequent political negotiations or the
adoption of an extraordinary procedure.”
“Result: The ruling party secured the
Upper House by a margin of just one spoiled vote, while the opposition
won a decisive victory in the Lower House with 74 votes.” (the latter is at the mercy of the Executive, which can dissolve it should it become “obstructionist”)
“From 12 noon onwards, the Senate saw a
tight contest between the lists headed by Miguel Torres and Daniel
Barragán, with the race too close to call. In the first round of voting,
Torres received 30 votes and Barragán 29, with one ballot containing an
apparently spoiled vote. The result was the same in the second round.
One congressperson spoiled their vote.”
This brief news item reports on the
reactionary collusion between FP, RP, and JPP—manifested in the
abstention of the JPP senator—which handed the Senate’s steering
committee to FP, and with it, control over other key institutions of the
old State. It later emerged that the senator had spoiled her vote in
exchange for the freedom of Vladimir Cerrón, the owner of the
revisionist party “Free Peru (Perú Libre),” who is facing corruption
charges, among others.
“The “sacrifice” came from the newly
elected senator Silvana Robles, who reportedly spoiled her vote to favor
the democratic pact, displaying it—just so, at a slight angle—so that
the small mark rendering it invalid would not be seen.”
“[…] Returning to Silvana, some
insinuate that her generous gesture stemmed from a negotiation regarding
the freedom of Vladimir Cerrón—who, by sheer coincidence, was
exonerated by the Constitutional Court right around that time. How
heartless must one be to attribute an act of patriotism to sordid
dealings?” (This article, written in a jocular tone, is the icing
on the cake of this reactionary collusion; it appeared in the
reactionary newspaper La República under the Opinion column “Cry, you
commies!” by Maritza Espinoza.)
Senator Silvana Robles was elected on the JPP ticket and belongs to Cerrón’s party, “Perú Libre.” (Free Peru)
And that’s the end of the story…
APPENDIX:
Proletarians of all countries, unite!
NOTES TO TYPIFY THE REGIME AS FASCIST:
Political Demonstration
On April 5, 1992 there was a
coup d’etat. That was the beginning of the application of a
counter-revolutionary plan which was foreseen as lasting 20 years (Oiga
magazine no. 647 and 648, July 1993).
At its root is a fascist
conception, but one adapted to the conditions of combating a people’s
war (it is very important to bear in mind the Chinese experience and the
application of fascism by Chiang Kai-shek). A plan advised and endorsed
by imperialism, principally Yankee imperialism, and executed by the
armed forces. Velasco was an antecedent. APRA as well. And this fascism
is not counterpoised to absolute centralization but rather complements
it. It is a shamefaced fascism. Today this is more clear, see Fujimori’s
speech of July 28, 1995: “Direct State management, efficient and
permanent”, “economic democracy”, “new nationalism” “modernization”, “we
wish to be modern” (Chiang Kai-shek), “a modern state”, “big structural
reforms”, “educational crusade”, “new framework of legality”, “neither
populism nor ultra-liberalism, neither Left nor Right”, “nor
capitalism”, “It is the State which defends the principle of authority”,
“reform of the Judicial power”, “finally we have the capacity to plan
long-term goals and objective”, “achieve Peru’s rebirth in the new
millennium”.
Measures with parliament (its course). Today, a
parliament managed the way they want it. Judicial power, electoral power
(elections and fraud), (on all these points APRA fell short and it was
already fascist). A violated Constitution. The new Constitution in force
is also violated.
– Legislation. The Anti-terrorist Law is worse
than APRA’s. Military Tribunals. Faceless Tribunals. Special Tribunals.
Life sentences. Denial of the right to defense, for two years they
followed the law which sentenced minors the same as adults. Sentences
with the accused in absentia. Retroactive laws.
– Regarding rights of the unions and the people: completely negated.
– Militarized universities in “reorganization”.
– Municipalities: cut backs.
–
Economy: From the fascism of Pinochet and liberalism. With Velasco they
strengthened the state monopoly, today they strengthen private
monopolies and this isn’t counterpoised to fascism.
–
Organizationally: It is in the countryside where corporativization is
expressed most clearly. See the law for “rondas” and their arming.
Analyze
the tactics they follow. They develop APRA’s tactics (see the document
“Develop the People’s War Serving the World Revolution”, pp. 108-109)
[Spanish Ed. – Tr.] “In point II, ONE YEAR OF THE APRISTA GOVERNMENT:
“APRA under the leadership of García Pérez has followed the strategy of
propping themselves on the poor masses of the shantytowns, winning the
peasantry in the mountains, especially the so-called “Andean Trapeziod”,
binding the struggle of the people especially by using the IU as a
caboose and uniting reaction under their command, isolating the
proletariat, striking at the masses of people and aiming against the
People’s War, counting on the use of repression by the armed forces and
police for this. Today this strategy is reinforced by more demagogically
raising their falsehoods of a “Nationalist, democratic and popular
State” and a greater high-sounding verbal anti-imperialism.”
Furthermore,
see the management by the Ministry of the Presidency of CONADE,
FONCODES, PRONAA, Development Committees, (Peruvian Army), etc.
Police
state: Along with the increase of the armed forces and police, and the
strengthening of SIN (there was a proposal to have a SIN office in each
ministry). Urban rondas. “Citizen’s security”.
The reelection of 1995 and the plan for re-nomination. Behind this is Hermoza and the armed forces clique.
(See
also:) On the Commentaries about the Coup D’etat. April 1992, second
paragraph. Two tendencies in the Old State: one fascist tendency and the
other demo-liberal… There it establishes how Fujimori is opposed to
parliament, … traditional parties, etc.
Fujimori’s speech:
“Modern State” … this is based on something like Chiang Kai-shek said.
(Selected Works, Vol. III, notes on p. 278, “On Coalition Government”)
[Spanish Ed. – Tr.]: On August 1, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek promulgated his
“Regulations for the Organization of Pao and Chia and for a Population
Census in the Counties”. He said that it was a basic administrative
system with which the reactionary Kuomintang clique imposed its fascist
domination.
We must look at the Communities Law, see the date on
which the law was passed … but, the manner in which the peasantry is
being organized is fascist … there are similarities and differences with
the Velasco era in 1968, they will not repeat this the same way, but at
heart it is fascist; they try to give it a demo-liberal appearance but
they have decided on fascism.
See Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 52 …
absolute centralism … We must review all of Fujimori’s legislation;
they aim to sow confusion with the part about direct democracy … the
current government is fascist but in demo-liberal clothing. In deeds, in
the countryside there is already a fascist system, see the previous
document, also “Overcome the Bend …”
In the cities. There is a
police state, in other words, there is a fascist state. This was even
said by one child of imperialism… We are not the inventors of the
gunpowder, as Chairman Gonzalo said. In the second half of each decade
their crisis aggravates, this is being fulfilled from beginning to end;
there is a serious crisis but two decades have merged, the 80s and the
90s … what they said in December about negative growth and that the
following month inflation would rise … they need to invest more …
…………..
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February, 1996
PCP-CENTRAL COMMITTEE
