Following
what was announced during his electoral campaign, the new president of the
United States, the ultra-reactionary and genocidal Donald Trump, has imposed a
25% customs tax on exports from Mexico and Canada to the US and a 10% tax on
Chinese exports to its territory by means of presidential decrees, which he has
sought to justify on the grounds of national security (drugs such as fentanyl
and illegal immigration). In order to be able to bypass internal legal norms
and trade agreements with these States and the rules that govern international
law.
It is clear
that with the justification of “national security” he bypasses Congress, which
is in charge of establishing these economic measures as US laws, thus
accumulating more authority in the person of the President. As it has been
doing with its other executive provisions, for example, on immigration, thus
advancing at a rapid pace in the greater reactionary nature of the Yankee
imperialist State through the centralization of power in the president, presidential
absolutism to the detriment of parliament.
The
measures of the North American administration not only imply unilateral taxes
on trade between countries but are true economic sanctions that, although they
appear to be directed against those three countries, hit the exports of other
countries that use Mexico, mainly, and Canada, to a lesser extent, as export
platforms. That is, it hits German exports and those of other countries of the
so-called European Union and China, again. But, it does not only have to do
with trade but with other economic activities, as announced by the Spanish Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bank (BBVA), which says that its banking activity will also be affected.
Trump's
most recent executive order is closely related to the other executive orders or
presidential decrees issued since the inauguration of his second term, such as
the one referring to the repeal of the previous administration's regulations on
electric cars in favor of the production of gasoline or diesel combustion
engine cars. Thus, the European manufacturers of these cars would have also
benefited, just like the US manufacturers. These initial measures affect
exporting companies not only from the named countries but from many others. In
addition, it is expected that the economic measures will be expanded as
sanctions against other countries, especially oppressed countries such as South
Africa. In the case of Mexico, it not only pursues economic objectives but
greater subjugation. The order to militarize the southern border and expand the
number of "criminal" immigrants has served as a "legal
argument" for the protectionist measures.
Yesterday,
the White House announced that President Trump has scheduled a telephone
conversation on Monday morning about customs duties with the Prime Minister of
Canada and, later, with the President of Mexico.
What is he aiming for with these measures?
Donald Trump, the highest representative of
Yankee imperialism, is seeking to negotiate new economic agreements from a
position of strength with Canada and Mexico, as well as with China; but as the
measure directly affects the EU countries, mainly Germany, he is seeking with
this measure to prepare the ground for preferably bilateral agreements with
these countries. Regarding this, it is important to quote from an article
published by the Royal El Cano Institute of Spanish imperialism, the following:
“Seen from
the European Union (EU), this perspective heralds problems. On the one hand,
because we can see that, with all its economic and technological power, it will
seek to divide and weaken the Twenty-Seven by strengthening bilateral relations
with each of them to the detriment of Brussels. To the extent that it cannot
subordinate the whole of the Union to its plans, it will try to feed the
fragmentation that already exists, courting some (with Viktor Orbán and Giorgia
Meloni at the head), while punishing others; All of this with the intention of
contributing to the discredit of a political union project that represents the
opposite of what the magnate advocates. On the other hand, beyond the fact that
his own figure will serve as an example to follow by Eurosceptic and
anti-European actors, determined to dynamite the Union from within, he could be
in charge of supporting them financially so that they can have greater capacity
to promote the same anti-democratic ultranationalism that defines the next
tenant of the White House” (Trum en clave imperial, Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde,
15 Jan 2025).
In the
quote, the author is well informed of the plans of Yankee imperialism as the
sole hegemonic imperialist superpower to divide the European imperialist
alliance under German hegemony and subdue the different countries that make it
up, a Yankee imperialist plan that with Trump takes a sharper and more
belligerent form. But the author of the article is wrong when he wants to limit
the collusion and struggle of the imperialist superpower with the imperialist
alliance of the EU to a personal question of the “convictions of the magnate”.
We do not agree because in this way they want to exonerate Yankee imperialism,
the imperialist State, because by recognizing the role of the individual, in
this case of the imperialist genocidal Trump, as the head of an imperialist
faction, he is the one who embodies this bourgeois-imperialist State in a
centralized Power as the absolutism of the president. Of course, these
independent interests that are presented as an individual's desire or whim, as
the embodiment of the relative independence of the State from society - we
repeat, represented in this case by "the magnate" - are exercised
precisely when Yankee imperialist society is at risk, and it has to strike a
faction or a part of the exploiters who endanger the interests of the whole,
the interest of maintaining the sole hegemony of Yankee imperialism, so that is
precisely when it assumes the class interests of the exploiters and oppressors,
in this case, Yankee imperialism. Regarding Trump's support for
"Eurosceptic and anti-European actors, bent on blowing up the Union",
it is an objective convergence. That is why Musk intervened in German politics
by supporting the AfD candidate.
Chairman Mao said in 1947: “The economic power of American imperialism, which grew during the Second World War, is faced with unstable and shrinking domestic and foreign markets every day. The further contraction of these markets will provoke the outbreak of an economic crisis. The war boom in the United States was only temporary. The strength of the United States is only superficial and transitory. Irreconcilable internal and international contradictions, like a volcano, threaten American imperialism every day. American imperialism is sitting on this volcano.” The long process of collapse, which has tormented American imperialism from then until today, shows the just and correct judgment of Chairman Mao. American imperialism with the new government expresses a greater political decomposition, as part of its process of greater decomposition in all orders.
The principles on which Trump, as the head of Yankee imperialism, is based are the same as those that Zbigniew Brzeziński (Johnson's campaign advisor from 1966 to 1968 and security advisor to US President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981 and consultant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.) set out in his book "The Only World Power (1997)", as the guidelines of the strategy that the United States should follow, among others, which are:
„The main
interest of the United States must be to help ensure that no single power gains
control over (Eurasia) this area of geopolitical importance and that the
world community has unhindered economic and financial access here.
Given the
climate of people on the political horizon of Europe and Asia, any successful
American policy must focus on Eurasia as a whole and be guided by a
geostrategic plan. (…) This requires a high degree of tactics and manipulation
so that an opposition coalition does not form that could ultimately call into
question the primacy of the United States (…).”
THE
INTERIMPERIALIST CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA
With
reference to later comments, we quote from the same institute of Spanish
imperialism the report: “Why does Latin America matter?”, Carlos Malamud, José
Juan Ruiz and Ernesto Talvi (eds.), Report 32 | June 2023, Elcano Royal
Institute - Madrid – Spain www.realinstitutoelcano.org, the part that says:
„ 3.2.
China as a competitor and as a market
China has
become a formidable competitor for emerging economies. Its exports to emerging
countries represent a figure close to the sum of US and EU exports.
However,
the EU and the US remain the main export markets for emerging economies.
The
combined sum of US and EU imports from emerging countries is almost twice as
large as China's imports. Moreover, US and EU imports, taken separately, are
similar and comparable to Chinese ones.
Regarding
China as a competitor and as a market for Latin America, there are two very
different realities.
China is
extremely small as an export market for Mexico and Central America in relation
to the dominant player, the US. 92% of Mexico's and Central America's exports
to the three major economic blocs – the US, EU and China – are destined for the
US.
In South
America, the opposite phenomenon is observed. China is the main destination for
exports with a share greater than that of the EU and the US combined.
As for
imports from China, the share is more evenly distributed between Mexico and
Central America, and shows a similar pattern to that of imports from China to
South America.
3.3. China
as a buyer and seller of primary and manufactured products
As Mexico
and Central America's trade with China is very small in absolute terms and in
relation to trade with the US, this section will focus on South America, where
the contrasts are marked.
What does
China buy and sell to South America? The region is a strong exporter of natural
resources and primary products, of manufactured goods based on natural
resources and agro-industrial products. These represent 80% of total exports,
with China being the main buyer, 37% of the total, and
greater
than the combined sum of the EU and the US.
South
America is a strong importer of manufactured products (70% of the total), with
China being the main seller (35% of the total), equal to the sum of the EU and
the US. If we focus on high-tech manufacturing, China is the main seller to
South America, accounting for 30% of the total,
also more
than the EU and the US combined.
South
America's trade link with China is marked by a strong contrast: it sells
natural resources and primary products (and manufactures from these resources
and products) and buys medium- and high-tech manufactured products. Although
there are segments in the agro-industrial chain and in the industrialization of
natural resources that produce high value-added and sophisticated manufactures,
these are chains that, even in the case of Mexico and Central America, which
primarily export industrial products to the US, import a quarter of their
medium- and high-tech manufactures from China.
To whom
does South America sell the little it exports of high value-added and
sophisticated manufactured products? 50% to the US and the EU and only 6% to
China.
…
3.4. China
as an investor
Although
anecdotal evidence suggests that Latin America is being invaded by an avalanche
of Chinese investments in infrastructure and other strategic areas, to ensure
supplies of natural resources and food, the data speak of a different reality.
First, Latin
America is the emerging region with the lowest direct investment from China and
its FDI stock barely exceeds 1% of GDP.
Second,
China's investment stock only exceeds 5% of GDP in one country, Panama.
Third, the
sum of the investment stock in Latin America of the EU and the US is 20 times
greater than the stock of Chinese investments.
It can be
argued that the accumulated stocks reflect the past, but not the present or the
future. The sum of investment projects and M&As originated predominantly in
the US and EU, and although China has a larger share of FDI flows than of
stocks, those of the EU and the US were five times higher. FDI flows over the
past 10 years have also seen an increase in the US share relative to the EU.
3.5. China
as a lender
As with
investment, the narrative suggests that China is not only playing a predominant
role as a bilateral lender to countries in the region, but is also competing as
a provider of finance with multilateral institutions, in particular the IMF and
the World Bank.
Once again,
the data reflect a very different reality.
First,
Latin America is the emerging region, along with South Asia, with the lowest
levels of indebtedness to China.
Second,
China's stock of bilateral loans, including its Development Banks, which are
its main source of external financing, only exceeds 5% of GDP in Venezuela,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Suriname, Guyana, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Dominica.
Third,
Chinese bilateral loan flows and stocks have consistently declined since 2017
following the sharp slowdown in China's growth rate and debtor countries'
payment difficulties that forced China to grant multiple debt restructurings
and forgiveness.
The result
of China's reduced lending to Latin America and the increased lending from the
IMF and the World Bank during the pandemic was that its share as a creditor has
been reduced to represent only 11% of the sum of total lending to the region
from the IMF, the World Bank, the Paris Club, and China.
If we
include the bonds that Latin America issues under international jurisdiction,
85% of which are in Western jurisdictions (mostly New York and London), China's
share of total loans to the region falls to 3%.
3.6. China
in the military field
In the
military field, China's influence is practically non-existent.
Latin
America's arms purchases from China are not only the lowest among all emerging
regions; thus, in 2020 and 2021, no purchases were recorded. In that biennium,
arms purchases were made in the EU and the US, with a strong contrast between
Mexico and Central and South America.
90% of
Mexico's and Central America's arms purchases were made in the US, and almost
60% of South America's were made in the EU, a ratio of four to one with the US.
3.7. China
and Latin America: tourism, higher education and migration
As regards
interpersonal ties with Latin America, the superiority of the Western blocs is
overwhelming.
In Mexico
and Central America, the predominance of the US is almost exclusive. More than
90% of tourism is to and from the US. 60% of university students from Mexico
and Central America who study abroad do so at US universities (Figure 34f), 97%
of migrants live there, and 97% of remittances from immigrants from Mexico and
Central America to their countries of origin have the same origin.
In South
America, the EU plays a leading role. 56% of tourism to South America comes
from the EU and 52% of South American tourism is destined for the EU. 60% of
South American university students who study abroad do so at European
universities and 50% of South American migrants live in the Union (Figure 34g).
As a result of the latter, a similar percentage of remittances originate in EU
countries.
And the
report on the cited part concludes:
„Conclusions
In just 30
years, China has become a giant of the global economy,
comparable
in size to the US and the EU, and it is natural that it has gained weight in
global
trade. But, despite the formidable growth of its share in the
world GDP
and in trade, China is underrepresented in all areas:
as an
export market for medium and high sophistication products, in
FDI and in
financial, human and military relations.
The EU and
the US remain the dominant players in Latin America, with
Mexico and
Central America strongly linked in all areas to the US and
South
America being “more European”, except in the commercial area.
When the
data is carefully analyzed, the prejudice does not hold up. Neither the EU nor
the US have
abandoned Latin America, nor is China the dominant player in the
region".