Friday, November 20, 2026

Kommunisten@riseup.net!: Imperialism in decline: The energy crisis (part 1)

 

Photo: Ansar Allah blows up an oil tanker in the Red Sea, 2024

Imperialism is, as we demonstrate in this series of articles, an incredibly fragile system that is in the midst of a very deep crisis. We will now take a closer look at and attempt to analyze current events from several different conflict zones, and then show how the consequences of these conflicts extend all the way to Sweden, given that imperialism is a global system whose crises create ripples around the world.

Everything we do—from shopping at the store to reading a book or arming a country for war—depends on the production and transportation of immense amounts of energy. This energy has a source and is, like so much else in this world, a commodity. War and conflict shape the world’s energy supply in ways that threaten the very foundations of most societies. We will therefore examine specifically how the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine affect the energy situation here in Europe.

It should also be noted here that we are not approaching this from any kind of Eurocentric perspective, where global events are only of interest if they affect us directly—the ravages of imperialism are just as unforgivable regardless of how many people are affected, and we are well aware that the energy crisis has far worse consequences than just slightly higher prices at the gas pump in Sweden —but rather, we are doing this to connect the global to the local and demonstrate the connection between them. In doing so, we can also demonstrate that there can be no event on this scale that does not have global consequences.

Part 2 will be available to read here soon.

Developments in the Middle East

When it comes to analyzing the energy issue internationally, it’s clear to everyone that a contributing factor to the rise in energy costs worldwide stems from developments in the Middle East, and that the conflicts in the region have damaged the infrastructure related to energy production.

A chain of bottlenecks throughout the system—from oil fields to gas pumps—has led to a decline in energy exports from the region and higher prices:

  • Damaged refineries and diesel shortages: Conflicts have damaged major refineries in the Gulf region and Russia, among other places. Net exports of refined products (such as diesel and jet fuel) have plummeted, driving up the price differential between crude oil and finished products.
  • High freight and insurance costs: It is expensive and risky to send tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. War risk insurance premiums have skyrocketed (up to 6–10% of a vessel’s value), which particularly affects smaller vessels transporting fuel.
  • Longer transport routes: When tankers are forced to take detours (“ton-miles”), capacity is tied up in longer voyages, which increases transport costs and drives prices even higher.
  • Depleted stockpiles: Global oil and fuel reserves have been depleted during the crisis. Even if the war were to end immediately, it would take time to repair refineries, rebuild stockpiles, and bring down insurance premiums.

It takes more than just getting crude oil shipments moving again to lower prices at the pump—the entire chain of refining, insurance, and distribution must return to normal.

What has happened?

No one who reads the newspaper can fail to notice how the war against Iran has affected the global energy market, but certain points are still worth repeating:

  • The war has affected Iran’s ability to export its oil and gas. The Iranian economy accounts for 10% and 15%, respectively, of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves. Its largest export partners are China (36%), Turkey (20%), Pakistan (10%), and the United Arab Emirates (10%).
  • The Persian Gulf, the source of 21 million barrels of oil—and thus slightly more than 20% of the world’s oil—has become a clear target of attacks.
  • Ports, refineries, military installations, infrastructure, and more have been destroyed by the resistance against the U.S.-imperialist-led aggression in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar.
  • Iran has succeeded in holding the Strait of Hormuz hostage. Now, only ships with costly security measures can pass through—with Iran’s consent.

This is nothing new; it has been the reality since the outbreak of the war. But on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, significant developments have taken place that have had repercussions in every corner of the globe.

Ansar Allah’s Counteroffensive

Ansar Allah, often referred to as the Houthi movement in the media, is a resistance group (without proletarian leadership) waging a national liberation struggle and mobilizing the masses against Yemen’s comprador government forces. They are at war with Saudi Arabia, and this war has escalated recently: Over the summer, Saudi Arabia intensified the genocide it has been carrying out in Yemen under the pretext that flights between areas controlled by Ansar Allah and Iran would be interpreted as acts of war. This subsequently enabled Ansar Allah to launtch a counteroffensive that is currently shaking not only the Yemeni government but also the entire Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

So, in a nutshell, what has happened?

Below, we’ve included a map of the Arabian Peninsula. This peninsula consists of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, and the Gulf States. Economic life on the peninsula is directly dictated by oil exports. On one side lies the Strait of Hormuz, on the other side lies the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and to the north lies the Suez Canal. Oil and gas, among other things, can be transported through these sea routes.

It may also be helpful to get an overview of the population figures here:

Yemen 41.8 million
Saudi Arabia 37 million
United Arab Emirates 11.5 million
Oman 5.5 million
Kuwait 4.9 million
Qatar 3 million
Bahrain 1.6 million

However, there are some issues with these figures: first, in several of these countries, a large proportion of the workforce consists of migrant workers who work on seasonal contracts and then return to their home countries; and second, not all countries have conducted censuses in recent years—the war in Yemen has likely contributed to changes in its population.

Below is the same table excluding guest workers:

Yemen 41.5 million
Saudi Arabia 19.6 million
Oman 3 million
Kuwait 1.6 million
United Arab Emirates 1.3 million
Bahrain 0.74 million
Qatar 0.35 million

Yemen and Saudi Arabia are thus by far the most populous countries on the peninsula.

In Yemen, moreover, a civil war has been raging since 2014, which, in short, involves Yemen’s government forces (closely allied with U.S. imperialism, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states) waging war against their own people, led by Ansar Allah. In the context of this civil war, Ansar Allah has taken control of large parts of western Yemen, thereby gaining significant influence in the Red Sea, where, among other things, they have been able to carry out attacks on ships delivering goods to Israel.

In September and October, Ansar Allah launched a counteroffensive after Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces escalated their attacks on the population. In addition to Ansar Allah’s numerous attacks against Saudi Arabia—primarily acts of sabotage targeting its oil industry—the group has also launched an offensive within Yemen. Taiz, the country’s third-largest city, is currently under siege by Ansar Allah.

The Attacks Against Saudi Arabia

The Gulf Research Center recorded 82 attacks against Saudi Arabia between July 13 and October 25 of this year, including 12 targeting airports and 10 targeting energy facilities. The number of attacks rose from 4 in July to 17 in September, before surging to 54 between October 1 and 25—accounting for roughly two-thirds of the total. In other words, the war is escalating.

To illustrate the scale of these attacks, we have chosen to highlight a few examples:

  • April 9: Attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure reduced oil production by 600,000 barrels per day and capacity in the east-west pipeline by approximately 700,000 barrels per day
  • July 13–August 14: Ansar Allah attacks Aramco’s oil facilities on the Red Sea
  • July 27: Ansar Allah attacks the refinery in Jizan—according to Reuters, the facility was so severely damaged that the refinery was shut down. It had a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day
  • September: The East-West pipeline is temporarily shut down following drone attacks. The pipeline normally transported approximately 4–5 million barrels per day
  • October 13–14: Attacks on Aramco’s headquarters in Dharan and on the refinery in Riyadh
  • October 18–22: Attacks on the Shaybah oil field and Aramco facilities in Yanbu
  • October 24–26: Attacks on pumping stations and the Petro Rabigh refinery
  • October 27: Attacks on one of Saudi Arabia’s most important export hubs: Ras Tanura. The oil export terminal was set on fire by a ballistic missile
  • November 8: An Aramco administrative building was damaged in Riyadh
  • November 9: Additional drone attacks and fires on the East-West Pipeline
  • November 10: An oil tanker is damaged off the coast of the United Arab Emirates, with up to 1.87 million barrels of Saudi oil lost

An article published in the New York Post on September 15, titled “Houthis are the world’s biggest new threat to global oil supply — and US ally infighting is to blame,” describes the situation:

“The Iran-backed Houthi rebels are now the biggest threat to the world’s oil supply after their latest attacks in Yemen and Saudi Arabia — with the terror group taking advantage of infighting among US allies in the Gulf.

In the past week, the rebel group has effectively taken over the critical Bab al-Mandeb Strait and are accused of masterminding the strike on the Saudi’s massive East-West oil pipeline, which has likely shut it down for weeks.

The disruption threatens the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia, the world’s second-largest supplier of crude, with the price of a barrel of oil jumping to $108 on Tuesday.”

The Bab al-Mandeb Strait had become Saudi Arabia’s primary export route after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz. Now that Ansar Allah has closed this strait as well, only the Suez Canal remains—a route that adds weeks to oil tankers’ journeys.

Through its military operations, Ansar Allah has thus been able to hold oil production hostage. By cutting off the East-West pipeline that runs through Saudi Arabia, exploiting the situation at the Strait of Hormuz, and exercising control over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, they have been able to force exports to go through the Suez Canal. The problem with the Suez Canal is that its queues are very long, as it handles around 10% of all global maritime trade. In addition, a spokesperson for Ansar Allah has publicly threatened to blow up the telephone lines that run via undersea cables in the Red Sea. This would cut off internet and telephone connectivity between Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Traffic would then be forced to reroute via the Atlantic, through the U.S., across the Pacific, and through Asia—which would be nearly impossible.

Oil Production in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil-producing countries, second only to the U.S., and produced an average of 10.3 million b/d (barrels per day) in 2018 and 9.9 million in 2019. It has the world’s largest proven oil reserves spread across 85 fields, which contain more than 1,000 production wells and 60 major geographical gas wells for production facilities.

Most Saudi oil is “sour” and must pass through a stabilizer that removes hydrogen sulfide. The largest facility, in Abqaiq, stabilizes 6–7 million b/d of crude oil, with up to 7 million b/d of additional capacity. The other nine operational facilities process only 2.8 million b/d. The entire oil infrastructure is linked by nearly 20,000 km of pipelines. Running from oil fields in the east to refineries and ports in the west is the East-West Pipeline, which pumps approximately 1.9 million b/d. KSA exports about 7.4 million b/d of crude oil and 1.9 million b/d of refined products. Four-fifths of these are shipped through the Ras Tanura and Ras al-Juaymah export terminals on the east coast.

Revenues from the Saudi oil industry account for 87 percent of budget revenues, 42 percent of GDP, and 90 percent of export revenues—this puts into perspective just how vulnerable Saudi Arabia is to disruptions in oil flows. A fact that has not been lost on Ansar Allah.

Why can’t Saudi Arabia defend itself?

It goes without saying that an incompetent monarchy consisting of children of incest and nepotism—who would rather spend their time inviting OnlyFans models to their palaces, engaging in pedophilia, or building a soccer league with world-class stars playing in front of empty stands—will not make the best decisions in a crisis situation. The Saudi monarchy has handled the crisis so poorly that trust among the country’s tribal leaders has plummeted, and there has even been speculation about a regime change(!).

But perhaps what’s more interesting is how the modern American Patriot system—described as unbeatable—has failed the Saudi tyrants. Saudi Arabia relies on the Patriot system (PAC-2/3) for its ballistic missile defense; these systems are extremely expensive (in the range of $1 billion each) and defend only a relatively small area. They also struggle to intercept cruise missiles and drones capable of flying at very low altitudes.

The problem with this massive and expensive missile system is that Ansar Allah, with its simple, inexpensive drones, has managed to penetrate these systems and take out key parts of the Saudi infrastructure. Sometimes something can seem difficult until you try to strike against it, and the mighty, wealthy, and technologically superior Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has proven to be nothing more than a paper tiger.

Prices are rising and stocks are running low

“The world has eroded its supply buffers by drawing nearly 1 billion barrels of oil from global reserves since the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz,” said the CEO of Abu Dhabi’s state-owned oil company, ADNOC.

Diesel inventories in some regions are at their lowest levels in 35 years for this time of year, while others face an LNG shortfall of 600 billion cubic feet, according to Sultan Al Jaber at the United Arab Emirates’ ADIPEC conference.

According to Al Jaber, the cost of shipping and logistics has risen to 30% of the cost per barrel, up from 5% before the war in Iran. Based on the international benchmark Brent index, oil is trading at around $110 per barrel, an increase of approximately 50% from February, just before the war began. Last month, the International Energy Agency agreed to release more than 20 million barrels of diesel onto the market, as well as any remaining oil from a record-breaking emergency reserve release promised in March to increase supply and cool rising prices. Amin Nasser, CEO of Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company Saudi Aramco, said last month that fewer than 6 billion barrels of commercial stockpiles remain, with the vast majority not practically accessible.

Governments are depleting their emergency oil reserves faster than ever, and the room to continue doing so is shrinking

As early as October 7, member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) endorsed accelerating the oil withdrawals they had committed to under the agency’s “Collective Action” plan from March 2026, with the goal of completing them as soon as possible. They also agreed to prioritize diesel, given how strained that market has become. An analyst at JPMorgan interprets the measure as an acceleration of the oil releases already promised.

The March measure was historic in its own right. In response to the war in Iran and disruptions to tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, IEA member countries agreed to make 400 million barrels of oil available to the market. This was the sixth collective action since the agency’s founding in 1974, and by far the largest.

Seven months later, the buffer stock is noticeably smaller. IEA member countries still hold approximately 1.1 billion barrels in public emergency reserves, including more than 200 million barrels of diesel, according to the agency. In March, that figure stood at more than 1.2 billion barrels. Aramco CEO Amin Nasser estimates that more than 1 billion barrels have been withdrawn from reserves worldwide. The IEA’s action followed a video conference on October 2 between G7 leaders, convened by French President Emmanuel Macron. In a joint statement, the leaders said they had agreed on coordinated measures to “stabilize the immediate energy supply and protect households and businesses from price shocks.”

At the heart of the plan is a coordinated release of 100 million barrels through the IEA over four months, with a large proportion of diesel to be released within the first 20 days. The G7 also pledged to stagger maintenance work at refineries so that facilities do not shut down simultaneously. The members pledged to urge refineries to operate at higher capacity where possible and to encourage countries with significant refining capacity to increase diesel production, as well as to ensure that energy exports among themselves would not be restricted.

Diesel is the critical issue. Damage to refineries and disruptions to shipping resulting from the wars in Iran and Ukraine have driven diesel prices to record highs in many markets, directly affecting the costs of trucking, agriculture, and freight transport. IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol urged everyone, including those who have already fulfilled their promised withdrawals, to consider whether additional diesel needs to be withdrawn from stockpiles.

US oil reserves are running low

In the U.S., the strain on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is becoming apparent. In March, the Trump administration initiated an emergency drawdown of 172 million barrels as its contribution to the IEA’s effort. Since then, the SPR has fallen to approximately 284 million barrels—the lowest level since 1982—and is on track to drop to about 243 million once the final barrels have been delivered. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has warned that draining the reserve too rapidly could damage the salt caverns where the oil is stored. This marks a sharp reversal from the administration’s earlier pledge to replenish the SPR “all the way to the top.”

A report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), published in May and released in June, suggests that the problems run deeper than just inventory levels. The GAO found that the Department of Energy (DOE) has released more than 500 million barrels of crude oil from the SPR since 1985, more than half of which were released in connection with emergencies such as wars. Nearly 70% of all withdrawals occurred between 2014 and 2025. Prior to 2026, the largest withdrawal ever recorded was the emergency sale of 180 million barrels that took place in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This pace has clashed with an aging infrastructure: the GAO found that investments in the reserve are not keeping pace with needs, leading to a growing maintenance burden. The DOE itself has warned that aging equipment will increasingly limit the SPR’s ability to carry out replenishment or withdrawal orders.

The bigger shortcoming, according to the GAO, is strategic. The DOE has not conducted a long-term review of the SPR since 2016, and Congress has never established a target size.

“Without an updated long-term plan or target size for the SPR, the DOE and Congress are making operational and investment decisions amid uncertainty about what the SPR is currently capable of, what it should be capable of in the future to meet the United States’ evolving needs and commitments, and what investments and other measures may be required to bridge any gaps,” the report states.

In addition, the Pentagon has recently requested $67 billion in funding “to continue operations … while many Americans are still struggling to cope with escalating bills.”

On the other side of the Red Sea

We consider it equally important to also highlight what is happening on the other side of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—in the Horn of Africa. Here lies an entirely different conflict zone that may also have an impact on the global energy market. This is a region that encompasses numerous states, peoples, armed groups, and interests, which we will now once again briefly address:

Ethiopia is the region’s most populous and economically powerful country. It is a federal republic consisting of two autonomous, privileged cities: Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa; as well as twelve ethnically based regions: Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Central Ethiopia, Gambela Hizboch, Harari, Oromia, Sidama, Somali, the Southwestern Ethiopian Peoples’ Region, Southern Ethiopia, and Tigray. The country has a population of over 100 million. Ethiopia has an estimated GDP of approximately 210 billion USD.

What is unique about Ethiopia is that it is one of the world’s largest countries by area without a seaport. It is not surprising that this creates fertile grounds for conflict under imperialism, and we will now examine the largest of these conflicts: Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Eritrea is one of the world’s poorest countries, with a GDP of only 1.9 billion USD. Compared to Ethiopia, Eritrea is a dwarf in many ways—economically, geographically, and, not least, in terms of population. Eritrea was formerly part of Ethiopia but waged a war of liberation, resulting in its independence in 1993. Since then, there have been obvious tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Between 1998 and 2000, a war broke out between the two countries, and it took seven years before new borders were drawn between them. Subsequently, a peace agreement was signed, and the UN lifted the arms embargo against Eritrea. Relations between the countries improved, a fact we would later see confirmed in the fall of 2020, when a common enemy emerged.

As mentioned, there are several ethnic groups in Ethiopia fighting for their right to self-determination. In the north, along the border with Eritrea, live the Tigray people. The Tigray people, much like the Eritrean people did in the past, are fighting for freedom from the rulers in Addis Ababa. The Tigray region is home to 7.4 million people, and the area is governed by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Its armed forces consist of 250,000 people. During the war that raged from 2020 to 2022, Eritrea and Ethiopia chose to jointly crush the Tigray people’s uprising. This war, known as the Tigray War, is said to be one of the deadliest of modern times, with approximately 500,000 fatalities. The war ended with an agreement signed between Tigray and Ethiopia, from which Eritrea was excluded. Eritrea sought to reunite the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

In 2024, the TPLF split into two factions led by Getachew Reda and the hard-line Debretsion Gebremichae. In March 2025, Debretsion staged a coup in Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. According to The Guardian, Debretsion’s faction received support from Eritrea’s intelligence services—the very same country that had previously sought to eliminate them.

On September 20, 2026, seven armed groups announced the formation of the Ethiopian People’s Forces Alliance for Survival—an alliance whose goal was to overthrow the rulers of Ethiopia. Among these are the TPLF and similar groups from Amhara and Oromo.

At the same time, Ethiopia is making a lot of money by selling weapons from the United Arab Emirates to Libya and Egypt, while also participating in the war in Sudan. There, they are supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are backed by the United Arab Emirates. This is interesting because on the other side of the conflict stands the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which is supported and trained by Eritrea. Many of the rebel groups in Ethiopia are also based in Sudan; for example, earlier this year they held preparatory meetings for the formation of a rebel alliance in Ethiopia.

Furthermore, amid the chaos, Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of supporting the rebels. The governor of the Afar Region has accused Eritrea of attempting to cut off the route to Djibouti, which handles 97 percent of Ethiopia’s international trade.

Ethiopia depends on being able to transport its goods to the port in Djibouti, a country that, aside from its port, is not much different from a military base. France has two military bases in the country, while China, Japan, Italy, and the U.S. each have one. The U.S. has the largest presence, with a military force of approximately 5,000 troops, while France and China each have around 1,500–2,000. A full 97% of Ethiopia’s trade passes through the port of Djibouti. Ethiopia has to pay exorbitant fees for this trade and surely misses the days when it could use the port cities in Eritrea. If the highway to Djibouti were cut off, Ethiopia would lose access to the sea almost entirely, which would, of course, create further economic uncertainty. In addition, Djibouti would lose up to $2 billion in fees it collects from Ethiopia—a massive blow to an economy worth $4.6 billion.

Over the past month, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has escalated. Eritrea has deployed armed forces into the Tigray region, while Ethiopia is redeploying most of its forces from Somalia, another key conflict zone in the region.

On October 1, Addis Ababa severed ties with Asmara, accusing it of “interference in activities that pose a direct threat to Ethiopia’s national security.” At present, evidence of Eritrean support is weak. Fragmentation in Ethiopia could shield Eritrea from pressure over Assab, but a conflict moving toward its border could leave Asmara vulnerable.

Why is this relevant to the energy trade? Since this is unfolding on the other side of the Red Sea, it involves a particularly important player. Eritrea has certain ties to the so-called “axis of resistance” and could become yet another force within it. Furthermore, as we have seen previously, Ethiopia has ties to several Gulf states.

Eritrea’s Foreign Minister Osman Saleh attended the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in 2024, and Asmara condemned the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Ethiopian analysts have claimed that Iran supplied drones to Eritrea and that Eritrean territory has served as a route for weapons bound for Sudan. Furthermore, Eritrea did not join in the Western condemnations of Ansar Allah’s Red Sea campaign against Israel, although allegations that Eritrea has aided the Sanaa-based movement remain unproven. Commenting on Yemen, Saleh said that the Saudi-backed government had “no control” over Yemen and warned that foreign powers cannot subjugate Yemen. When asked whether Eritrea would impose tolls on the Red Sea, Saleh said, “This is a new idea, a new concept,” but added that he could not comment on the matter as long as there was a war in Yemen. Furthermore, the Eritrean regime shares enemies with the resistance axis, as several opposition groups opposing the regime receive support and training from Israel.

Ethiopia has also participated in campaigns alongside Israel to gain control of the Red Sea. In February of this year, a four-party agreement was finalized linking Israel, India, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia. This emerging axis focuses on securing maritime hubs in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandeb, while laying the groundwork for an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in East Africa.

At the same time, we wish to highlight how the U.S. is openly attempting to coax Eritrea onto its side to prevent the conflict from escalating. In September, Washington lifted sanctions against the country and has sought closer ties with Asmara as Sanaa continues to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea.

This volatile situation could thus also disrupt—and possibly contribute to the closure of—yet another critical hub in global energy shipping. This also contributes, among other things, to increased insurance and security costs to maintain trade under the guise of “business as usual.”

Conclusion

When it’s cheaper to take a weekend trip to space than to charter a ship around the Arabian Peninsula, it’s not hard to see that there are problems in the world.

Imperialism is a global system that depends on the exploitation of the natural resources and labor of Third World countries. One of the problems with such a system is that it is highly vulnerable to global crises, and a conflict in one region has repercussions throughout the world, as we have now demonstrated. Capital’s general process of monopolization also means that any competition that may exist in a global market results in bankruptcies, and that an ever-greater centralization of control over resources essential to the entire globe occurs among a handful of powers.

But it is also not easy to control and maintain a colony, as the global trend is for people to resist this parasitic system more and more. During the colonization of the Americas and Africa, Europeans were able to prevail thanks to their superior weapons; today, the Americans’ Patriot missile system is being taken out by cheap Yemeni drones. At the same time, the masses are growing in number, becoming hungrier and angrier.

Energy reserves are being depleted worldwide. Wars are driving up the price of all energy, and the result is that the cost of all operations in society is rising. After all, there is no industry that does not require the transportation of goods, and the war in the Middle East is affecting merchant fleets around the world. In China, for example—one of the countries most dependent on oil from the Middle East—prices are being driven up for the production of goods on which both Americans and Europeans depend.

The shockwaves from this crisis show no signs of abating, and this will be demonstrated in the following part 2 article by examining the situation in Europe.