On the occasion of the celebration of the 130th Anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao of the International Communist League, we publish, for the first time in English, the MPP document: The Communist Party of Peru and Maoism.
Proletarians of all countries, unite!
The
Communist Party of Peru and Maoism
Peru People’s Movement
October 2023
On the
Problem of the Path of Encircling the Cities from the Countryside (CCCC)
In
this document, issued on the occasion of the celebration of the 95th
anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Peru by José Carlos
Mariátegui on October 7, 1928, according to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo
Thought, it is explained how Chairman Mao resolved the pending issue of
specifying revolution in a country under imperialist domination with feudalism
at its base and bureaucratic capitalism. It also discusses how the Communist
Party of Peru, under the leadership of Chairman Gonzalo and his all-powerful
Gonzalo Thought, upholds, defends, and applies it, developing it further.
How did Chairman Mao
solve the problem of revolution?
Chairman
Gonzalo, at the First Party Congress, summed it up with great precision:
“With
the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the establishment of the strategy of encircling
cities from the countryside, it was in 1936, in Problems of Strategy in China’s
Revolutionary War that the law was first established: The ‘encirclement and
annihilation’ campaigns and counter-campaigns became the primary form of
development in the Chinese civil war.”
It is
Chairman Mao, then, who resolves the pending issue. The Autumn Harvest Uprising
took place on September 9, 1927; as everyone knows, he gathered soldiers,
organized them into the army linked to the Party because they were within the
Kuomintang army, but there were parts that obeyed the communists. He brought
together those parts and formed battalions with workers and peasants; that is
the Autumn Harvest Uprising. As it is known, even among them, clashes occurred,
and there was a retreat. The Chairman narrowly escaped falling into the hands
of Chiang Kai-shek in Hanyang. He regrouped his forces and marched to Jinggang,
establishing the Power and, for the first time, the laws of people’s war in
1936, which is nine years later.
Chairman
Mao created the Power in Jinggang, after having created the Red Army of workers
and peasants.”
History
of the Army: The formation of the People’s Liberation Army of China has been a
challenging process. The Chinese Red Army (called the Eighth Army and the New
Fourth Army Corps during the War of Resistance against Japan and later, the
People’s Liberation Army) was born on August 1, 1927, with the Nanchang
Uprising.
Regarding
the above, Chairman Gonzalo continues:
“Chairman
Mao, with this, he solves a pending problem because, until him, it was not
known how to carry out the revolution and lead it in a country under
imperialist domination with feudalism at its base and bureaucratic capitalism.
This is very important because for some, simply seeing capitalist relations
means the country is capitalist. Thus, Chairman Mao solved the problem, which
was unresolved before; Lenin did not solve it, and neither did Stalin. It was
the Chairman who solved it, and in this way, he develops the democratic
revolution under the leadership of the proletariat led by the Communist Party.
How can we deny this reality?
Chairman
Mao Zedong once again reaffirms and advocates revolutionary violence as a
universal law without any exceptions whatsoever; this is extraordinary. He
specifies violence as war and the military and asserts its character as a
universal law. ‘Power grows out of the barrel of a gun,’ 1927, That’s when the
Chairman raised this thesis; don’t get confused because it’s in a later text.1 Chairman Mao, in the August 1927 meeting, after
all the slaughter carried out by the wretch Chiang Kai-shek, raised the slogan:
‘Power grows out of the barrel of a gun,’ and it was also at that time when he
proposed the issue of ‘encircling the cities from the countryside’ (CCCC).
The
Chairman reaffirms once again: ‘Revolution as the violent replacement of one
class by another,’ and he tells us that it is a universal law without any
exceptions. Because Marx presented us with violence, but he thought that in England,
given its peculiarities in the past century, it might be possible to take power
without applying violence as an exception, as he clearly explained in the
19th
century, as Lenin has pointed out perfectly. However, Lenin himself, after the
February 1917 revolution, began to think that
due to the dual power structure in old Tsarist Russia, following the
bourgeois revolution of February, and considering that there were committees
called soviets in which soldiers were involved, and that part of the army only
moved by order of the soviets, and if not, it did not move; given the set of
contradictions that made the government of Kerenski extremely fragile, he
thought that, as an exception, power could be seized because it was very
corrupt, a reactionary power, indeed, very corrupt. When the events of July
(the Kornilov affair) occurred, the reaction violently suppressed the
proletariat and the people, so Lenin said that it was not feasible, that
violence had to be applied, but in order to prevent it from failing, the
revolution had to be armed, the revolution had to be prepared. When everyone
was saying, ‘It’s impossible now, they’ve beaten us so much.’
Regarding
the specification of the revolution in backward countries, Lenin himself, at
the Second Congress of the International, gathered comrades from the East and
told them, including himself, that we know the revolution in capitalist
countries but not in backward countries under imperialist domination; that is
your task, it is pending, you have to solve it without forgetting that you are
communists and that you must organize yourselves as such, as a Party, linked to
the Communist International.”
Continuing,
Chairman Gonzalo, regarding the “Autumn Harvest Uprising”:
“The
Chairman himself, in an interview with Edgar Snow, says: ‘In September, we had
managed to organize a very broad uprising with the peasant unions of Hunan, and
the first worker-peasant units of the army were formed. The recruits came from
three sources: rural populations, miners from Hanvang, and insurgent troops
from the Kuomintang. This initial military force of the revolution was called
the ‘First Division of the First Army of Peasants and Workers”
At
the First Party Congress, Chairman Gonzalo takes on the defense of the
historical significance for the Chinese Revolution and the worldwide revolution
of the “Autumn Harvest Uprising.” In a controversial tone, he addressed the
members of the First Party Congress with a strong conviction about how the
great communist leaders should act in the face of new situations they have to
resolve. He said:
“I
ask now, what were the great armies that Chairman Mao defeated, what were the
sieges he destroyed if the sieges began on the 30th? I believe what is
happening is that we don’t even know
what
we’re talking about. Yes, comrades, I refer to the biography of Chairman Mao
Zedong, furthermore, I refer to the history of the Communist Party of China. I
do not agree with the stupidity
that
the Autumn Harvest Uprising was a failure; for the idiot opportunist revisionists,
for Deng, it is a failure! The classification made by the Sixth Congress of the
Communist Party of China in Moscow when it was said that among the uprisings in
Nanchang, Autumn, and Canton, the most important was Canton, is erroneous,
comrades, if we view it in the light of Maoism, we do not understand it; we
cannot allow it because in ‘Peking Review,’ what does it say? The revolution
was crushed, it was a defeat, but if it was the path of encircling the cities
from the countryside, what the Chairman does is raise the Autumn Harvest,
gather the forces after that initial clash, or perhaps they
thought
they would take power the next day? They march to the Jinggang Mountain, which
was a den of bandits, or weren’t they? And there, he creates the new Power. How
did Chairman Jinggang find it?, the revolutionary forces were destroyed, I
refer to ‘The Jinggang Mountains,’ isn’t it there? I wonder, what are we
reading? What are we studying?
With
the laws that the Chairman passes afterward, they are making a mistake with the
laws established on the 1936, regarding how they are developed, but they are
not addressing how they begin. They are confusing birth with adulthood. Do you
think that’s correct? It’s like equating a baby’s first cries with a young person
who votes,2 who comes up with that? I repeat, when do the “encirclement and annihilation” campaigns start? On the 30th!
There are no “encirclement and annihilation”
campaigns on the 27th, 28th, or 29th; the “encirclement and
annihilation” campaigns strictly appear on the 30th, the problem is that
then the President passes the law and confuses things. I believe, comrades,
that we should never be mechanistic; mechanicism leads to opportunism. It is
the Chairman himself who says this in Introducing The Communist like this: ‘Why
did many comrades fall into opportunism? Due to mechanical application,’ he
says. It is in a long process that the general laws are established; it is 1936
in Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War that the law is
established for the first time, 9 years later. Isn’t this the very history
itself? Then, with this, he resolves a pending issue because it was not known,
until him, how to make the revolution and how to lead it in a country under
imperialist domination with feudalism at its base and bureaucratic capitalism.
This is very important, comrades, because for some, just seeing capitalist
relations means the country is already capitalist. This is how the problem was
resolved; it was the Chairman who resolved it, and in this way, he developed
the democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat led by the
Communist Party. How can we deny this reality?”
Chairman Gonzalo, also at the First Congress, said
in this regard:
“So,
the Chairman has solved the problem of the democratic revolution and its
uninterrupted transition to socialism; the Chairman has resolved that. Lenin
couldn’t do it because Kerenski happened to lead the democratic revolution in
old Russia due to historical chance. Lenin did say that the Bolshevik Party
could and should lead the democratic revolution, as he put it in his words, a
‘revolutionary government of workers and peasants.’ So, doesn’t he propose
that? Remember, comrades, in Two Tactics he proposed that; but he himself
acknowledges that the Party was not in a position to lead the democratic
revolution, that was the reality, so we cannot say that he solved the problem,
it was the Chairman. The fact that it should be uninterrupted, Lenin knew that,
he knew it, it comes from Marx; from Marx comes the valuable thesis of
permanent revolution, which is rarely touched upon because Trotsky, that idiot,
tarnished the term, and there is fear of using it. But, comrades, the time will
come when we will use it again because it is of pure Marxist origin. The Gotha
Program, comrades, who made it? Marx did, that’s key. He proposed permanent
revolution, a revolution after revolution until communism, he said. Of course,
he didn’t list them for us, he didn’t say, ‘revolution here,’ ‘revolution
there,’ ‘cultural revolution,’ no, he didn’t tell us that. Comrade Stalin, did
he know this? Of course, he knew about uninterrupted revolution. Did the
Communist International know? Of course they did. Many things, my dear
comrades, that are in Mariátegui’s writings are from the Communist
International, in case you didn’t know; I believe we don’t know our history and
talk about things we don’t understand. Do you think the Communist International
didn’t know that the revolution was uninterrupted? Do you think the Communist
International didn’t know that? Comrade Stalin knew that perfectly well. Wasn’t
Stalin a Marxist? Please, man! Let’s not forget that Mariátegui was in Europe;
let’s not forget that there were recommendations from the Communist
International, explicit ones. I think we don’t remember or know many things.
But it’s the Chairman who has embodied it,
developed it, found its laws, and solved the issue of uninterrupted revolution
by giving it an economic, political, and ideological foundation. So, he
has been, comrades.”
The Establishment of the Path of the Path of
Encircling the Cities from the Country (CCCC) and the Development of the
Proletarian Military Line in the Democratic Revolution in China Took Place in a
Fierce Struggle Against Opposing Lines
Against
the establishment of the path of the CCCC and the development of the
proletarian military line in the democratic revolution in China, the bourgeois
military line was expressed. In those years, after August 1927, when the right
capitulationism of Chen Duxiu was swept away, as stated by the Chairman
himself, it manifested as “left” lines:
“For
a brief period after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, a ‘Left’ putschist
tendency arose in the Communist Party. Regarding the Chinese revolution as a
‘permanent revolution’ and the revolutionary situation in China as a ‘permanent
upsurge,’ the putschist comrades refused to organize an orderly retreat and,
adopting the methods of commandism and relying only on a small number of Party
members and a small section of the masses, erroneously attempted to stage a
series of local uprisings throughout the country, which had no prospect of
success. Such putschist activities were widespread at the end of 1927 but
gradually subsided in the beginning of 1928, though sentiments in favour of
putschism still survived among some comrades.”
The
“line of Li Lisan” refers to the opportunistic “left” line that prevailed in
the Party for approximately four months, starting in June 1930, and was
represented by Li Lisan, the main leader of the Central Committee of the CPC at
that time. This line rejected the need to prepare the masses
for
revolution and denied its uneven development. It considered Chairman Mao
Zedong’s ideas, which focused on creating support bases in rural areas, using
the countryside to encircle the cities, and leveraging these bases to
accelerate the revolution across the country, as “extremely wrong localism and
conservatism characteristic of the peasant mentality.” It advocated making immediate
preparations for uprisings nationwide. Based on this erroneous line, Li Lisan
devised an adventurous plan to immediately organize armed uprisings in China’s
major cities. At the same time, this line did not recognize the uneven
development of the world revolution, claiming that the general outbreak of the
Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to the world revolution and that only
with the general outbreak of the world revolution could the Chinese revolution
succeed. It also did not acknowledge the protracted nature of the
democratic-bourgeois revolution in China, asserting that the initial victories
of the revolution in one or several provinces would mark the beginning of the
transition to socialism. Therefore, it formulated a series of untimely, adventurous,
and “leftist” political measures. Chairman Mao Zedong defeated this erroneous
line in September 1930, and Li Lisan was removed from his leadership position.
The
“left” opportunists of the years 1931-1934, such as the “Li Lisan line,” also
did not understand the law of the repetition of “encirclement and annihilation”
campaigns. In the support base of the Jupei-Jon´an-Anhui Border Region, the
so-called theory of “auxiliary forces” emerged. Some leading comrades there
believed that the Kuomintang army, after its defeat in the third “encirclement
and annihilation” campaign, was nothing more than an auxiliary force. They
thought that for a new attack on the Red Army, the imperialists themselves
would have to intervene as the main force. The strategic line based on this
estimation was to launch the Red Army against Wuhan. This was in line with the
opinions of comrades in Jiangxi who urged the Red Army to attack Nanchang,
opposed efforts to unite support bases, opposed the tactic of luring the enemy deep
into our areas, believed that capturing the capital and other major cities of a
province was a guarantee of victory in the entire province, and argued that
“the struggle against the fifth ’encirclement and annihilation’ campaign is the
decisive battle between the revolutionary path and the colonial path,” etc.
This “left” opportunism was the origin of the wrong line adopted and caused
enormous losses to the Chinese revolution.
Chairman
Mao’s proletarian military line was definitively imposed on the opposing lines
(bourgeois military line) at the Zunyi Conference, when the CPC established a
leadership headed by Chairman Mao, adhered to his line and rejected the right
opportunist lines disguised as “left.” The lessons of this blood-curdling
experience of the Chinese and world revolution must be studied and embodied by
the Maoists of the world, primarily for those who have the task of carrying out
democratic revolutions.
The
history of the CPC tells us:
At
the expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Party held in January 1935 in Zunyi, Guizhou province, a new leadership of the
Central Committee was established, led by Chairman Mao Zedong, replacing the
old opportunist “left” leadership. This meeting took place during the Great
March of the Red Army, where decisions were made on the most urgent military
issues and organizational matters related to the Secretariat and the
Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee.
The Second Revolutionary Civil War
April
1927: Chiang Kai-shek carries out a counterrevolutionary coup d’´etat and
crushes the masses and the Party.
August
1927: The Central Committee of the CPC rectifies the line and dismisses Chen
Duxiu (Chen Duxiu’s right opportunism: capitulation on the united front).
September
1927: Second Revolutionary Civil War. Chairman Mao leads the Autumn Harvest
Uprising and establishes the first revolutionary support base in the Jinggang
mountains.
(...):
“Left” line of Chu Chiu-pai.
1930:
“Left” line of Li Lisan.
1931:
“Left” line of Wang Ming.
1934:
The Long March of the Red Army.
1935:
At the Zunyi Conference, the CPC established a leadership headed by Chairman
Mao, adhered to his line, and rejected the right opportunist lines disguised as
“left.”
1935:
“Left” line of Zhang Guotao of dividing the Army.
1937:
War of Resistance Against Japan. United front: CPC and Kuomintang.
Note:
In the history of the CPC, it is stated that in his December 1935 report,
Chairman Mao Zedong foresaw that contradictions among different imperialist
powers could lead to a division within the ranks of the landlord class and the
comprador bourgeoisie in China. Later, as the Japanese imperialist offensive in
Northern China seriously clashed with the interests of Anglo-American
imperialism, the Communist Party of China considered that Chiang Kai-shek’s
gang, closely linked to these interests, could, by order of their masters,
change their attitude towards Japan. In view of this, they adopted the policy
of forcing Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan. In May 1936, upon their return to
Northern Shaanxi province from Shanxi province, the Red Army directly demanded
from the Kuomintang government in Nanjing the ending of the civil war and unity
against Japan. In August, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
sent a letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang proposing
that both parties form a united front against Japan and designate delegates to
hold negotiations with this objective. However, Chiang Kai-shek rejected these proposals.
It was only in December, when he was detained in Xian by Kuomintang army
officers who supported an alliance with the communists to resist Japan, that
Chiang Kai-shek was forced to comply with the Communist Party’s demand to end
the civil war and prepare for resistance against Japan.
The Application and Development of the Path of
Encircling the Cities from the Country (CCCC) by Chairman Gonzalo
(Regarding Unified People’s War)
The
application of the CCCC, in the People’s War in Peru, is specified as a unified
People’s War, where the countryside is primary and the city is a necessary
complement. Furthermore, in the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Peru, Chairman Gonzalo clarified how
the
path established by Chairman Mao for democratic revolutions is being applied in
the People’s War in Peru. This is the path that, despite all the twists and
turns, including the current ones, our People’s War will continue until
conquering power throughout the country, establishing the People’s Republic of
Peru, and thereby proceeding uninterruptedly to develop the socialist
revolution.
In
the First Congress, attention was given to work in the cities, it says: “it is
very important to focus the struggle in the cities, it has to do with the
insurrection; if we don’t prepare for the seizure of the cities, mainly the
largest ones, to complete the final stage of the People’s War, the conquest of
power in the entire country will be delayed...” It continues: “The work in Lima
must be developed more, considering that it is the capital.” Very important, it sees the role of the cities and
Lima in particular; it is highly relevant to take this into account. Lima is
like an echo chamber, where everything that happens there has repercussions in
the world.
Then,
the application of the CCCC, in the people’s war in Peru, is specified as a
unified people’s war, where the countryside is primary and the city is a
necessary complement. How should this specification and development of Maoism
by Chairman Gonzalo be understood? As we have already pointed out, to clarify
this, we refer to the Central Document of the Third Plenum of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Peru, a historic and momentous plenum,
where an assessment is made of the path taken in the 12 years of development of
the people’s war in Peru.
In
that plenum, Chairman Gonzalo clarified how the path established by Chairman
Mao for democratic revolutions has been applied in the People’s War in Peru.
This path, through all the twists and turns, through all the challenges and
even the current obstacles, will continue to guide our People’s War until the
democratic revolution is successfully completed, and we can immediately and
uninterruptedly transition to the socialist revolution. The Chairman said:
“(...)
regarding The People’s War. We have completed twelve years, we are starting the
thirteenth. In everything, we always have to see the specific aspect. What does
‘the specific’ mean? It is the result of the application of
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Peruvian reality. If this is the case in
everything, it is even more urgent in warfare, which is the primary form of
struggle and is generated or concretized by the primary form of organization,
which is the People’s Guerrilla Army managed by the Party in terms of military
line; so, we need to examine the development of the people’s war and the
counterrevolutionary, counter-subversive war; that’s what we need to look at.
The two hills, and see what the specific laws of our people’s war are, that is
the main thing for us, that is decisive. The question of balance, how does it
occur here? In the Second Plenum, it is well specified: ‘The protracted war and
its three stages. The three specified stages of the protracted People’s War in
Peru. The strategic equilibrium and the preparation of the counter offensive:
the enemy, to recuperate positions to maintain its system. The development of
the strategic offensive via the building of the conquest of power. Because of
that, reaction sees the need to annihilate the People’s War and the Party while
the people must build the conquest of power.’ War is a problem of military strategy; therefore,
military strategy must be examined in its course, in its development, in how it
stands today, and how it needs to be developed to be effective. It has to do
with the construction of the People’s Guerrilla Army that needs to be
strengthened, especially its main forces. It also involves how to develop our
Army, which has its own characteristics like the three forces. Strategy and
tactics are another field, but in these three things, the focus is on
understanding what is happening here, the specifics of this war. This is what
we should be concerned about (…)
The Path of Encircling the Cities from the
Countryside (CCCC) and the Shifting of
the Focus from the Countryside to the City
When
analyzing the situation in Ayacucho, fundamental political questions were taken
into consideration. At this point, the following proposition is noteworthy:
‘The strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside and the shift of
power from the center to the city.’
In
synthesis, Maoism teaches us that the people’s war in a country like ours
follows the path of encircling the cities from the countryside, which requires
placing the focus of work in the countryside for many years. As the end of the
people’s war approaches, as it progresses, the conquest of power in the
country, in the entire country, requires shifting the focus from the
countryside to the city. It is a challenge and a perspective in every approach
to encircling the cities from the countryside.
What
is important to us is that this is no longer a perspective, it is a reality
that we are implementing and need to develop. The work of the Party and the
development of the war clearly show that the path of encircling the cities from
the countryside is coming to an end, to that encirclement of the cities and the
capital itself. It is obvious to understand that this encirclement and
development are not equal, it is uneven, but it is happening. The work and
development in Lima are clear evidence that what was once a perspective is now
a reality, and we must strive intensively to advance this direction so that the
weight is shifted from the countryside to the city. This requires intense work
and time; it is related to our own efforts and the development of the class
struggle. We must understand with great precision that it is not that the city
is already the center, but the shift has already begun, and we must work to
make that shift a reality. However, this shift requires tasks to be fulfilled,
such as strengthening and further developing the work in the countryside, which
is still where the weight of the Party and the people’s war lies, particularly
developing work in the Principal areas, in the Fundamental areas, in the
Fundamental Committees, in what is known as the Sierra in the country, in the
jungle’s edge, and in the Coast; promoting work in the cities but starting by
expanding it in the countryside, taking into account small, medium, and large
cities, and especially the capital itself.
So,
we have the shift as our perspective, and it is already a reality. The weight
of the Party that is in the countryside must be shifted; this phenomenon has
already begun. Let the tasks we have just outlined be fulfilled, and we will
achieve it. It is an indispensable condition for conquering power throughout
the country, and the center of this weight should be in the city. It is not
lost on anyone that this is a complex, tough, and arduous task, but it is the
right one, no matter how much we might wish it weren’t. Well, the objective
prevails, our problem is that the subjective aligns with the objective. It is
important to insist that this is of great importance.”
The Changes of Contradiction in the Development of
the Democratic Revolution
The
main contradiction, Chairman Gonzalo said, is between the popular masses and
semi-feudalism; that’s the main one. However, there are three contradictions:
the other one is against bureaucratic capitalism and against imperialism. These
are three contradictions that exist in the country. But, with the development
of the people’s war, a change in contradiction will necessarily occur.
The
Second Revolutionary Civil War, as Chairman Mao himself specified, was carried
out under the leadership of the CPC from 1927 to 1936, paving the way for the
War of Resistance against Japan from 1937 to 1945, which was also led by
Chairman Mao and the CPC. From the end of the War of Resistance against Japan
until the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it encompasses the historical
period of the War of People’s Liberation, or the Third Revolutionary Civil War
against Chiang Kai-shek, supported by American imperialism. Chiang Kai-shek
represented the interests of large landowners and the bourgeoisie in the
country, who sought to snatch the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance
from the hands of the people and keep China as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal
country under their dictatorship. On the one hand, the Communist Party of
China, representing the interests of the proletariat and the masses, resolutely
defended the gains of the people’s struggle and worked towards the creation of
a new China, a China of new democracy for the broad masses under the leadership
of the proletariat. Thanks to the correct leadership of the Communist Party,
the Chinese people achieved a great national victory in just four years of
struggle: the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and the establishment of a new China.
Therefore,
it is necessary to emphasize the importance of correctly managing the fundamental
contradictions of the democratic revolution and the changes that occur in their
interrelation. Because in the initial phase of the democratic revolution, the
contradiction between the masses and feudalism is the primary contradiction,
which we emphasize because failing to recognize this will inevitably lead to
failures and costs in the development of the revolution. Then, with the
development of the revolution, due to the intervention of imperialism, it
changes, polarization occurs, and the primary contradiction shifts, as we have
just seen in the previous paragraph, as it happened in China.
In the same document of the Third Plenum, Chairman
Gonzalo, in this regard, states:
“Rectification
Campaign. Specific documentation. Let’s also highlight that, as in other cases,
the Ayacucho Zonal Committee has been asked to study certain documents. We are
all studying three documents in the Rectification Campaign: Regarding Our
Policy, Quotations on the People’s War by Chairman Mao, and The Construction of
the Party, the document by Bandera Roja. However, each committee is being instructed to
study specific documents or consider such experiences and lessons from Marxism
for their own work. In this case, the Ayacucho Zonal Committee has been tasked
with studying three documents by Chairman Mao that form a unit. They are titled
The Role of the Communist Party of China in the National War (the first one),
The Issue of Independence and Initiative Within the United Front (the second
one), and Problems of War and Strategy (the third one). These documents are the
result of the same meeting of the CPC’s leadership, during which Chairman Mao
analyzed these three issues for the direction and guidance of the anti-Japanese
war. This occurred when there was a shift in the contradiction, which became a
contradiction between the Chinese nation and Japanese imperialism. One might
wonder: but we are not precisely in that contradiction. That’s true; our
primary contradiction is between the popular masses and semi-feudalism. That is
the main one. However, there are three contradictions; the other two are
against bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism. These are three contradictions
that exist in the country. While that is the main point, we must consider that
the development of people’s war, the issue of seizing power throughout the
country, inevitably leads to clashes with imperialism. Inevitably, it’s like
two plus two equals four. Therefore, this contradiction will become primary.
Why? Imperialism could not, in any way, tolerate us taking power while they
simply watched. They could not allow that, especially in America. This is a
specific issue to consider, seeing American imperialism as the major enforcer
aiming to become the sole hegemonic superpower. Imperialism always fights against
the seizure of power and strives to crush the revolution, especially where the
danger is greater. Where does the danger arise in Latin America? In Peru,
that’s the fact. Latin America is the direct sphere of influence, the very
foundation of its power to exploit and oppress this continent, and thus use it
as a base to establish hegemony worldwide, to be the sole hegemonist. Because
it needs its own base of influence to exercise it all over the globe. Just as
others have dreams, the American dream is the same, and it has been exercising
that power and influence in America since the 1910s. This is something we must
consider. They themselves say that Peru is a danger to American imperialism,
and it is true, and it is a growing, ever-increasing danger. In synthesis, the
fact that the people’s war is unfolding in a strategic equilibrium, preparing
for a strategic offensive to seize power, leads to a change in contradiction,
to the intervention of imperialism, mainly Yankee (referring to U.S.
imperialism). We are in the midst of this transition; contradictions must be
viewed differently because there is polarization occurring in Peru. I believe
this needs to be acknowledged. In Peru, polarization is taking place; this
polarization implies that on one side, there is imperialism and the Peruvian
reactionaries, which includes bureaucratic capitalism, landowners, and all
reactionaries. On the other side, there is the people led by the Party as the
representative of the proletariat. This is a class struggle issue, with all
reactionaries and pro-imperialists on one side, led by the bourgeoisie, and on
the other side, all the classes that make up the people, led by the
proletariat. That is the problem. To understand this, one must remember or
revisit what Chairman Mao says about contradiction in Volume 1, on page 354 and
the following page. He states: ‘In a semi-colonial country such as China, the relationship
between the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions
presents a complicated picture.’ He presents three possibilities: the first one
is ‘When imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a country, all
its various classes, except for some traitors, can temporarily unite in a
national war against imperialism.’ This is the first case, and it is indeed the
case when imperialists unleash an aggression, invading a country. For example,
when Japan invaded China, when Japan invaded Korea, or when the United States
invaded Vietnam, or when the socialimperialism led by the USSR invaded
Afghanistan, in those situations, the contradiction is between the nation and
imperialism. However, what distinguishes them is the aggression; they aim to
conquer and subjugate for their global interests. In other words, it does not
involve a revolution. This is the third case, where there is aggression in line
with their global struggles, attacking a country and taking possession of it.
That’s the first one, he says.
‘But
in another situation,’ says the Chairman, ‘When imperialism carries on its
oppression not by war, but by milder means – political, economic and cultural -
the ruling classes in semi-colonial countries capitulate to imperialism, and
the two form an alliance for the joint oppression of the masses of the people.’
When it doesn’t engage in military aggression, when there’s no direct attack,
it uses other means - political, economic, and cultural. ‘At such a time,’ he
continues, ‘the masses often resort to civil war against the alliance of
imperialism and the feudal classes, while imperialism often employs indirect
methods rather than direct action in helping the reactionaries in the
semi-colonial countries to oppress the people, and thus the internal
contradictions become particularly sharp.’ An example is the Revolutionary War
of 1911 in China and the ten-year Agrarian Revolutionary War that began in
1927. This is our case; we have initiated an agrarian war, and it must be
remembered. That’s why the principal contradiction is against semifeudalism.
However, since there are three fundamental contradictions in Peru, we also
fight against bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism, but not as the principal
one. There has been an objective issue for some time regarding how this has
been changing, and it even seems that the Party-Armed Forces contradiction is
emerging in perspective. In other words, we have considered that there is a
change in contradictions, but the decisive issue remains semifeudalism -
combating feudalism in its general form in Peru remains the principal
contradiction, masses versus semifeudalism, that’s the problem. This is how it
has played out in Peru.
Then
the Chairman says, ‘When a revolutionary civil war develops to the point of
threatening the very existence of imperialism and its running dogs, the
domestic reactionaries, imperialism often adopts other methods in order to
maintain its rule; it either tries to split the revolutionary front from within
or sends armed forces to help the domestic reactionaries directly. At such a
time, foreign imperialism and domestic reaction stand quite openly at one pole
while the masses of the people stand at the other pole, thus forming the
principal contradiction which determines or influences the development of the
other contradictions.’ That’s what needs to happen. So, the issue at hand is
the question of the third point, in the meeting of the Political Bureau of
1990, there we already raised the issue of polarization, this needs to be
looked at, if I remember correctly, I think we also discussed polarization in
the First Plenary Session, we said that polarization is occurring, and that’s
the direction we are heading towards.
So
then, we need to consider the three scenarios presented by the Chairman.
Firstly, when imperialism invades and unleashes aggression without there being
a revolution. This was a predominant case in the previous century, carried out
by all major powers. It still occurs in this century when there is no
revolution, but imperialism, due to its hegemonic conflicts, leads to this
situation. This is how it happens. The second scenario he presents is when
imperialism doesn’t intervene directly but indirectly. In this case, if the
revolution progresses, develops, and ignites a people’s war, how does it do so?
Through armed struggle, specifically agrarian warfare. Why? Because we are
talking about semi-feudal and semi-colonial countries. When discussing the
relationship with imperialism, what we need to emphasize is the semi-colonial
nature of these countries. This is a crucial consideration. The issue with
regards to imperialism is that it’s semi-colonial, and that’s why there is
imperialist dominance – that’s the crux of the matter. The third circumstance
he mentions is when the revolution advances, and imperialism has to intervene.
That’s the problem he’s pointing out. Imperialism intervenes, leading to
polarization. What’s important to note here is that imperialism can intervene
directly by sending a large number of troops, or it can intervene directly as
an advisor with fewer troops. It can even intervene by mobilizing others as a
multinational force or by using puppet regimes, neighboring states with
appetites, to achieve its goals. However, this doesn’t change the fact that
it’s still imperialistic aggression, as it’s ultimately imperialism pulling the
strings. In other words, there are various forms of intervention, and based on
this, the contradictions are defined.
So,
in Peru, we are in the process of polarization, and that’s why the imperialist
question comes into play. How is it intervening today? Through its
low-intensity warfare. Don’t they have advisors? However, its actions will
either increase; they can send in many troops or a few troops and bring in
troops from neighboring countries or send multinational troops. That’s the
problem. And what’s the consequence? It endangers us. And what does endanger
mean? It means moving towards the conquest of power throughout the country.
That’s the danger. Therefore, studying these documents, keeping in mind,
without forgetting for a moment, that the Chairman is already talking about the
anti-Japanese war, which means that the nation-imperialism contradiction is
well-defined, will be very useful for us. We can handle them well, use them to
apply. Later on, we’ll have to analyze other issues to see the polarization
mentioned in Volume 4. It’s not the problem at this moment. So, this serves us
in perspective. This is how we are prepared. Remember that we have been raising
the issue of Yankee aggression and intervention for a long time. All of this
prepares us.”
The
process of polarization raises the two poles at each stage of the revolution
and the change of contradiction. This is about identifying who our main enemies
are and who our friends are. This leads us to the problem of the front of the
revolution, and there is leftism and rightism in the implementation of the
policy to unite all forces that can be united. In the cited document, the
Chairman says:
“Specific
Documentation. (...) On Policy. This text has been agreed to be studied in the
Rectification Campaign, in Volume 2, page 461. The first issue that the
Chairman analyzes here is the change in situation and change in policy, that
is, how the contradiction changes, as we discussed this morning, remember? It
refers to how the contradiction changes; a change in contradiction leads to
changes in policy. This means that just as in China, they shifted from agrarian
warfare to anti-Japanese warfare, it implied a change. Similarly, for us, the
transition towards seizing power implies a shift, a change, the situation
changes, and this leads to changes in policy. And in these changes in policy,
we must always persist in keeping in mind the fundamental characteristics of
the revolution. It says that the Chinese revolution has characteristics; it is
a democratic-bourgeois revolution in a semi-colonial country and a prolonged
revolution. These are the same characteristics that we have. It’s on page 461, very important. On the other hand, the Chairman
tells us that in the struggle in China, in those stages and those changes, in
the agrarian revolution, in the anti-Japanese revolution, or in the agrarian
revolution itself, there are moments that occur of opportunist ‘left’ line
contrary to the opportunist right line. He says we must take this into account,
so both leftism and rightism occur. He says that if one looks at the problem
head-on during the time of Cheng Tusiu, the alliance was everything and the
struggle meant nothing. Cheng Tusiu represents a rightist line, around the year
1927, meaning the alliance with the Kuomintang was everything, and the struggle
meant nothing. However, he says that in the ‘leftist’ line of the agrarian
revolution, the struggle was everything, and the alliance meant nothing. In
other words, while some saw unity, unity without struggle, others saw struggle,
struggle. This phenomenon always occurs, and we must draw lessons from it. This
allows us to analyze our own reality (...).
On
page 464, the Chairman talks about deviations and the development of policy, that
is, how to combat deviations, how to prevent them. He says, ‘To correct the
lop-sided views of many Party cadres on the question of tactics and their
consequent vacillations between ‘Left’ and Right, we must help them to acquire
an all-round and integrated understanding of the changes and developments in
the Party’s policy, past and present.’ Here lies the problem; it’s important.
In other words, the deviations themselves. We need to learn that. That’s what
it says: to forge, to assist, to understand the Party’s policy and the
deviations it has had in the past, and what the current policy is, what
deviations it might have. And why focus on the cadres? Because cadres are the
ones who convey the Party’s policy to the members and, consequently, to all the
masses. ‘In the Kuomintang areas, there are many people who cannot seriously
carry out the policy of having well-selected cadres working underground for a
long period, of accumulating strength and biding our time, because they
underestimate the gravity of the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist policy.’ Why, you
ask? They cannot maintain a Party following those rules of secrecy, compact
organization, selectivity, effectiveness, staying concealed, accumulating
strength, and waiting for the right moment. In other words, why don’t they keep
the Party hidden, secret, with the five necessities when developing their
actions in the cities? Why? Because they don’t understand, they underestimate
the severity of this government’s reactionary policy. That’s the reason; it’s
not for any other. So, the concern is to make them understand. Then he tells
us, ‘...many others who cannot carry out the policy of expanding the united
front,’ another problem, why? ‘because they over-simplify matters and consider
the entire Kuomintang to be quite hopeless and are therefore at a loss what to
do.’ why does he mention the Kuomintang? Because the problem for him was that
the Kuomintang allied with the CPC to pursue an anti-Japanese policy. Our
problem is not like that; it’s not our situation. So, we need to differentiate.
Our problem is how to handle class divergences and how to unite various
classes. But what happens? For example, some think that the national
bourgeoisie should not participate; they think it’s corrupt, it belongs to the
other camp, the opposite camp, that’s what they think. There are various criteria
within the Party that express this. They don’t understand that there can also
be contradictions within the bourgeoisie itself. They don’t understand, they
don’t grasp that, and therefore, they don’t understand how to penetrate them.
And if imperialism directly invades, directly or indirectly with other
international forces, within the bourgeoisie itself, there are individuals who,
out of patriotism, defend the homeland, just like within he upper layers of the
bourgeoisie, what the Chairman called ‘enlightened gentry,’ the very top layers
of the middle bourgeoisie, further their national sense. Our situation is not
like that today, alright, but in the case of the national bourgeoisie, their
incorporation is necessary and not well understood, it gets confused. On the
other hand, I repeat, class divergences are not seen, nor are they
differentiated, nor is it seen how to use these contradictions within the big
bourgeoisie, nor are groups seen, so a single monolithic block is seen, one
must know how to classify, then.
What
happened here, it tells us in the history of the CPC? ‘...those who held such
views used to stress alliance to the exclusion of struggle and overestimate one
of the aspects of the Kuomintang...’ if you look at the history of the Party,
it has always been ‘uniting with the bourgeoisie,’ and with whom? The pretext
for uniting with the national bourgeoisie was essentially to align with the big
bourgeoisie, one of its factions. That is the history of the Party, that is the
history of Peru, until the split in 1965, that was the prevailing criterion;
so, ‘[they] rejected the policy of independence and initiative within the
united front,’ isn’t that the policy they advocate in the frontism we
criticized this morning? That’s it. Well, thus, ‘they did not dare to boldly
expand the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces,’ anti-communists, ‘[nor]
conducting resolute struggle against the Kuomintang’s policy of opposing and
restricting the Communist Party.’ that is the tradition of Peru, that is
frontism, they do not fight decisively with the bourgeoisie; what other
deviation was there? ‘an ultra-Left tendency has cropped up in many places as a
result of the anti-Communist ‘friction’ engineered by the Kuomintang’ an
ultra-left deviation of not uniting due to the frictions that existed,
so they could not unite for the anti-Japanese
struggle; thus, we must always consider ‘rightism’ and ‘ultra-leftism,’ I think
that is what matters most in this case for the Committee (…)”
The Relationship Between the Class Struggle and the
National Struggle
“We do not deny the class struggle, we adjust it.”
- Chairman Mao.
“We
are communists, our goal is communism, but now, why are we fighting? (...) the
objective of the war is to conquer power in order to culminate the Democratic Revolution
and continue it as Socialist.”
- Chairman Gonzalo.
Finally, we quote from the Central Document of the
Third Plenum, page 31:
“On
page 206, Chairman Mao presents to us ‘MAINTAIN BOTH THE UNITED FRONT AND THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE PARTY,’ Once again, he emphasizes the issue of the Front.
What does the Front’s policy demand? It demands the preservation of
ideological, political, and organizational independence, and one should not
waver on that. Those who participate in the Front raise issues, says Chairman
Mao: ‘To speak of unity alone while-denying independence is to abandon the
Principle of Democracy... independence within the united front is relative and
not absolute’ Of course, if it were absolute, there would never be unity. So
here, he analyzes the issue of the Front. Here, on page 207, he tells us that
everything mentioned earlier ‘...The same is true of the relationship between
the class struggle and the national struggle. It is an established principle
that in the War of Resistance everything must be subordinated to the interests
of resistance. Therefore, the interests of the class struggle must be
subordinated to, and must not conflict with, the interests of the War...’ of
course, because it’s war that decides everything; everything is subordinated to
the interests of war. Why? Because that war is aimed at the central task, the
central problem of everything, which is Power, the conquest of Power that will
solve all the issues. Furthermore, war is the primary means to resolve higher
contradictions; everything is subordinated to it. So, when four classes unite,
the interests of all four are subordinated to maintaining the war. But
maintaining the war implies keeping it with its objectives, and the goal of the
war is to conquer Power in order to culminate the Democratic Revolution and
continue it as a Socialist one. That’s the problem. Therefore, we cannot
renounce the class’s interests, its objectives, or its goals. That’s why the
Chairman tells us, ‘But classes and the class struggle are facts, and those
people who deny the fact of class struggle are wrong. The theory which attempts
to deny this fact is utterly wrong. We do not deny the class struggle, we
adjust it.’ So, we start from the perspective that it’s a class front where
these classes contend and fight, but they must set aside their interests in
favor of the common goal, the war. For example, we are communists, and our goal
is communism. But now, why do we fight? To conquer and establish a People’s
Republic of Peru, that’s what we want—the People’s Republic, in other words, to
culminate the Democratic Revolution. And that’s what the peasantry wants, what
the petty bourgeoisie wants, what the national bourgeoisie wants; that’s their
interest. But since we do not renounce the class struggle, we persist and
remain independent ideologically and organizationally to then continue and
lead. And because that interest is the only one that can save all of humanity,
we organize and manage everything in order to achieve that because otherwise,
the other classes cannot be emancipated. That’s how we act, but for each stage,
we have our objectives. That’s why the Chairman says, ‘We do not renounce the
class struggle; what we do is readjust it according to the objectives.”
Long live Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally
Maoism!
Long live the 31st Anniversary of the Speech of
Chairman Gonzalo!
Long live the 95th Anniversary of the foundation
of the Communist Party of Peru!
Celebrate the 130th Anniversary of the birth of
Chairman Mao!
Peru People's Movement
October 2023