U.S.
imperialism is knocking on the door of the Cuban people. CBS News
reported as early as late September that Trump is planning an invasion
of Cuba to take place within 90 to 120 days. As part of an escalation of
the trade embargo, Cuba has been subjected to additional U.S. sanctions
this year, creating a humanitarian crisis on the island. Cuba relies on
imports for many basic necessities—for example, a full 80% of the
country’s food is imported. In addition to food, the embargo also covers
drinking water, healthcare equipment, medicine, contraceptives, and
more. Furthermore, the year began with an energy blockade described even
by the UN—imperialism’s own “peacekeepers”—as an act of war.
The
Yanks have said they don’t intend to stop there. They have stated loud
and clear on numerous occasions that they will continue to increase
pressure on the regime until it capitulates. But what does this mean?
What changes do the Yanks want to see?
To answer that question, we need to have a brief look at Cuba’s modern history.
THE INTERRUPTED REVOLUTION: CUBA’S MODERN HISTORY
To
make a long story short, let’s try to summarize Cuba’s modern history.
Cuba began the twentieth century by freeing itself, two years earlier in
1898, from the colonial rule of the Spanish Crown. During the final
year of the conflict, the Cuban freedom fighters received significant
support from the United States, whose capitalism had by then evolved
into monopoly capitalism. American capitalists were able to impose a
semi-colonial relationship on Cuba by financing (and controlling) a
handful of landowners. In addition, the Yanks were able to invest a
small amount of capital in the country to establish their financial
control, which created a clique of bourgeois on the island that was
directly dependent on Yankee capital. This clique evolved into the
compradors—the local administrators of U.S. imperialism.
Over
the course of the 20th century, the capital, Havana, developed into a
harem for Yankees who wanted to live a decadent, hedonistic life. In
Havana, you would find a city built for tourists, rife with drugs,
poverty, and prostitution. Surrounding the city was a relatively large
semi-proletariat and urban petty bourgeoisie; in the countryside, the
majority were peasants.
During
the 1930s, the working class and the peasants launched a major uprising
across the country. They went on strike and demonstrated. Weapons were
even raised against the island’s rulers. Within the country’s most
important industry—the sugar mills—a Soviet movement emerged, featuring
revolutionary workers’ councils. It all culminated in the fall of the
U.S.-led comprador government. But not long after that, the army staged a
coup and established a classic Latin American-style military
dictatorship led by Fulgencio Batista. It was all orchestrated from
Washington.
During
the 1950s, the petty bourgeoisie had developed into one of the most
numerous classes in the country, as it was their organizations that were
the most militant. Castro’s July 26 Movement emerged precisely from the
petty bourgeoisie. Its 1956 program contained classic bourgeois demands
and phrases. It was “guided by the ideals of democracy, nationalism,
and social justice,” a “Jeffersonian democracy” (named after U.S.
President Jefferson, 1801–1809), and they declared that “democracy
cannot mean a government of one race, class, or religion; rather, it
must be a government for the entire people.” In other words: the
Castro-led movement did not fight for socialism or a new democracy, but
to take over the U.S.-controlled economy and make it Cuban; it fought
for a democracy that claimed to be above the classes.
With
this program, Castro and a small group took up arms against Batista’s
government in the Sierra Maestra mountains, while other young
intellectuals and professionals organized resistance in the cities. This
war won the support of nearly all other classes except for the small
handful of people directly linked to the landowners and the United
States. In the struggle, the decisive force was the small farmers, who
waged an armed struggle against the landowners and the army. Batista’s
army, which consisted largely of farmers, soon began to fall apart.
Batista’s government disintegrated after two years of fighting in which
only a few hundred armed rebels were involved.
During
the final months of the fighting, even the U.S. government had
withdrawn some of its support for the Batista regime, believing it was
more likely that the July 26 Movement would agree to a settlement than
that the Batista regime could survive. Shortly after taking power in
1959, Castro traveled to the U.S. on a “goodwill tour” and declared in
New York: “I have clearly and definitively stated that we are not
communists… The doors are open to private investment that contributes to
Cuba’s development.” He even advocated for a massive U.S. aid program
for Latin America, “to avoid the danger of communism.” His openly
anti-communist rhetoric, intended to appease the Yanks, stemmed from the
same reason that later forced him to change his tune and adopt
“communist” rhetoric to appease the Soviet Union: he was the embodiment
of opportunism.
Creating
a new Cuba required expropriating the sugar plantations, which ran
counter to the Yanks’ capitalist interests. These were the pillars of
the economic and political system that had originally sparked the
uprising. Challenging them meant challenging the entire colonial system
that prevailed on the island, and there was no turning back, as the
people would rightly view it as a capitulation. So it was quite
convenient that a certain Nikita Khrushchev, who had recently led a
capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union, came knocking on the door.
CUBA IS TRANSFORMED INTO A SEMI-COLONY OF THE SOVIET UNION
Following
the capitalist restoration, the Soviet Union had begun to be governed
by the laws of imperialism—that is, it was driven by the need to
monopolize sources of raw materials, export capital to extract
superprofits, and compete with imperialist rivals for world domination.
They realized that by bringing Cuba into their imperialist sphere of
influence, they would be able to extract great wealth from the country.
Cuba thus became a political and military tool in the revisionist Soviet
Union’s struggle against its American rivals.
Like
any entrepreneur, the Soviets granted the first loans to Cuba at a low
cost. In the early years of “aid,” loans were provided interest-free,
and later they began charging 2.5% interest. Their actual profit,
however, was much higher than that. Under the original agreement, 80% of
the Soviet Union’s credit and funds were to be used to purchase Soviet
products at heavily inflated prices. Just as with interest rates, once
Cuba’s dependence had been firmly established, the Soviets raised the
stakes and demanded that all credit be spent on Soviet products.
According to one author with access to Cuban statistics, the Soviet
Union charged 11% to 53% more for machinery than the price of comparable
machinery in the West. And to make this robbery even more outrageous,
they sold much of this sugar at an even higher price to Eastern Europe,
even though the Soviets initially paid Cuba more for its sugar than the
world market price at the time (which, of course, they soon stopped
doing).
This
was standard Soviet practice throughout the world. It was through
unequal trade that the Soviet Union realized the surplus value generated
by capital exports. Essentially, it was little more than an accounting
arrangement regarding whether the profit returned to the Soviet Union in
the form of interest or in the form of superprofits from sales, when
those sales were tied to trade agreements and capital exports.
It
was the sugar plantations that the Cuban economy was condemned to
produce and export throughout the nineteenth century and the first half
of the twentieth century. During the Spanish colonial era, it was
administered by Spanish officials on the island; during the American
era, by the landowners and compradors in the city; and later, by
government officials in Havana during the Soviet era. During the Batista
era, farmers were forbidden from cultivating unused land, as they were
instead required to work on the sugar plantations. The same occurred
under Castro. The people were herded into working on the sugar
plantations; they were forced to work longer hours and, over time, were
paid less.
Castro
claimed that the country did not need to develop any other industry
but, as mentioned, condemned the people to a life of perpetual
plantation labor. Instead, he and his associates asserted that Soviet
aid and sugar purchases enabled them to buy everything they needed to
“build socialism and communism simultaneously in Cuba.” The Soviet Union
succeeded in buying itself a new colony.
Castro
had no interest in developing the country or building socialism.
Instead, he chose to ensure that, just as the island had been ruled
under the rule of landowners and compradors under the control of U.S.
imperialism, the sugar industry would continue to dominate economic life
on the island.
CUBA IS GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF IMPERIALISM
Castro
claimed, in an attempt to mislead the masses, that in order to achieve
communism, Cuba first needed to develop the productive forces to produce
a surplus. Therefore, he argued that the country needed to plan to
maximize its profits by centering the economy on sugar plantations, and
use the profits from this industry to develop the sugar industry and
import food, cars, etc. It was precisely this line of reasoning that
Castro used when workers’ wages were cut and they were forced to work
longer hours.
This
economic system described by Castro is based on the same principles
that govern all capitalist countries, particularly in the form of state
capitalism: that prices should be set based on production costs; that
the factories and industries yielding the highest return on investment
should be the areas where expansion is greatest; that the managers of
these units should be paid based on their social status as well as the
companies’ profitability; that workers should be paid based on the
profitability of the companies they work for, and lose their jobs if
production would be cheaper without them; and furthermore, that workers
should be paid strictly according to their productivity, measured by
piece-rate wages or based on whether they meet the production quota set
for their jobs—in other words, whether they meet the standard.
This
is truly capitalism in all its glory. Nowhere is this evident in its
ugliest form more clearly than when Castro said in the 1970s that he
regretted the terrible housing shortage in Cuba, but that “the
revolution has not been able to do much” about it—while later revealing
that the government was building 14 new tourist hotels and expanding
others.
AFTER THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION
The
Cuban state remained standing when the Soviet Union collapsed. During
the 1990s, the country faced a severe crisis as its economy had become
dependent on trade with the Soviet Union. Since then, the country has
had to sell its goods on the international market. To illustrate this
shift in the Cuban economy, we can look at the share of exports in GDP.
Until 1990, exports accounted for 30% of GDP. During the remainder of
the 1990s, this figure fell to between 10% and 15%, before fluctuating
between 15% and 25% during the 2000s and 2010s. Since then, another
shift has taken place: the country has opened up to more exports, and in
2022, trade accounted for 40% of the country’s total GDP. Today, Spain
and China are the largest importers of Cuban goods.
Now
that the Americans want to reclaim their former sugar colony, they have
tightened their trade embargo. The U.S. trade embargo against Cuba,
which has been in effect since 1962, prohibits most commercial and
financial transactions between the two countries, with only limited
exceptions for food and medicine. The embargo is enforced through
various laws and regulations that make it difficult for Cuba to engage
in international trade and gain access to financial markets. It also
penalizes companies from other countries, which face fines or other
restrictions when doing business in the U.S. The U.S. has tightened this
embargo to counter Cuba’s efforts to expand its exports. Both Trump and
Biden have imposed additional sanctions on Cuba since 2017—in 2017,
2021, and 2026.
SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION
As
mentioned, a bureaucratic faction within the bourgeoisie has ruled Cuba
since the 1959 revolution. By seizing control of the state apparatus,
this class has been able to reshape the country to serve the interests
of the bureaucrats and, by extension, imperialism. They have deepened
the presence of semifeudalism on the island and transformed the country
into a sugar colony, which has weakened the tendency toward capital
accumulation within the country and thereby preserved the semi-feudal
base throughout the country. Today, however, we see signs that the door
is opening to a shift within the ruling class.
CUBA’S NEW REFORM PACKAGE
On
June 18, 2026, Cuba’s National Assembly unanimously passed one of the
most comprehensive market-oriented reform packages since the revolution.
Most of the new reforms have not yet become law, but the trend is
unmistakable: Cuba is opening up to the outside world in a way that is
transforming the country from one with strong bureaucratic control over
the economy to one that is opening up to more direct foreign
intervention. Political power is shifting from the bureaucratic faction
within the bourgeoisie to the more comprador elements. The result of the
reforms, if they are fully adopted, is that both Cuban exiles and other
foreigners will be able to do business in Cuba—provided the bureaucrats
there are on board. In other words, once the “reforms” become law, Cuba
will not be so different from El Salvador, Panama, Ecuador, and similar
countries where the comprador factions rule the country.
It
is not clear exactly which political factors have prompted the latest
package of reforms. But it is impossible to analyze the situation
without considering developments in the wider world. As the U.S. exerts
ever-greater pressure on the rulers in Havana—who are holding their own
people hostage—by choking off imports of essential goods, parts of the
bureaucratic faction are choosing to switch sides to save their own
skins and prevent the conflict from escalating into a de facto invasion.
It is not farfetched to assume that internal opportunistic forces have
joined forces with the U.S. Cuban exiles and their favorite senator,
Marco Rubio. Now he finally has a chance for revenge; Marco is blocking
oil and other essential supplies—such as medicines and baby food—from
entering the country and boasts that he is the nation’s liberator. He is
making all sorts of demands and urging the population to revolt, just
as Trump is doing in Iran. Like Trump, he isn’t getting much of a
response either.
Even
the Los Angeles (LA) Times, on June 19, cited statements from both
Trump and Rubio in which they both openly acknowledge that they want to
impose U.S. imperialist control on Cuba. As mentioned, the U.S. does not
rule out military intervention: as we noted in the introduction, CBS
News reported in September that Trump is planning an invasion of Cuba to
take place in 90 to 120 days—that is, around the turn of the year. This
follows a year of preparations. The LA Times does not see a problem
with these statements but treats them merely as the latest in a string
of more or less crazy statements from the White House. The newspaper may
have other things on its mind, which is understandable given the
current situation. Had Cuba had the support of a rival superpower, such
as the Soviet Union, however, the tone would have been quite different.
The
LA Times further notes that market reforms are by no means a new
phenomenon. Raúl Castro, Fidel Castro’s brother, has previously
attempted to push through limited market-economy reforms but has been
met with “bureaucratic obstacles.” From the newspaper’s reporting, we
cannot determine whether it was simply that the party did not accept the
reforms, or whether there were literally bureaucratic obstacles. It is
reasonable to assume that there was resistance within the ruling class
from segments of the bureaucratic faction of the bourgeoisie who
themselves would stand to lose from the reforms. Regardless of the
reason, the obstacles appear to be being removed this time.
BIRDS OF A FEATHER
Cuba’s
president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, now states in official statements that
the reforms are based on Vietnamese and Chinese “communist” economic
models. The economic systems of these countries have even become so
popular that bourgeois economists now view them as equivalent to those
of the U.S. and the EU. A Cuban representative of the “Communist” Party
is thus advocating for the market economies of revisionist states; he
tries to keep up appearances by referring to Vietnamese mass production
and Chinese financial institutions.
What
does the “Communist Party” actually want to achieve with its “reforms”?
Among other things, it wants to eliminate current restrictions that
prevent individuals from owning multiple businesses, allow shareholdings
in multiple companies, and create new legal forms of business entities,
including jointly owned corporations. Similarly, the party proposes
removing the cap on private enterprise size and allowing companies to
employ more than 100 workers. In unabashedly capitalist fashion, such
enterprises are now simply and unambiguously referred to as “private
enterprises.”
Market-based
solutions are also to be permitted in critical sectors in the “new”
Cuba. These critical sectors include agriculture, which the population
literally needs to survive. International trade is also to be
facilitated. Through such trade, the country has its only chance to
acquire products that cannot easily be manufactured domestically, such
as cars, components for solar energy, and nuclear power plants. It’s no
coincidence that Cubans still drive around in rusty turquoise ’50s
Chevrolets with V8 engines that guzzle 4 liters per mile, since
international trade is blocked by the U.S. Even the real estate sector
is to be exposed to market forces – a sector that determines whether the
population will have a roof over their heads or not. One might ask:
what interests are driving this change?
THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STATE-MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND BUREAUCRATIC CAPITALISM
Let’s
draw a comparison with Sweden. Sweden, as we know, is a
monopolistic-capitalist and imperialist country, and the people are
mainly divided into two classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
Within the bourgeoisie, there are essentially two factions: those who
represent private monopoly capital and those who represent state
monopoly capital. A similar contradiction exists in all oppressed
nations between bureaucratic capital, which is linked to the state
apparatus, and the compradors, who are directly linked to foreign
capital. This contradiction also exists in Cuba.
Under
the new “reform package,” the Cuban state will also be able to purchase
minority stakes in private companies—that is, act like any other market
participant. This policy is the same as in any Western European or
North American country.
Given
this, it is not entirely unreasonable that there are Cuban officials
who are happy to look toward the northeast. On the other side of the
Atlantic, in “social-democratic” Sweden, for example, there is the 100
percent state-owned energy company Vattenfall, where the CEO is paid an
astronomical 1,600,000 SEK before taxes each month in salary. The irony
is that this is something such “left-wing” figures in Sweden love to
talk about, even as they offer their unconditional and uncritical
support to the Cuban state. It would be fascinating to see if there are
Cuban officials who translate these pages and learn from Vattenfall how
to distribute the people’s property.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
So-called
“foreign direct investment”—one of several forms of what Lenin called
the export of capital, in which imperialists buy up natural resources,
build production facilities, and exploit the local population, among
other things—is to be permitted to an ever-greater extent in Cuba,
according to the proposal. Before 1982, there were absolutely no
opportunities for such foreign investment in Cuba. However, a “joint
venture law” was passed that year, which required that foreign
investments be jointly owned with the Cuban state. This law led to an
increase in European and Canadian investments, though not American ones,
since the U.S. did not permit such investments.
The
difference between the 1982 law and the new proposal is that foreign
direct investment could now take place entirely without state
involvement—that is, not just in the form of partnerships where the
exploitation of domestic resources can, at least in theory, be limited.
In practice, this is a return to “old” Cuba, where the Yanks were
allowed to own, for example, sugar plantations thanks to permits from
willing officials, in order to produce cheap raw materials for the
imperialists’ companies.
Everything
we see in other bureaucratic-capitalist countries can, in practice,
also happen in Cuba. Consequently, no “bribes” are needed for foreign
compradors (locally hired corporate agents) to buy up natural resources,
formerly state-owned enterprises, and infrastructure, as well as to
price export products on the imperialist powers’ terms—including through
demands from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to secure
new loans. The small Cuban bourgeoisie’s control over natural resources
and enterprises will likely be outcompeted and disappear to the benefit
of companies such as Dole, Chiquita, McDonald’s, Wendy’s, Monsanto, and
energy companies. Admittedly, the Cuban state will still be able to
control and grant or deny permits for direct investments in the future,
but there are no guarantees that the greedy beaks of the compradors will
be reined in.
CONCLUSION
On
social media, the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba,
PCC) has stated that the reforms are “an expression of the logic of
development” during our “historical period” and that they “in no way
deviate from the socialist project.” The head of the “Ministry of
Ideology” claimed that the reforms constitute a “domestic, creative,
courageous, and revolutionary response” to the “economic war Cuba is
facing.” What a joke! Given the actual content of the reform package,
the PCC’s claims about revolution and socialism are nothing but a
mockery.
However,
it is not a given that the reform program will succeed. U.S.
imperialism is proclaiming loud and clear that it is preparing an
invasion, and most of the bureaucratic capitalists in Cuba are trembling
with fear. To save their own skins, they are ready to implement reforms
that would appease the Yanks, even if this is not popular among the
people. At the end of the day, it is the masses who determine their own
fate, and this reform package is not popular among the masses.
The
Cuban people do not want to become slaves again to the masters on the
other side of the Florida Straits. Instead, they are ready to defend
themselves. All domestic forces that are ready to capitulate in the face
of Yankee aggression are doomed to fall. For the Cuban people to be
liberated, and for the Cuban nation to be formed, a definitive break
with imperialism is required. The country cannot allow itself to remain
merely a producer for all manner of foreign powers; it must develop
independently and become self-sufficient. In this regard, bureaucratic
capital becomes a bottleneck, since it profits only from keeping the
country in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal state. Chairman Gonzalo
teaches us that confiscating bureaucratic capital is crucial for paving
the way for the democratic revolution and necessary for the transition
to the socialist revolution. What is required in the war of liberation
must therefore be proletarian leadership: a leadership that will never
capitulate to save its own skin, nor settle for half-measures; it will
loudly and clearly proclaim its intention to overthrow imperialism
through people’s war.
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