s
This
note (*) is based on quotations and comments that make historical
reference to more than a century of development of bureaucratic
capitalism in Bolivia, based on a semi -feudal and semi -colonial
economy, in order to understand economic policy at their service of
the proposals of the candidates and applied by the reactionary
governments that have occurred under the command of the Bolivian
state in these last 20 years, which has its most recent roots in the
latest roots in the latest roots of the previous century. First five
years of the present century, so this temporary space will always be
taken into account.
Only
based on the past and recent history of this economic-social
formation can be understood and determine what is the fundamental
character of the program implemented by the successive governments
and the one proposed by the different candidates in this new 2025
electoral farce, which now enters its second round. In this way we
will have the radiography of all of them.
I
Let's
start with the programs presented for these elections of the parties
that participated in the first round.
Common
places and differences
The
common place of all of them is that they serve the development of
bureaucratic capitalism, that is, of an economy in the service of
imperialist interests, what Thyrios and Trojans call "extractivist
economy." The axis of the difference is that those of the
bureaucratic faction are based on the company and investment of the
State and those of the buying faction in the company and particular
investment. What those of the bureaucratic faction in the Bolivian
case call economy of "socialism of the 21st century" and
capitalist economy; Meanwhile, those of the Comprador faction of the
great bourgeoisie call "statism" or "direct" and,
to which they defend, "market economy."
"Welfare"
or "social policy" as we will see in the note (**) in facts
cannot be a substantial difference, but only of discourse or how it
is presented and managed.
A
medium linked to the Comprador big Bourgeoisie (Comprador) faction
summarizes or synthesizes the difference from programs, like this:
“Among
based proposals and other unacceptable for a fair electoral that
defines the future of the country from next August 17, clearly the
presence of less state, to continue with the gigantic state or a
confessed statism, it is the main brand of difference between the
programs registered by the 10 political parties and alliances
officially registered before the highest electoral authority of the
country.“ (Current, bicentennial, democracy 10 Government programs
of 10 candidates For Bolivia 2025 elections, May 2025, Textual®
Ideas).
The
previous appointment is very illustrative because from its
reactionary point of view it defines the fundamental difference in
the economic of the different programs presented, that is, among
“less state” in the economy (comprador partisans) and what they
call “statism” (partiduits of the bureaucratic). "Welfare"
or "social policy
Another
medium, also linked to the Comprador, establishes the difference
between the different candidate by dividing them in the two fields
already indicated above based on their economic proposals and also
considers their political differences; But, add a useful subdivision
in each of the fields, let's read:
“The
candidates to be elected president are divided into two groups: the
first opposition politicians and the second the ruling that governs
the country that in total are ten candidates registered in the
Supreme Electoral Court.
According
to the classification of comparative economic systems and the
economic programs of the parties (PEP) in the electoral race, two
are identified: the first six Pro Mercado Economics that
in turn is subdivided into three PEM inclined to have a market and a
regulatory state (or mixed economy), that is, to seek spaces of
complementarity between private activities and the roles that the
government has to fulfill Substitute for the State, the second
formed by the official party based on government and three parties
seeking to continue with a leading economy and state monopoly (or
path to socialism) in the economy.
(…)
The model and economic policy of direction (or statism, or on the way
to socialism), is characterized by the intervention of markets,
greater fiscal expense for welfare and creation of public companies,
weakened institutionality, incentives declining, lack of clear rules,
etc. Stable an adverse climate to production, investment,
consumption, exports, imports and employment.
The
first pro market declare: normalize the supply of dollars and fuel in
a hundred days and another point that it would be in ninety -nine
days; close public companies; reduce public spending; negotiate with
the IMF; get $ US12,000 million multilateral organisms; save the
country; transform the country; decrease tax aliquots and create the
entrance tax; modify the distribution of public resources of the
central level to the subnational level; solutions at ten points;
solutions at seven points; both market as possible, both state and
necessary; free market; Transnational companies will come to invest
the country, etc. those that defend the leading economy offer import
and industrialization substitution, broadband growth, economic
diversification, etc. ”
On
the offer of the candidates to solve the problems in “one hundred
days” or “99 days”, says the analyst we are citing, that this
was not fulfilled in the previous century or in this century,
therefore does not generate trust, about the governments of the MAS
(2006-2025), in this regard, he says:
“(…)
In the 21st century since 2006 during the three continuous
presidential periods of Mr. Morales, I publicly declared that the
country would be like Switzerland, that we have a natural gas ocean,
industrialization of lithium, etc. that did not materialize and did
not fulfill what President Arce offered with the Plan for Economic
and Social Development (PDES) 2021-2025 achieved the results
scheduled by 100 percent as happened with public investment as a
percentage of GDP that was only 50 percent;
(Economic
systems, program, and 2025 elections. The voters have the
responsibility to analyze the proposals of the various
constitutionally enabled candidates, analyzing their economic
programs of the country vision they offer, opinion by Germán Molina
Díaz, in La Razón, Thursday, June 26, 2025)
Some
critical voices against "extractivism" to which they
consider as a clear expression of the current "capitalist"
model current and not as bureaucratic capitalism, summarize the
proposals of "governors" and "opposition", as
well as, of the different factions of the MAS, focusing on the
similarities of its electoral economic proposals, with some irony, in
this way:
-
All candidates carry the economic axis in their government plans.
-
The speeches of progress, freedom and overcoming extractivism are
recurring, while the candidates themselves carry mineral helmets in
their campaigns, appealing to a symbol associated with groups
historically benefited by extractivism and neo -extractivism, such as
the corporatized mining sector.
-
None of the candidates or the candidate mentions alternatives
extractivist model.
-
The options in the Bolivian electoral race bet on lithium as if it
were the golden eggs, reproducing an endless loop of extraction and
dispossession. Without taking into account the fall in international
lithium prices due to a combination of factors: the increase in
supply and deceleration of demand. A volatile and highly speculative
market.
II
After
the first round of the electoral farce (August 17), there are two
candidate, Paz for PDC and Quiroga by ALD, to define the designation
of president and vice president, both representatives of the
Comprador, so we consider it necessary to illustrate their proposals
in base to the summary appointments of two journalistic articles:
1.
“In conversation with Eduardo Feinmann on Radio Miter, Paz
explained that his proposal seeks to break with the historical logic
of state exclusion and bureaucracy that, according to him, keeps the
Bolivian economy stagnant.
"85%
of the Bolivian economy is informal in union stores, accounting,
carriers, merchants ... If you do not deal with the country's
informality to create a cheap formality, you are hardly going to
rearrange the economy," said the candidate, who insisted that
the key is in an inclusive project that leaves behind years of
confrontation and division.
“Our
project is called‘ Capitalism for all ’, which implies closing a
corrupt customs, facilitating national production and creating trade
with cheap technologies,” he explained.
For
Paz, the difference with Quiroga is central: “He goes for the
normal recipe of‘ I go to the International Monetary Fund to
achieve twelve billion dollars to reactivate this economy ’in
Bolivia there are resources, only that you have to end a tranca state
that is consumed 80% of those resources,” he said. He also stressed
the need to decentralize powers and build the economy "from the
regions." " (Infobae, Aug 19, 2025)
2.
“Rodrigo Paz and Tuto Quiroga will face an unpublished presidential
ballot on October 19. Both have presented their economic plans, but
are they really viable?
International
credits
From
the Alliance Freedom and Democracy (free), it is proposed to go to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to request a loan that would
range between 5,000 and 12,000 million dollars.
On
this proposal, economist Bonadona considers that external financing
is urgent. "Because of the volume of needs, both in terms of
imports, that is, of the commercial balance, we have payment problems
to fuel suppliers, we have to continue importing fuels, we have the
big problem of the exchange rate that has been due to the fall of
reserves so spectacular that has occurred since 2015".
(...)
He
also points out that the possibility of reaching agreements with
other financial entities such as the World Bank or the Inter
-American Development Bank (IDB) will depend on the success of the
efforts with the IMF.
In
contrast, the program of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) does
not refer to the issue of international credits.
Fiscal
discipline
Both
programs, both free and PDC, coincide with the need to reduce the
fiscal deficit and reduce the size of the State. They also propose to
review the functioning of deficit public companies.
However,
they differ in regards to large state companies, such as Bolivian
fiscal oil deposits (YPFB), the National Telecommunications Company
(Entel), the National Electricity Company (ENDE), Bolivian Aviation
(BOA), Bolivian Lithium deposits (YLB) and the Minera Corporation of
Bolivia (Comibol). At this point, Free proposes to transfer 50% of
these companies' shares to citizens of legal age.
On
this idea, the economist Mendieta comments that "it has a lot of
similarity to the capitalization process in terms of Bolivians being
shareholders, in that sense let's say we can do, we must see the
legal part."
The
economistBonadona agrees and compares it with the capitalization
promoted during the first government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.
However, he warns that this experience did not work as expected,
since the pension fund managers (AFP) did not distribute the actions
and "imprisoned them."
50/50:
The Paz proposal
Another
proposal by Rodrigo Paz is to redistribute the national budget under
a 50/50 scheme with the regions. Both economists consider that the
idea is interesting, but requires institutional adjustments. "
(By Diego Montaño, La Paz / August 21, 2025 in La Razón Plus,
Nacional)
The logic of the
development of bureaucratic capitalism in Bolivia
-Economic context of the
general elections 2025-
As
we have advanced when referring to the economic context in which
these general elections are held, of great discontent of the masses
for the cyclical economic crisis, which happens each time in shorter
periods since 2014, in which the export boom of fossil fuels is over,
which also increases energy for homes and originates the shortage of
dollars in an economy dependent on this currency with the consequent
indebtedness for subsidizing them. This is the logic of the
development of bureaucratic capitalism for imperialist needs; From a
primary export -centered economy, which entails economic growth
(BOOM) without development of the country's economy, which entails
more delay, what the institutes of imperialism call “a new decade
loss” (ECLAC), which added to the previous decade, are “two lost
decades” in the present century. You are added to the "loss
decade" of the 80s, three decades of more delay in the country.
We will see almost at the end how this occurs.
As
we have already advanced, the Bolivian economy now crosses a strong
economic recession as an expression of the character of its economy:
semicolonial and semifeudal on which a bureaucratic capitalism
develops at the service of imperialism, mainly Yankee.
And,
the above, we do not say only us, but also from its own class
perspective imperialist institutes and therefore unsuspected of
Maoism, we cite:
“Extractivism
has been a central characteristic of the Bolivian economy throughout
its history. From the Potosí silver in the colony to hydrocarbons
and lithium today, the dependence on the export of natural resources
has conditioned the development of the country. This model has
brought wealth and progress, at least for some time, and will
continue to be a central economic pillar. But, at the same time, it
has shaped a vulnerable economy International prices and, especially
in recent years, has caused a strong economic recession, while
increasingly harmed the environment, climate and many vulnerable
groups of society. ”
The
previous appointment is from Agramont-Rechín, D. and Seoane, A.
(coord.) (2025). Extractivism in Bolivia, debates and alternatives.
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, La Paz March 2025, Universidad Mayor de San
Andrés (UMSA).
And
about the governments of the MAS, in the publication of Fes-Bolivia,
mentioned above, we read:
“The
weight of the primary sector in the Bolivian economy has been a
recurring theme in our history; the importance of the export of raw
materials has marked the history of our country and industrialization
has been a commitment raised by different governments on multiple
occasions. However, this commitment has not come true in the sense
that the predominance of the extraction and export of raw materials
in our economy has not changed, on the contrary. Tendency to retreat
minimal advances for industrialization of small subsectors. "
Not
only, that with the governments of the MAS, the economic situation
did not change but worsened, but the government made up the economic
data, as commented on the event below:
"According
to these data (of the Government), the sector called"
Manufacturing Industry "represents about 50% of exports, with a
tendency to increase that percentage. It is on the basis of those
data that the Government has published the supposed importance of its
industrial sector and some degree of success in its commitment to
industrialization (Flores, 2022); as well as argument to refute the
weight of extractivism in the Bolivian economy (…)
In
order to understand that apparent contradiction, let's see in
detail the products that make up this relevant manufacturing industry
presented by the official data.
(...)
gold, tin and soy represent more than 70% of this sector (45.3%,
23.5% and 9%, respectively). In the case of gold and metallic tin, it
is assumed that the manufactured product are metal bars. While in the
case of products derived from soybeans - observing the most detailed
exports data per year - these consist mainly of soybeans and to a
lesser extent soy oil (...) it is possible to question the
classification of these products as part of an industrialization
process and how they make the analysis of the real weight of the
primary sector in the Bolivia economy.
The
separation of gold and its concentration in bars that are marketed in
Bolivia, in most cases involve their amalgamation with mercury and
its concentration by gold marketers in rudimentary bars - its
refining in bullion with international certifications is not a
process that is carried out in Bolivia -, they can hardly reflect an
industrialization process; However, they represent 45% of the value
of this manufacturing industrial sector. In the case of the metallic
tin, its separation and foundry require, without a doubt, of more
complex and specialized technical processes, carried out in the
foundry of Vinto. This process, although it implies a "staniferous
industry", is still a very basic step in a long tin
industrialization chain. Something similar can be said of soy cakes.
(…)
An
attempt to reclassification of the data - in which this basic
processing is included in the primary sector - shows a different
panorama.
This
reclassification raises the percentage of mining participation to
50%, from 20%hydrocarbons and agribusiness (including meat export) to
20%. Beyond the details of the reclassification process, the
aforementioned data does reflect more precisely the reality of
exports and show the weight of extractivisms and the primary sector
in Bolivia. ” (I environmental sustainability in the primary
sector: cases of gold and lithium, Oscar Campanini, extractivism in
Bolivia, debates and alternatives, Fes-Bolivia)
The history of a colonial
economy from its origins to date
We
cite
“With
the exception of the 1990s, exports of these resources represented at
least 80% of the total Bolivian exports (...). From the colony to the
end of the 19th century, the main export product was silver. Then,
between 1904 and 1970, the tin represented at least 60% of Bolivian
exports. With the beginning of gas exports to Argentina at the
beginning of the 1970 Hydrocarbons began to gain prominence and
consolidated as the most important in the first decade of the 21st
century.
This
dependence against specific natural resources has implications in
terms of long -term growth. Indeed, although other sectors of the
economy may be larger (in Bolivia, for example, agriculture has a
larger size either analyzing GDP or employment), the dynamism of the
economy tends to be subject to the evolution of the exploitation of
non -renewable natural resources. Thus, when the export basket is
concentrated in a few products, international markets of the
international market usually affect the whole economy.
This
fragility against international markets explains the difficulty of
natural resources dependent on growth rates that are sustainable in
the long term. In the case of the Bolivian economy, three major
oscillations highlight throughout the twentieth century (...). Thus,
the profits that the economy obtained during the first decades of the
twentieth century, the 1940s and the period 1960-1978 vanished during
the crises of 1930, 1950 and 1980. Moreover, the levels prior to each
of these crises were recovered several years and, even, decades
later. ”
Of
the same author, that we consign underneath, for its importance to
make more sartorial, than the character of the economy of
bureaucratic capitalism at the service of imperialism and not of the
country, we cite:
"(…)
Another widely recognized limitation around the exploitation of
natural resources, in general, and non -renewable natural resources,
in particular: the difficulties of systematically linking the sector
with other sectors of the economy. In other words, the ability to
transfer productivity profits generated in the exploitation of
natural resources towards the rest of the economy is one of the most
important challenges of these economies.
(III
Extractivism in the history of Bolivia What does economic history
tell us? José Peres Cajías, Fes-Bolivia, 2025, cited)
The
above must be completed with what another exhibitor of the same
Fes-Bolivia seminar says in IV Brief exposure on some elements around
extractivism and institutionality in Bolivia, Guillermo Guzmán
Prudencio, but which is generally serves to see the economic cycles
of bureaucratic capitalism in Latin America and as with each crisis
they always have to start below and that mean many years lost (“lost
decades”) We cite:
“If
we see the performance of the Bolivian economy in the
twentieth century (measured by GDP per capita) we can verify its
dependence on extractive economic cycles. It is possible to
identify important falls of national production in 1929, 1952 and
1980 (...), these years not only drove to significant recessions, but
also, they supposed many years lost, or dedicated to the economic
recovery to reach economic recovery falls. If we add all the years
that have been lost in Bolivia - in the twentieth century - we have a
total of 52 years.”
As
we had advanced in the last citations on the history of bureaucratic
capitalism we see how the economic cycle of bureaucratic capitalism
is given and as they always have to start below, etc., and the last
part of the appointments undoubtedly refers to one of the economic
reasons of the disputes between the two factions of the great native
bourgeoisie.
On the development of
bureaucratic capitalism in the Bolivian agriculture
-
New concentration process of the agricultural land
-
Ther landlord-bureaucratic Stat at the service of
imperialism headed with alternation by government of the two factions
of the great bourgeoisie
To
finish this note, we consign some events of the article Impacts and
trends of the agro-industrial model in the lowlands of Bolivia of
Carmelo Peralta-Rivero, because it serves to illustrate what we hold
in summary in the preceding subtitle, let's read:
„Since
in Bolivia there is a dualism in agricultural production, in this
work we will focus mainly on the expansion of the agroindustrial
model and its relationship it has with the agribusiness and its
impact especially in the lowlands of Bolivia, mainly of Santa Cruz
where soybeans and other industrial crops have proliferated in recent
decades.
The
objective of this article is to analyze economic and political
changes that drive agribusiness, and the impacts and trends of the
expansion of the agricultural border by this production model in the
lowlands of Bolivia (…) ”
The
article begins with the quantitative description of the phenomenon:
“In
the case of Bolivia, agricultural activities and emergence of
agribusiness in the 50s, it has been promoting the cultivation of
oilseeds such as soybeans, sunflower and other agroindustrial
monocultures such as cane, wheat, sesame, sorghum, cotton, etc., all
implemented in lowlands, especially in the department of Santa Cruz,
represents between 3.95 and 8.58% of agricultural production units
(between 33,998 and 73,888 UPA), but cover between 27,471,258.70 and
29,841,992.60 hectares, that is, up to 86.11% of Lands with potential
for agricultural exploitation according to the INE (2015).
In
contrast, small UPA (with surfaces less than 50 hectares), are
usually of the family and indigenous family agriculture, they
represent 91.42% (787,720) of the total of UPA, however, they only
cover 13.89% (4,812,991.10 hectares) of the agricultural lands with
such a potential, although the forest UPA of large extensions of the
Low Amazon or Earth of Bolivia is still clear. These units are
located throughout the country, although according to the INE (2015)
it indicates that they are mainly in the departments of La Paz,
Cochabamba, Potosí (Altiplano and Valleles) in more than 60% and
later in Santa Cruz and the other departments. The CIPCA-IISEC (2020)
according to the 2015 Agricultural Survey and a national projection
indicates that the UPA are mainly located in valleys and highlands in
more than 70%, in the eastern plains by 20.5%, and the remaining in
other large regions, in addition, 55%of the UPA are of family
agriculture.
Above
all, the UPA of family agriculture supply with food products the
domestic market, such as vegetables, tubers, fruits and others; In
this way, we can observe that on the one hand, agribusiness is mostly
linked to the external market with agro -extractivist practices and
family agriculture to the domestic market with practices more
sustainable and resilient.
According
to the INE (2016) based on the 2013 agricultural census, he reported
that there are 502,281 UPA that practice collective or family
community and 294,831 UPA participate in the work system called
“Mink’a or Ayni” (family reciprocity work system in Quechua or
Aymara, respectively).
Bolivia
has a surface of 109.9 million hectares of which 51.5 million are
wooded (Mmaya, 2013) and are located mainly in lowlands and Yungas
(45.28 million hectares until 2017) and, since 1985, this surface
decreased by more than 3.6 million hectares (Mapbiomas project
Amazon, 2020) mainly by the implementation of crops. industrial and
livestock exponentially exponentially the agricultural border. ”
From
the conclusions of the article, we cite:
“
(...) How did food
agribusiness arose in the lowlands of Bolivia and how economic and
political changes led to their extension?; Since its inception,
agribusiness was favored and ally of political elites, and many
political leaders were and are linked to this sector that for more
than 70 years have led and promoted with economic regulations and
transformations in different periods that they favored the sector, it
always guaranteed them with financial support both nationally and
external to the United States in the beginning, as well as the
investment of Brazilian businessmen in recent years. Likewise,
liberalism and neoliberalism from the mid -80s achieved the
definitive concretion of this sector in the lowlands. Since the
sector depends on the international market, the tendency of recent
years is that it is expanded since it currently has the National
Government support becoming the state-capital relationship.
As
for the second question:
What
are the impacts of the agro -industrial activities of the food sector
in the forests for the expansion of the agricultural border in the
lowlands?; We conclude that agribusiness has a considerable
negative impact on the environment and translates with the loss of
large wooded surfaces especially since the 80s and, at present, the
agro -industrial ones together with the low -land farmers are the
ones that expand the most agricultural border year after year
nationwide, being the low and Yungas lands the most affected by
losing more than 3.6 million hectares between 1985 2018, and with a
total increase of 3.69 million agricultural hectares and pastures.
The department of Santa Cruz is the most affected and that is where
the national agroindustrial base resides. Likewise, the amplaciation
of the agricultural border has a direct relationship with the
expansion of agroindustrial crops such as soybeans, as well as the
enable of grasslands for livestock. "
The
last conclusion shows more clearly as the Bureaucratic faction
government drives its enemy the buying faction:
“Finally,
regarding what are the future scenarios of expansion of the
agricultural border by food agribusiness as a pressure factor on the
earth?; that had their impact on deforestation, according to the
events of the last Years, we consider that the lowlands of Bolivia
will be pressed even more, considering a scenario where the
government and mainly the agroindustrials of Santa Cruz have an
agreement to expand the agricultural border. Under this analysis,
deforestation for the 2040s and 2050s could minimally decupleted with
the basis of almost 7.5 million hectares deforested until 2017 and
could be of greater magnitude in a scenario where the
state-capital relationship is even stronger to agree on the expansion
of the agricultural border for agribusiness crops and livestock."
(Impacts and trends of the agroindustrial model in the lowlands of
Bolivia)
will
continue with note (**)
