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This note (*) is based on quotations and comments that make historical reference to more than a century of development of bureaucratic capitalism in Bolivia, based on a semi -feudal and semi -colonial economy, in order to understand economic policy at their service of the proposals of the candidates and applied by the reactionary governments that have occurred under the command of the Bolivian state in these last 20 years, which has its most recent roots in the latest roots in the latest roots of the previous century. First five years of the present century, so this temporary space will always be taken into account.
Only based on the past and recent history of this economic-social formation can be understood and determine what is the fundamental character of the program implemented by the successive governments and the one proposed by the different candidates in this new 2025 electoral farce, which now enters its second round. In this way we will have the radiography of all of them.
I
Let's start with the programs presented for these elections of the parties that participated in the first round.
Common places and differences
The common place of all of them is that they serve the development of bureaucratic capitalism, that is, of an economy in the service of imperialist interests, what Thyrios and Trojans call "extractivist economy." The axis of the difference is that those of the bureaucratic faction are based on the company and investment of the State and those of the buying faction in the company and particular investment. What those of the bureaucratic faction in the Bolivian case call economy of "socialism of the 21st century" and capitalist economy; Meanwhile, those of the Comprador faction of the great bourgeoisie call "statism" or "direct" and, to which they defend, "market economy."
"Welfare" or "social policy" as we will see in the note (**) in facts cannot be a substantial difference, but only of discourse or how it is presented and managed.
A medium linked to the Comprador big Bourgeoisie (Comprador) faction summarizes or synthesizes the difference from programs, like this:
“Among based proposals and other unacceptable for a fair electoral that defines the future of the country from next August 17, clearly the presence of less state, to continue with the gigantic state or a confessed statism, it is the main brand of difference between the programs registered by the 10 political parties and alliances officially registered before the highest electoral authority of the country.“ (Current, bicentennial, democracy 10 Government programs of 10 candidates For Bolivia 2025 elections, May 2025, Textual® Ideas).
The previous appointment is very illustrative because from its reactionary point of view it defines the fundamental difference in the economic of the different programs presented, that is, among “less state” in the economy (comprador partisans) and what they call “statism” (partiduits of the bureaucratic). "Welfare" or "social policy
Another medium, also linked to the Comprador, establishes the difference between the different candidate by dividing them in the two fields already indicated above based on their economic proposals and also considers their political differences; But, add a useful subdivision in each of the fields, let's read:
“The candidates to be elected president are divided into two groups: the first opposition politicians and the second the ruling that governs the country that in total are ten candidates registered in the Supreme Electoral Court.
According to the classification of comparative economic systems and the economic programs of the parties (PEP) in the electoral race, two are identified: the first six Pro Mercado Economics that in turn is subdivided into three PEM inclined to have a market and a regulatory state (or mixed economy), that is, to seek spaces of complementarity between private activities and the roles that the government has to fulfill Substitute for the State, the second formed by the official party based on government and three parties seeking to continue with a leading economy and state monopoly (or path to socialism) in the economy.
(…) The model and economic policy of direction (or statism, or on the way to socialism), is characterized by the intervention of markets, greater fiscal expense for welfare and creation of public companies, weakened institutionality, incentives declining, lack of clear rules, etc. Stable an adverse climate to production, investment, consumption, exports, imports and employment.
The first pro market declare: normalize the supply of dollars and fuel in a hundred days and another point that it would be in ninety -nine days; close public companies; reduce public spending; negotiate with the IMF; get $ US12,000 million multilateral organisms; save the country; transform the country; decrease tax aliquots and create the entrance tax; modify the distribution of public resources of the central level to the subnational level; solutions at ten points; solutions at seven points; both market as possible, both state and necessary; free market; Transnational companies will come to invest the country, etc. those that defend the leading economy offer import and industrialization substitution, broadband growth, economic diversification, etc. ”
On the offer of the candidates to solve the problems in “one hundred days” or “99 days”, says the analyst we are citing, that this was not fulfilled in the previous century or in this century, therefore does not generate trust, about the governments of the MAS (2006-2025), in this regard, he says:
“(…) In the 21st century since 2006 during the three continuous presidential periods of Mr. Morales, I publicly declared that the country would be like Switzerland, that we have a natural gas ocean, industrialization of lithium, etc. that did not materialize and did not fulfill what President Arce offered with the Plan for Economic and Social Development (PDES) 2021-2025 achieved the results scheduled by 100 percent as happened with public investment as a percentage of GDP that was only 50 percent;
(Economic systems, program, and 2025 elections. The voters have the responsibility to analyze the proposals of the various constitutionally enabled candidates, analyzing their economic programs of the country vision they offer, opinion by Germán Molina Díaz, in La Razón, Thursday, June 26, 2025)
Some critical voices against "extractivism" to which they consider as a clear expression of the current "capitalist" model current and not as bureaucratic capitalism, summarize the proposals of "governors" and "opposition", as well as, of the different factions of the MAS, focusing on the similarities of its electoral economic proposals, with some irony, in this way:
- All candidates carry the economic axis in their government plans.
- The speeches of progress, freedom and overcoming extractivism are recurring, while the candidates themselves carry mineral helmets in their campaigns, appealing to a symbol associated with groups historically benefited by extractivism and neo -extractivism, such as the corporatized mining sector.
- None of the candidates or the candidate mentions alternatives extractivist model.
- The options in the Bolivian electoral race bet on lithium as if it were the golden eggs, reproducing an endless loop of extraction and dispossession. Without taking into account the fall in international lithium prices due to a combination of factors: the increase in supply and deceleration of demand. A volatile and highly speculative market.
II
After the first round of the electoral farce (August 17), there are two candidate, Paz for PDC and Quiroga by ALD, to define the designation of president and vice president, both representatives of the Comprador, so we consider it necessary to illustrate their proposals in base to the summary appointments of two journalistic articles:
1. “In conversation with Eduardo Feinmann on Radio Miter, Paz explained that his proposal seeks to break with the historical logic of state exclusion and bureaucracy that, according to him, keeps the Bolivian economy stagnant.
"85% of the Bolivian economy is informal in union stores, accounting, carriers, merchants ... If you do not deal with the country's informality to create a cheap formality, you are hardly going to rearrange the economy," said the candidate, who insisted that the key is in an inclusive project that leaves behind years of confrontation and division.
“Our project is called‘ Capitalism for all ’, which implies closing a corrupt customs, facilitating national production and creating trade with cheap technologies,” he explained.
For Paz, the difference with Quiroga is central: “He goes for the normal recipe of‘ I go to the International Monetary Fund to achieve twelve billion dollars to reactivate this economy ’in Bolivia there are resources, only that you have to end a tranca state that is consumed 80% of those resources,” he said. He also stressed the need to decentralize powers and build the economy "from the regions." " (Infobae, Aug 19, 2025)
2. “Rodrigo Paz and Tuto Quiroga will face an unpublished presidential ballot on October 19. Both have presented their economic plans, but are they really viable?
International credits
From the Alliance Freedom and Democracy (free), it is proposed to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to request a loan that would range between 5,000 and 12,000 million dollars.
On this proposal, economist Bonadona considers that external financing is urgent. "Because of the volume of needs, both in terms of imports, that is, of the commercial balance, we have payment problems to fuel suppliers, we have to continue importing fuels, we have the big problem of the exchange rate that has been due to the fall of reserves so spectacular that has occurred since 2015".
(...)
He also points out that the possibility of reaching agreements with other financial entities such as the World Bank or the Inter -American Development Bank (IDB) will depend on the success of the efforts with the IMF.
In contrast, the program of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) does not refer to the issue of international credits.
Fiscal discipline
Both programs, both free and PDC, coincide with the need to reduce the fiscal deficit and reduce the size of the State. They also propose to review the functioning of deficit public companies.
However, they differ in regards to large state companies, such as Bolivian fiscal oil deposits (YPFB), the National Telecommunications Company (Entel), the National Electricity Company (ENDE), Bolivian Aviation (BOA), Bolivian Lithium deposits (YLB) and the Minera Corporation of Bolivia (Comibol). At this point, Free proposes to transfer 50% of these companies' shares to citizens of legal age.
On this idea, the economist Mendieta comments that "it has a lot of similarity to the capitalization process in terms of Bolivians being shareholders, in that sense let's say we can do, we must see the legal part."
The economistBonadona agrees and compares it with the capitalization promoted during the first government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. However, he warns that this experience did not work as expected, since the pension fund managers (AFP) did not distribute the actions and "imprisoned them."
50/50: The Paz proposal
Another proposal by Rodrigo Paz is to redistribute the national budget under a 50/50 scheme with the regions. Both economists consider that the idea is interesting, but requires institutional adjustments. " (By Diego Montaño, La Paz / August 21, 2025 in La Razón Plus, Nacional)
The logic of the development of bureaucratic capitalism in Bolivia
-Economic context of the general elections 2025-
As we have advanced when referring to the economic context in which these general elections are held, of great discontent of the masses for the cyclical economic crisis, which happens each time in shorter periods since 2014, in which the export boom of fossil fuels is over, which also increases energy for homes and originates the shortage of dollars in an economy dependent on this currency with the consequent indebtedness for subsidizing them. This is the logic of the development of bureaucratic capitalism for imperialist needs; From a primary export -centered economy, which entails economic growth (BOOM) without development of the country's economy, which entails more delay, what the institutes of imperialism call “a new decade loss” (ECLAC), which added to the previous decade, are “two lost decades” in the present century. You are added to the "loss decade" of the 80s, three decades of more delay in the country. We will see almost at the end how this occurs.
As we have already advanced, the Bolivian economy now crosses a strong economic recession as an expression of the character of its economy: semicolonial and semifeudal on which a bureaucratic capitalism develops at the service of imperialism, mainly Yankee.
And, the above, we do not say only us, but also from its own class perspective imperialist institutes and therefore unsuspected of Maoism, we cite:
“Extractivism has been a central characteristic of the Bolivian economy throughout its history. From the Potosí silver in the colony to hydrocarbons and lithium today, the dependence on the export of natural resources has conditioned the development of the country. This model has brought wealth and progress, at least for some time, and will continue to be a central economic pillar. But, at the same time, it has shaped a vulnerable economy International prices and, especially in recent years, has caused a strong economic recession, while increasingly harmed the environment, climate and many vulnerable groups of society. ”
The previous appointment is from Agramont-Rechín, D. and Seoane, A. (coord.) (2025). Extractivism in Bolivia, debates and alternatives. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, La Paz March 2025, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA).
And about the governments of the MAS, in the publication of Fes-Bolivia, mentioned above, we read:
“The weight of the primary sector in the Bolivian economy has been a recurring theme in our history; the importance of the export of raw materials has marked the history of our country and industrialization has been a commitment raised by different governments on multiple occasions. However, this commitment has not come true in the sense that the predominance of the extraction and export of raw materials in our economy has not changed, on the contrary. Tendency to retreat minimal advances for industrialization of small subsectors. "
Not only, that with the governments of the MAS, the economic situation did not change but worsened, but the government made up the economic data, as commented on the event below:
"According to these data (of the Government), the sector called" Manufacturing Industry "represents about 50% of exports, with a tendency to increase that percentage. It is on the basis of those data that the Government has published the supposed importance of its industrial sector and some degree of success in its commitment to industrialization (Flores, 2022); as well as argument to refute the weight of extractivism in the Bolivian economy (…)
In order to understand that apparent contradiction, let's see in detail the products that make up this relevant manufacturing industry presented by the official data.
(...) gold, tin and soy represent more than 70% of this sector (45.3%, 23.5% and 9%, respectively). In the case of gold and metallic tin, it is assumed that the manufactured product are metal bars. While in the case of products derived from soybeans - observing the most detailed exports data per year - these consist mainly of soybeans and to a lesser extent soy oil (...) it is possible to question the classification of these products as part of an industrialization process and how they make the analysis of the real weight of the primary sector in the Bolivia economy.
The separation of gold and its concentration in bars that are marketed in Bolivia, in most cases involve their amalgamation with mercury and its concentration by gold marketers in rudimentary bars - its refining in bullion with international certifications is not a process that is carried out in Bolivia -, they can hardly reflect an industrialization process; However, they represent 45% of the value of this manufacturing industrial sector. In the case of the metallic tin, its separation and foundry require, without a doubt, of more complex and specialized technical processes, carried out in the foundry of Vinto. This process, although it implies a "staniferous industry", is still a very basic step in a long tin industrialization chain. Something similar can be said of soy cakes.
(…)
An attempt to reclassification of the data - in which this basic processing is included in the primary sector - shows a different panorama.
This reclassification raises the percentage of mining participation to 50%, from 20%hydrocarbons and agribusiness (including meat export) to 20%. Beyond the details of the reclassification process, the aforementioned data does reflect more precisely the reality of exports and show the weight of extractivisms and the primary sector in Bolivia. ” (I environmental sustainability in the primary sector: cases of gold and lithium, Oscar Campanini, extractivism in Bolivia, debates and alternatives, Fes-Bolivia)
The history of a colonial economy from its origins to date
We cite
“With the exception of the 1990s, exports of these resources represented at least 80% of the total Bolivian exports (...). From the colony to the end of the 19th century, the main export product was silver. Then, between 1904 and 1970, the tin represented at least 60% of Bolivian exports. With the beginning of gas exports to Argentina at the beginning of the 1970 Hydrocarbons began to gain prominence and consolidated as the most important in the first decade of the 21st century.
This dependence against specific natural resources has implications in terms of long -term growth. Indeed, although other sectors of the economy may be larger (in Bolivia, for example, agriculture has a larger size either analyzing GDP or employment), the dynamism of the economy tends to be subject to the evolution of the exploitation of non -renewable natural resources. Thus, when the export basket is concentrated in a few products, international markets of the international market usually affect the whole economy.
This fragility against international markets explains the difficulty of natural resources dependent on growth rates that are sustainable in the long term. In the case of the Bolivian economy, three major oscillations highlight throughout the twentieth century (...). Thus, the profits that the economy obtained during the first decades of the twentieth century, the 1940s and the period 1960-1978 vanished during the crises of 1930, 1950 and 1980. Moreover, the levels prior to each of these crises were recovered several years and, even, decades later. ”
Of the same author, that we consign underneath, for its importance to make more sartorial, than the character of the economy of bureaucratic capitalism at the service of imperialism and not of the country, we cite:
"(…) Another widely recognized limitation around the exploitation of natural resources, in general, and non -renewable natural resources, in particular: the difficulties of systematically linking the sector with other sectors of the economy. In other words, the ability to transfer productivity profits generated in the exploitation of natural resources towards the rest of the economy is one of the most important challenges of these economies.
(III Extractivism in the history of Bolivia What does economic history tell us? José Peres Cajías, Fes-Bolivia, 2025, cited)
The above must be completed with what another exhibitor of the same Fes-Bolivia seminar says in IV Brief exposure on some elements around extractivism and institutionality in Bolivia, Guillermo Guzmán Prudencio, but which is generally serves to see the economic cycles of bureaucratic capitalism in Latin America and as with each crisis they always have to start below and that mean many years lost (“lost decades”) We cite:
“If we see the performance of the Bolivian economy in the twentieth century (measured by GDP per capita) we can verify its dependence on extractive economic cycles. It is possible to identify important falls of national production in 1929, 1952 and 1980 (...), these years not only drove to significant recessions, but also, they supposed many years lost, or dedicated to the economic recovery to reach economic recovery falls. If we add all the years that have been lost in Bolivia - in the twentieth century - we have a total of 52 years.”
As we had advanced in the last citations on the history of bureaucratic capitalism we see how the economic cycle of bureaucratic capitalism is given and as they always have to start below, etc., and the last part of the appointments undoubtedly refers to one of the economic reasons of the disputes between the two factions of the great native bourgeoisie.
On the development of bureaucratic capitalism in the Bolivian agriculture
- New concentration process of the agricultural land
- Ther landlord-bureaucratic Stat at the service of imperialism headed with alternation by government of the two factions of the great bourgeoisie
To finish this note, we consign some events of the article Impacts and trends of the agro-industrial model in the lowlands of Bolivia of Carmelo Peralta-Rivero, because it serves to illustrate what we hold in summary in the preceding subtitle, let's read:
„Since in Bolivia there is a dualism in agricultural production, in this work we will focus mainly on the expansion of the agroindustrial model and its relationship it has with the agribusiness and its impact especially in the lowlands of Bolivia, mainly of Santa Cruz where soybeans and other industrial crops have proliferated in recent decades.
The objective of this article is to analyze economic and political changes that drive agribusiness, and the impacts and trends of the expansion of the agricultural border by this production model in the lowlands of Bolivia (…) ”
The article begins with the quantitative description of the phenomenon:
“In the case of Bolivia, agricultural activities and emergence of agribusiness in the 50s, it has been promoting the cultivation of oilseeds such as soybeans, sunflower and other agroindustrial monocultures such as cane, wheat, sesame, sorghum, cotton, etc., all implemented in lowlands, especially in the department of Santa Cruz, represents between 3.95 and 8.58% of agricultural production units (between 33,998 and 73,888 UPA), but cover between 27,471,258.70 and 29,841,992.60 hectares, that is, up to 86.11% of Lands with potential for agricultural exploitation according to the INE (2015).
In contrast, small UPA (with surfaces less than 50 hectares), are usually of the family and indigenous family agriculture, they represent 91.42% (787,720) of the total of UPA, however, they only cover 13.89% (4,812,991.10 hectares) of the agricultural lands with such a potential, although the forest UPA of large extensions of the Low Amazon or Earth of Bolivia is still clear. These units are located throughout the country, although according to the INE (2015) it indicates that they are mainly in the departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosí (Altiplano and Valleles) in more than 60% and later in Santa Cruz and the other departments. The CIPCA-IISEC (2020) according to the 2015 Agricultural Survey and a national projection indicates that the UPA are mainly located in valleys and highlands in more than 70%, in the eastern plains by 20.5%, and the remaining in other large regions, in addition, 55%of the UPA are of family agriculture.
Above all, the UPA of family agriculture supply with food products the domestic market, such as vegetables, tubers, fruits and others; In this way, we can observe that on the one hand, agribusiness is mostly linked to the external market with agro -extractivist practices and family agriculture to the domestic market with practices more sustainable and resilient.
According to the INE (2016) based on the 2013 agricultural census, he reported that there are 502,281 UPA that practice collective or family community and 294,831 UPA participate in the work system called “Mink’a or Ayni” (family reciprocity work system in Quechua or Aymara, respectively).
Bolivia has a surface of 109.9 million hectares of which 51.5 million are wooded (Mmaya, 2013) and are located mainly in lowlands and Yungas (45.28 million hectares until 2017) and, since 1985, this surface decreased by more than 3.6 million hectares (Mapbiomas project Amazon, 2020) mainly by the implementation of crops. industrial and livestock exponentially exponentially the agricultural border. ”
From the conclusions of the article, we cite:
“ (...) How did food agribusiness arose in the lowlands of Bolivia and how economic and political changes led to their extension?; Since its inception, agribusiness was favored and ally of political elites, and many political leaders were and are linked to this sector that for more than 70 years have led and promoted with economic regulations and transformations in different periods that they favored the sector, it always guaranteed them with financial support both nationally and external to the United States in the beginning, as well as the investment of Brazilian businessmen in recent years. Likewise, liberalism and neoliberalism from the mid -80s achieved the definitive concretion of this sector in the lowlands. Since the sector depends on the international market, the tendency of recent years is that it is expanded since it currently has the National Government support becoming the state-capital relationship.
As for the second question:
What are the impacts of the agro -industrial activities of the food sector in the forests for the expansion of the agricultural border in the lowlands?; We conclude that agribusiness has a considerable negative impact on the environment and translates with the loss of large wooded surfaces especially since the 80s and, at present, the agro -industrial ones together with the low -land farmers are the ones that expand the most agricultural border year after year nationwide, being the low and Yungas lands the most affected by losing more than 3.6 million hectares between 1985 2018, and with a total increase of 3.69 million agricultural hectares and pastures. The department of Santa Cruz is the most affected and that is where the national agroindustrial base resides. Likewise, the amplaciation of the agricultural border has a direct relationship with the expansion of agroindustrial crops such as soybeans, as well as the enable of grasslands for livestock. "
The last conclusion shows more clearly as the Bureaucratic faction government drives its enemy the buying faction:
“Finally, regarding what are the future scenarios of expansion of the agricultural border by food agribusiness as a pressure factor on the earth?; that had their impact on deforestation, according to the events of the last Years, we consider that the lowlands of Bolivia will be pressed even more, considering a scenario where the government and mainly the agroindustrials of Santa Cruz have an agreement to expand the agricultural border. Under this analysis, deforestation for the 2040s and 2050s could minimally decupleted with the basis of almost 7.5 million hectares deforested until 2017 and could be of greater magnitude in a scenario where the state-capital relationship is even stronger to agree on the expansion of the agricultural border for agribusiness crops and livestock." (Impacts and trends of the agroindustrial model in the lowlands of Bolivia)
will continue with note (**)